State building at the expense of political community? The construction of citizenship in the urban space of Dili, Timor Leste

Source: photograph taken by the author

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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Development Planning Unit, UCL

August 2015

I, Alix Valenti, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Signed:…….

Abstract

Despite an increasing number of international state building interventions in post-conflict countries in the past decade, the prolonged economic, social and political issues plaguing the development of these countries into peaceful states has brought increased attention on the inability of the institutions carrying out these interventions to learn from their past mistakes. The following research contends that one of the main issues at the root of such failures, lies in international state building interventions framing the (re)construction of state institutions around the notion of an ideal-type state that is ahistorical and inherently detached from the society it is meant to govern. Instead, this research argues, state building and political community construction are two distinct processes, which have historically come to be contingent upon each other with the territorialisation of the state; as such, for state building to be successful, it needs to focus on the establishment of state institutions capable of promoting, within the territory, a sense of citizenship that will facilitate the emergence of a political community upon which state sovereignty and legitimacy rest. In this light, using the case study of Dili, the capital of Timor Leste, this research seeks to demonstrate that urban spaces are particularly pertinent contexts to explore the relationship between state building and political community. It begins by outlining the impact of the state building process on the shaping of state institutions, between 1999 and 2012, and the type of policies emerging from such institutions. It then moves on to the analysis of social cohesion in two case study areas, highlighting how the implementation of state policies on widely diverse urban fabrics – shaped by different economic, social, political and historical dynamics – results in different scales and spaces of polity construction.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB – Asian Development Bank

AMP - Aliança Maioria Parlamentar

AusAid – Australian Aid

Apodeti - Associação Democratica de Timor

ASDT - Social Democratic Timorese Association

CAVR - Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation

CIVPOL - UN civilian police

CMAT - Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea

CNRM - National Council of Maubere Resistance

CNRT - National Council of Timorese Resistance

CPA - Coalition Provisional Authority

CPRN - Canadian Policy Research Network

DFO – District Field Officer

ETTA - East Timor Transitional Administration

FALINTIL - Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste

FDI – Financial Direct Investment

F-FDTL – FALINTIL Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste

FRETILIN - Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente

GDS – General Directorate of Statistics

ICJ – International Court of Justice

IDP – Internally Displaced Person

IFI – International Financial Investment

IMF – International Monetary Fund

INTERFET - International Force East Timor

IOM – International Organisation for Migration

ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

JAM – Joint Assessment Mission

JICA – Japanese International Cooperation Agency

MDG – Millennium Development Goals

MoF – Ministry of Finance

MTB-MLE - Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education

NDP – National Development Plan

NC – National Council

NCC – National Consultative Council

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

NSP – National Strategic Plan

ODA – Overseas Development Assistance

OECD – Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development

POLRI - Indonesian National Police

PNTL – Policia Nacional Timor Leste

SAP – Structural Adjustment Programme

SEFOPE – Secretaria de Estado para a Politica de Formacao Professional e Emprego

SIP – Strategic Investment Programme

SoN – State of Nature

TAF – The Asia Foundation

TLPDP - Timor-Leste Police Development Programme

UDT - União Democratica Timorense

UN – United Nations

UNAMET - United Nations Mission in East Timor

UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNICEF – United Nations Children Fund

UNMIK - United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNPOL – UN police

UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration to East Timor

U.S – United States

WWII – World War II

WB – World Bank

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The completion of this long journey would not have been possible without the professional and personal support of many people.

Firstly, my family for providing endless emotional support and for never having doubted – even when I did – that I would make it to the finish line. I owe much of my sanity, also, to my amazing friends around the world, who have shown sustained interest in my research, have put up with all my stories and have always been there to share both good and bad times. Particular thanks do go to Vanessa Foo, Clemence Marcelis, Nicolo Alberti, Virginia Stephens and Stephane Clair for being my 'homes away from home' during the writing process.

The fieldwork in Timor Leste has been the beginning of a great many personal and professional relationships. A heartfelt thank you to Joao Boavida, of CEPAD, for giving me an office to work from and sharing his many valuable insights on Timorese history and politics. To Tracey Morgan for being my first Timorese home and an endless source of contacts before, during and after the field. Michael Leach and Damian Grenfell, for sharing their knowledge and interest on Timor Leste's politics, but also for keeping my motivation and spirits high by taking a great interest in my topic and encouraging me academically and professionally. Last but not least, I want to thank again all the interviewees who shared their knowledge and stories, making this research possible and fascinating.

A warm thank you also to all my closest friends in Timor Leste, who made the long distance away from home feel easier to bear – especially Fiona Liongue, Fanny Coussy and my housemates Eva Hall and Simon Braxton.

This work would have never been possible without my interpreter in the field, Angela Tavares de Jesus. A warm thank you for your professionalism in all circumstances, your patience and feedback during interviews and for lighting up the fieldwork with your sunny personality.

Finally, I consider myself lucky to have been able to draw on the constant support and knowledge of not one but two supervisors, Camillo Boano and Michael Walls. Thank you both for putting up with my moods and for never letting me give up, even halfway across the world.

NOTE ON TIMORESE TERMS

Timor Leste has a large number of languages and dialects, however one language in particular has emerged to facilitate communication across the island: Tetun. As such, upon independence Tetun was made, along with Portuguese, the *lingua franca* of the country.

There are two varieties of Tetun. Tetun 'Terik' is spoken mainly along the border with West Timor and some areas on the South coast, but its use is not widespread across the territory (Williams-van Klinken, 2003; p.xiv). The other type is referred to alternatively as 'Tetun Dili', 'Tetun Prasa' or just 'Tetun'; it has evolved from Tetun Terik but has become so influenced by Portuguese that the two now bear fewer resemblances (ibid). The kind learned by the author during her stay in Timor Leste is Tetun Dili, for ease of communication with a wider variety of people, and it is the kind used in this thesis when referring to Tetun words.

Tetun, however, has remained an oral language until very late into Portuguese colonisation. There are no certain sources as to who and when it began developing as a written language, but the author's conversations with various people appear to point to Portuguese missionaries, who used to teach in schools. It has since then continued to evolve, but many different influences have resulted in a lack of "generally accepted standard spelling" (ibid; p.279). As a result, it is common to notice differences between official Timorese documents and newspapers, or across the literature on Timor Leste, especially in relation to the "glottal stop" (ibid): for example "this" can be spelled *nee* or *ne'e* (ibid).

For ease of pronunciation and spelling, the author has made the choice to use the spelling **not marking** the glottal stop and the spelling most common across the literature she used. The following Tetun words appear in the text: *liurai*, the traditional Timorese ruler; *lia nain*, the traditional elder; *suco/suku*[1] and *aldeia*, Timorese administrative divisions; and, *xefi suku/aldeia*, 'chiefs' of the administrative divisions.

[1] *Suco* will be used when explaining the Portuguese colonial rule, but *suku* will be used throughout the rest of the text

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

“Each man’s life involves the life of all men, each tale is but the fragment of a tale”

(Stephen Vizinczey, 1984)

1. Introduction

The worldwide interconnectedness, brought on by globalisation of people, capital, goods and services, has led in the past decades to an increased focus by international institutions on a wide variety of interventions in conflict affected countries. From the implementation of the Marshall Plan after the second world war, through conditional financial assistance provided to post-conflict states, to state building processes and international transitional administrations, it has become evident that in the past century the provision of post-conflict reconstruction assistance has moved well beyond the sole realm of international relations. The necessity to restore security, not only in post-conflict countries, but within the international order as well, has shifted international attention to the belief that, "security, development and good governance are the heart of a virtuous circle that produces a legitimate and capable state" (Goodhand, 2014; p.1), therefore placing state building processes also in the realms of political and social sciences.

Yet, despite number of state building interventions in the past decades – in countries such as Timor Leste, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq – and the increasing budgets they are associated with, the harsh reality that decades after these interventions those countries continue to be subject to internal struggles, that characterise their institutions and plight their development, begs the question of why these interventions have failed. Indeed, continued unrest in Iraq – now further aggravated by the presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – or the emergence of parallel administrations established by Kosovo Albanians and Serbs as international institutions delayed the implementation of national level authority in Kosovo (Lemay-Hébert, 2009; p.31), are but two examples that contribute to shine light on the fact that, despite governance and legitimacy clearly pertaining to the political and social realms that define state-society relations, international state building processes have failed to engage with either of these fields.

In response to these failures, the past few years have seen an increasing amount of literature highlighting the importance, for state building processes, to complement efforts at state level with in depth understanding of the societal dynamics that make up the context within which these processes take place (Beall, Goodfellow and Rodgers, 2011; Chandler, 2012; Fregonese, 2012; Jones, 2012, 2010 & 2013; Lemay-Hébert, 2009 & 2011; Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2007, 2013 & 2014). They call upon international actors to acknowledge their inability, thus far, to

create legitimate post-conflict institutions capable of promoting and maintaining liberal peace within their territory, and recognise that assisting in the construction of state institutions implies "engaging with state theory […] to understand what states are, how they are formed and transformed and what factors lead to their stability and fragility" (Jones, 2013; p.70). For instance, Oliver Richmond (2007; 2013; 2014) and Sara Fregonese (2012) use the contexts of Cambodia, Timor Leste, Kosovo and Lebanon to argue that a blank slate approach to the establishment of Western-style liberal democracy, in post-conflict countries, often leads to the development of hybrid institutions where customary forms of governance and authority co-exist with the new institutions, generally undermining the legitimacy of the new state.

In this context, this research is interested in exploring the impact of exogenous state building processes on the more endogenous dynamics of political community construction. Drawing from a historical account of the development of international post-conflict reconstruction assistance since 1945, this research contends that the liberal peace ideal, at the heart of the emergence of state building, originally placed a significant emphasis on democracy as a process for developing strong domestic institutions capable of "promoting the empowerment of the unorganised, the poor and the marginalised" (UN Security Council, 1992; p.21) to create a political community. The relationship between the state and its political community, it was argued, would bring "the social stability needed for productive growth" (ibid), akin to the way in which Western liberal democratic states have developed and thrived. However, using a review of the literature on state formation and social contract theory, this research seeks to demonstrate that the framework within which state building interventions are designed moves away from the ideal-type state at the core of the liberal peace project; instead, this research argues, the territorial states (Agnew, 1994; p.63) resulting from state building processes are ahistorical and decontextualised, removed from the daily realities of their citizens, and failing to reflect anything of the identity, expectations and political aspirations of the many different social identity groups sharing these countries' territory (Neves, 2012). **The aim of this research is to explore how the disconnection, between the states emerging from international state building and the societies they are intended to govern and control, can potentially undermine the successful outcomes of the state building process itself by failing to**

create the conditions for the development of a post-conflict political community.

Understanding how international state building processes may affect the ability of new states to build a political community within their territory out of a wide variety of – at times conflicting – local polities, however, requires the articulation of an analytical framework that can weave the complexities of local polity building with the multiple scales and spaces at which state institutions do – whether positively or negatively – influence citizens' daily interactions within the territory. It requires a context where the role of institutions and systems in creating and reproducing inequalities across individuals and groups (World Bank, 2011; p.11) can be analysed to understand its effects on the development of social cohesion and political community from the local scale to the scale of the state's territory. Post-conflict urban environments, this research argues, are particularly suited for understanding these dynamics, for the infrastructural and structural challenges facing war-torn countries are further accentuated by the rapid urbanisation brought on by a sudden surge in economic opportunities, resulting in the emergence of stark socio-economic inequalities and spatial contrasts. For example, Kabul, Afghanistan's capital, "used to be an egalitarian city" (Rasmussen, 2014), but the past ten years have seen an increase in inequalities that have redesigned the capital's urban spaces in ways that make it "clear to ordinary people how egregiously wealthy some people are" (ibid).

The importance of urban spaces as presenting both theatres of violence and opportunities for building sustainable peace, has been increasingly recognised in urban development and urban planning literature (Anderson 2010; Bickford, 2000; Bollens, 1998, 2001 & 2007; Esser, 2004 & 2013). They contend that a combination of liberal public policy decision-making in political, economic and social matters, combined with urban planning strategies that are either absent – leading to uncontrolled growth – or divisive – if ethnic differences have been institutionalised – contribute to creating "rigid boundaries on highly amorphic and dynamic spaces inhabited by different groups" (Esser, 2004; p.2). These spaces, in turn, contribute to the development of different social identities that can – and often do – run counter to the image of territory-wide political community promoted by the state. Daniel Esser (2013; p.3085) uses the example of Kabul to explain how international state building in Afghanistan contributed to the establishment of liberal market-driven urban planning that, "instead of resulting in greater political

and economic participation […] exacerbated local tensions and furthered economic and political exclusion".

The introduction of urban space within the research's analytical framework therefore provides the nexus between state territory and the local, between the state institutions that emerge out of the state building process and the impact of their policies on the spaces and scales of interaction that shape the construction of the political community. Indeed, the political community related to the state, this research argues, is the result of a long process of social construction carried out by state institutions, which have penetrated society so as to enable and facilitate people's recognition of their belonging, from the local scale to the scale of the state territory, to more than one polity (Kearns and Forrest, 2000; p.1002). It is therefore the ability of state institutions to create spaces of daily interaction between different groups of people – through policies promoting equal access to political, social and economic opportunities – that determines the construction of a political community, for "the spatial relations built into modern life cannot be thought of as primarily a reflection of desired social relations, […] they also produce and form those relations" (Bickford, 2000; p.366) through spaces of inclusion and exclusion.

Consequently, focusing on state institutions' ability to foster their own legitimacy and sovereignty within a given territory, this research seeks to bridge the gap between the pervasive focus on macro-structures at the heart of international literature and the more micro bias characterising urban planning literature. The analytical framework it develops, puts urban spaces at the centre of an analysis of social cohesion within different and often contrasting spaces of interaction emerging from state policies. In doing so, it highlights the importance of analysing the different historical, political and socio-economic contexts, within which state policies are implemented, so as to articulate the relationship between a social group's organisational characteristics, the urban environment resulting from state policies and the ensuing spaces and scales of interaction that contribute to defining the group's polity.

This research seeks to analyse the impact of state building on political community in post-conflict urban environments by answering the following **three main research questions**:

- How do international state building practices affect the nature of post-conflict state institutions?
- How do the policies emanating from these institutions affect the core functions of the state?
- How does the relationship between the urban environment emerging from state policies and social cohesion affect the spaces and scales of socially constructed polities?

As the main research questions highlight, the emphasis of this research lies in exploring the dynamics and impacts at play between the complex realities of globalisation pressures, national post-conflict reconstruction imperatives, urban liberal development priorities and local polity construction. As such, the methodology used for understanding these processes was that of undertaking an in depth fieldwork in a selected case study to gather the data necessary in order to substantiate the arguments made in the literature and framework chapters of this thesis. Two areas of research were selected, where interviews based on open-ended questions were carried out to include a wide variety of views from different groups – gender, employment status, employment sector, level of education, age group. The aim of the case study research was not that of going into an in-depth analysis of a select number of issues unique to the selected country; rather, it sought to understand whether multiple variables pertaining to the state building process have affected the case study country and how. This methodological choice was motivated by a commitment to test the purpose and strengths of the analytical framework, and ensure that it can be applied to other contexts, thus expanding a theoretical field.

The case study country chosen for the purpose of this research was Timor Leste. Branded as 'the twenty-first century's newest nation', Timor Leste became an important milestone in the field of international state building because upon emerging, in 1999, from twenty-five years of Indonesian military rule – preceded by 400 years of Portuguese colonial administration – it became one of the first countries – alongside Kosovo – to experience full United Nations (UN) transitional administration. That is, for two years, from 1999 to 2002, Council Resolution 1272 entrusted the UN "with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor", thus empowering it "to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the

administration of justice" (UN Security Council, 1999; p.2), whilst at the same time preparing the new country for democratic self-governance by providing the support necessary to build the new state institutions. Endowed with such extensive mandate, it was therefore inevitable that the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) would have far reaching consequences on the nature of the new state institutions and, consequently, Timor Leste's long-term ability to govern itself.

This became evident as a crisis of state legitimacy nearly brought the country to its knees in 2006 and forced its first government to step down. Indeed, sparked by protests from a group of soldiers demanding better living conditions in their barracks, the 2006 crisis very quickly turned into a political protest against the way in which the establishment of the police and the military forces had been handled during UNTAET. The progressive involvement of the country's opposing political elites in the crisis, by promoting a divisive 'East/West Timor' discourse rooted in pre-independence political differences, further highlighted a series of mistakes made by the transitional administration in the establishment of the state system, which contributed to institutionalising political differences in the country's state building process. Finally, as the crisis turned into a full blown national riot, resulting in the displacement of approximately 150,000 people (IOM, 2012; p.16), it became evident that what was at stake was not merely an institutional issue; rather, more pervasive structural and endemic issues were resurfacing as a result of those institutional problems, creating deep divisions in a society believed to have become strongly unified by the struggle against Indonesian rule.

The capital of the country, Dili, played an important role throughout the development of the crisis. At the heart of political and economic decision-making since Portuguese colonial rule, Dili has developed into Timor Leste's most significant urban area and became the focus, upon independence from Indonesia in 1999, of most of the political, economic and social development of the country. As such, between 2004 and 2010 the number of people originally from the districts living in the capital has increased by 37%, making it home to 21% of the country's population (NDS, 2013) and transforming it into the most diverse urban space of Timor Leste. However, despite the strains that such fast urbanisation has put on urban infrastructure and services, the development of the urban space has remained uncontrolled and has come to be characterised by deep contrasts between areas that have managed to become part of the liberal state project and those have remained at the margins. Consequently, the concentration of structural,

endemic and political issues in Dili has resulted in much of the 2006 violence, destruction and displacement, taking place in the capital.

Therefore, Dili provided an ideal setting for testing the multiscalar and multidimentional analytical framework developed in the context of this research. The fact that a population, initially strongly bounded by its fight for independence, could so quickly identify with divisive political discourses and descend into violence indeed begged many questions as to the extent to which international state building processes affected the country's state institutions, and the impact of these institutions' decisions on widely diverse historical, political and socio-economic spaces. This research aims to address these questions by testing the analytical framework in two selected areas in Dili, Liriu and Metin IV, where contrasting histories of development, violence and socio-economic characteristics have shaped strongly contrasting urban fabrics. Starting with an understanding of the international state building processes that Timor Leste has undergone since the arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th century, the empirical research subsequently provides an analysis of the impact of these processes on the construction of the country's new state institutions. On that basis, it then moves on to analyse social cohesion in the two selected areas to draw the link between international state building and the processes of local polity construction at play in widely contrasting urban spaces between 1999 and 2012.

To this end, this thesis begins, in chapter 2, with a historical account of the development of international post-conflict reconstruction assistance in order to highlight the importance of liberal peace within the state building process. It subsequently reviews the literature on state formation and social contract theory as the basis for understanding how state building's ahistorical approach to its ideal-type state affects the construction of a political community in post-conflict countries. It does so by using the notions of territory, sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship previously highlighted as underpinning the relationship between state and political community.

Chapter 3 draws from the conclusions of chapter 2 in order to develop the analytical framework for this research. It articulates the relationship between the state and the political community around the notion that states only become actual objects if the spaces and scales of local polity construction successfully shape citizens' virtual representations of belonging to a political community. It

subsequently introduces social cohesion to facilitate a multidimentional and multiscalar analysis of the political, economic and social dynamics that affect the construction of these virtual representations through the development of citizenship within different urban contexts.

Chapter 4 discusses the methodology used for testing the analytical framework with empirical research. It outlines the objectives of the research, the theoretical approaches that have guided the research methods and the research methods.

Chapter 5 begins by providing a historical understanding of the way in which Portuguese colonisation and Indonesian rule have contributed to shaping the citizenship, legitimacy, sovereignty and territory of Timor Leste. Subsequently, using the same analytical lenses, the chapter moves on to analysing the extent to which UN decision-making within the post-independence state building process failed to understand and address the impact of the territorial, societal and political legacies highlighted previously on Timor Leste's state and society.

Chapter 6 explores how the decision-making processes outlined in the previous chapter have contributed to shaping Timor Leste's institutional design. It does so by looking at the new state's ability to fulfil four of its core functions: administrative control, legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, management of public finance, and investments in human capital.

Chapter 7 provides an analysis of social cohesion in the two selected case study areas in Dili to understand how the urban fabric emerging from different political, social and economic dynamics has contributed to shaping contrasting spaces and scales of citizenship.

Finally, chapter 8 concludes this thesis with an analysis of the impact of international state building on the construction of a polity in Timor Leste at local, urban and national level. It then moves to identifying how these findings contribute to validating the research's analytical framework as a tool for understanding the impact of state building on the construction of political community, as well as highlighting areas for further research.

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW

"And if these difficulties, whose essence we share, hinder us, it is understandable that the rational talents on this side of the world, exalted in the contemplation of their own cultures, should have found themselves without valid means to interpret us. It is only natural that they insist on measuring us with the yardstick that they use for themselves, forgetting that the ravages of life are not the same for all, and that the quest of our own identity is just as arduous and bloody for us as it was for them"

(Gabriel Garcia Marquez, 1982).

2. Literature review

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the ahistorical, ideal-type understanding of the notion of state, that characterises state building interventions, stands in stark contrast with the history of state formation these interventions are actually modelled on. It begins with an account of the development of post-conflict reconstruction assistance – from the Marshall Plan after World War II (WWII) to UN transitional administration in the past decade – to demonstrate that the rationales, timetables and institutional contexts framing state building interventions are strongly focused on the reconstruction of state institutions, while scant attention is paid to the society these new institutions are meant to govern.

Taking, as a starting point, the notion of liberal peace underpinning state building interventions, this chapter subsequently seeks to highlight how the dissociation between state and society characterising these interventions is at odds with the ideal-type Western state the liberal peace process is modelled on. It begins with a review of the literature on state formation and social contract theory, in order to illustrate the importance of the relationship between the state and its political community in the development and sustainability of state institutions. On this basis, the chapter then moves on to demonstrating how state building internventions' use of the ideal-type Western state, when abstracted from its historical context, can significantly harm the mutually constitutive relationship between state and political community, therefore risking to severely undermine the sustainability of their own objectives.

2.1. From financial assistance to state building – changes in the post-conflict reconstruction rationale since 1945

The following section provides a historical account of the development of international post-conflict reconstruction assistance since 1945. Starting with the Marshall Plan implemented in Europe after WWII, this section provides an account of the evolution of international post-conflict reconstruction within changing geopolitical contexts. In doing so, it highlights the shifts in these interventions' paradigms, which have moved from straightforward financial assistance to increased interference in the reconstruction of state institutions based on liberal democratic rule and market oriented economics.

2.1.1. The Marshall Plan – territorial sovereignty and state planning

The Marshall Plan is widely referred to in the literature (Chesterman, 2005; Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Woodward, 2011) as the first most important international post-conflict reconstruction effort[2].

Conceived and managed by the United States (U.S) in the aftermath of WWII, it aimed at granting and loaning money to European states to assist them in rebuilding their economy and infrastructure; reconstruction efforts were centrally planned by the states, with little interference from the U.S in the decision-making processes if not for a desire to establish new market relations with Europe. Therefore, the Plan's key characteristic lain in the fact that the sovereignty of each state benefitting from financial support was to remain unconditional, and as allies' reconstruction efforts were carried out within the pre-war state system, the legitimacy of the state within its territory also remained intact.

The implementation of the Marshall Plan also marked a turning point in the international state system. Indeed, whilst "for many in both the U.S and Britain 'reconstruction' meant *domestic* reconstruction" (Williams, 2005; p.544), the aim of this international effort was to cement international political and economic state relations for the creation of a "new world that was hopefully to emerge from the ashes of the old" (ibid; p.549). Therefore, the emphasis put on the importance to create an international political and economic system led to the birth of the United Nations from the ashes of the League of Nations created in the aftermath of WWI in 1920. Its main aim was to maintain or broker peace in the world through the mediation of a wider variety of international interests.

The particular focus of the Marshall Plan on the importance of developing good economic relationships between countries set a precedent for the evolution of post-conflict reconstruction assistance within a framework revolving around the need to "ensure political stability while promoting a liberal economic world order" (Chomsky 1999 in Barakat, 2010; p.13), as already developed in the U.S. The influence of this approach transpires clearly throughout the next phase of international post-conflict reconstruction assistance within the context of liberation wars, in the wake of WWII.

[2] Williams (2005) argues that the Marshall Plan is actually not the first international effort in post-conflict reconstruction to have taken place in the new international state system – WWI also saw considerable efforts taking place for intra-state support in reconstruction. However, the Marshall Plan remains the most elaborate first programme, and is therefore taken here as the starting point to international post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

2.1.2. Wars of liberation – increased international economic intervention

Weakened by the destruction of WWII and the resulting post-conflict reconstruction efforts, maintaining colonies across South America, Africa and Asia became a heavy burden on European countries' financial and human resources, especially as number of these colonies took advantage of such weakening to spark revolts against the colonisers, thus requiring even more resources (Encyclopaedia Britannica[3]). Furthermore, political support for colonial projects also became increasingly scarce as the two emerging superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, took official positions against colonialism (ibid). As a result, the colonisers began withdrawing from their colonies, opening up a new process of state formation, in the period between 1945 and 1989, rooted in the construction of identity around colonial and liberation collective memory.

During the same period, mounting tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union took shape in the form of the Cold War and materialised, upon implementation of the Marshall Plan, into a division of the world order: on one side, Western European countries brought under American influence; on the other, communist regimes of Eastern Europe the Soviet Union was determined to maintain control over (ibid). In the context of this ideological chasm – commonly referred to as 'the iron curtain' – international post-conflict reconstruction took on a new meaning: delivered by one of the two super powers, and driven by declared allegiances with either side of the iron curtain, international assistance in response to liberation wars became a playing field for the ideological battle between the U.S and the Soviet Union, wherein each sought to increase the number of allies.

Much like the Marshall Plan, post-conflict reconstruction delivered during the Cold War to countries allied with the Western block was essentially of a liberal economic nature; it was based on the assumption that, as had been the case for Western Europe, by providing states with loans targeted at developing national infrastructure, and strongly encouraging the adjustment of the local economy for export (Barakat, 2010; p.18), development would automatically take place thus bringing about the societal changes necessary to ensure peace and stability. However, contrary to the Marshall Plan, and despite apparently respecting state sovereignty, the participation of the countries that were receiving financial

[3] Encyclopeadia Britannica – 'Decolonization' (accessed 28/07/14): http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/155242/decolonization

assistance was sought essentially in terms of state implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) devised by international financial institutions (IFIs) – such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – and to which strong conditions of economic and political reforms were attached (ODI, 1992; p.2). Indeed, anchored in a belief that the political nature of decision making strongly affects economic choices in a society (Drazen, 2000; p.5), the main characteristic of these SAPs was the promotion of the liberal ideals of "macroeconomic stability, reduction of the role of the state, the squeezing of collective and public space, a quest for private affluence, and a reliance on privatisation and on exports and foreign investment to stimulate economic growth" (Pugh, 2005; p.25).

In opposition to Western liberal ideals, under the Soviet system post-conflict reconstruction was delivered in return for the establishment of strong communist rule. This implied supplying the USSR with machinery and raw materials to contribute to a reconstruction programme mainly focused on heavy industry, at the expense of agriculture and consumer goods (Curtis, 1996).

Consequently, though not directly intervening on the nature of post-conflict state institutions, post-conflict reconstruction efforts during the Cold War already emphasized a strong desire to influence states' internal affairs.

2.1.3. New Wars – from SAPs to liberal peace

a) The emergence of the New Wars

The implementation of the SAPs was firmly grounded within a framework that took the state, as it had developed and consolidated in Western Europe, as "an idealised decision-making subject" (Agnew, 1994; p.63) in the process of post-conflict reconstruction. It ran on the assumption that what had worked under the Marshall Plan – that is, strong economic reforms in countries run by democratic states – would have similar positive outcomes if the conditions of liberal economic and political reforms, attached to the loans, were implemented. Such assumption, however, failed to account for the fact that, as opposed to Western countries, states that have come into being through decolonisation have acquired their boundaries and sovereignty from the outside, "without the same internal forging of

mutual constraints between rulers and ruled" (Tilly, 1985; p.186)[4]. These territories, therefore, acted as containers for a wide variety of different, and at times competing, social identities that had not, however, been renegotiated into a wider social identity through the process of delimiting territorial boundaries. Post-conflict reconstruction, therefore, failed to view the state in its historical particularity.

The consequences of the ahistorical (Agnew, 1994; Dinnen, 2008; Isin, 2007; Selby 2007) approach to the state in these countries became apparent as the Cold War drew to an end in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin wall. With the end of the Iron Curtain, the withdrawal of U.S' and U.S.S.R's financial and technical assistance from their allies, left behind weak institutions that struggled to deal with the insecurities associated with globalisation's strong market driven global economy. As these countries opened up to international markets, their populations found themselves caught up in a global economy where their traditional sources of livelihood were no longer sufficient to make a sustainable living, whilst their competences, inadequate in the context of these new markets, did not allow them to participate in either production or consumption (Kaldor, 2006; p.78). Consequently, "in some underdeveloped countries the nominal state […] ceased to be a viable group to which to belong" (Hetcher, 1987 in Stoddard, 2000; p.9), leaving room for ethnic and religious factionalism to (re)emerge and shape increasingly polarised societies.

The 1990s, therefore, saw a rapid increase of internal conflicts characterised by violent struggles between different identity groups claiming to represent the population in order to gain access to state controlled resources. The external enemy was suddenly replaced by antagonising national groups, and strategies akin to guerrilla warfare emerged where "territory is captured through political control of the population rather than through military advance" (Kaldor, 2006; p.8), a control gained by sowing 'fear and hatred'" (ibid; p.9) amongst the different groups in the country. As a result, the civilian population was no longer a casualty in a bigger struggle for geo-political power; rather, civilians became intentional targets in a fight articulated around movements mobilised on the basis of "ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power" (Kaldor, 2006; p.80). These conflicts came to be known as 'New Wars' (Kaldor, 2006) and

[4] Such as, for example: Indonesia and Timor Leste, countries in the Congo region such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, etc.

brought about a significant increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) between 1970 and 2008, as Figure 1 illustrates.

Figure 1 – Total refugees and IDPs between 1970 and 2008



Source: Elaborated by Orchard (2010; p.40) on the basis of UN data

As a consequence of the widespread internal violence on the population and the lack of state response to it – whether because unwilling or unable – countries affected by the New Wars suffered significant crisis of state legitimacy and sovereignty, which often culminated in the complete collapse of state institutions[5]. The breakdown of state/society relationships at the core of state collapse therefore brought to the fore the issue of 'failed states' whereby "the leadership and institutions of the state are weakened and discredited to the point where the state can no longer fulfil its responsibilities or exercise sovereign power over the territory within its borders" (Stoddard, 2000; p.8). The redefinition of internal conflicts around the notion of failed states provided a new rationale for international post-conflict reconstruction interventions.

b) Implication of failed states for post-conflict reconstruction

The notion of failed states brought on an increased reluctance to channel reconstruction efforts through state structures, resulting in a dramatic decrease in the 1990s in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, which fell from over $70 billion in 1990 to $50 billion in 1995 – as shown in Figure 2 below. Instead,

[5] For instance: Somalia, Chad and Rwanda, where the nature of state institutions came to be significantly detached from the socio-political processes and divisions plaguing society; Congo, Uganda and Haiti, where the accumulation of state assets in the hands of a few elites became challenged by liberation fronts (Doornbos, 2002; p.804)

amid growing humanitarian concerns, brought on by the extent of civilian casualties and the impact of high numbers of refugees and IDPs in conflict-affected regions, international post-conflict reconstruction efforts slowly shifted from the implementation of SAPs to more humanitarian and development oriented concerns: assistance came to be increasingly delivered by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and international organisations – such as the UN – that "were no longer confined solely to the periphery of conflict, but could engage *in* conflict zones" (Duffield, 1994 in Macrae, 1999; p.7) to provide humanitarian assistance to affected civilians.

Figure 2 – ODA from OECD countries since 1960



Notes: Total DAC excludes debt forgiveness of non-ODA claims in 1990, 1991 and 1992. Preliminary estimates for 2010.

Source: OECD (2014)

Furthermore, as the effects of globalisation increased significantly with the end of the Cold War[6], failed states became a threat to the growing interconnectedness of the international state system. This coincided, in the late 80s, with a strong belief amongst Western countries that liberal peace, combined with market-oriented economics, provided the best solution to sustainable peace – both between and within countries (Paris, 2004 in Goetze and Guzina, 2008; p.322). It was grounded, on the one hand, in statistical evidence that democracies were less likely to collapse internally or wage war against each other (Goetze and Guzina, 2008; p.322) and, on the other hand, in the Washington Consensus' essentially liberal prescription for Latin America in 1989 (Williamson, 2004; p.1). As a result, international post-conflict reconstruction assistance "became more contingent upon [states' adherence] to the political and economic prescriptions of the major

[6] International financial markets, the delocalisation of industrial production to developing countries, and significant developments in communication technology (Taylor, 1996; p.1924)

donor governments" (Macrae, 1999; p.6) translating, in practice, into the withholding of assistance to states that did not conform to these prescriptions – such as Idi Amin and Milton Obote in Uganda – limiting intervention to neutral relief aid instead – as happened in Ethiopia and Sudan (ibid). These shifts in the nature of international post-conflict interventions show that "de facto empirical sovereignty of states was under threat" (ibid).

c) Liberal peace through state building interventions

However, the poor international success record (de Zeeuw 2001; p.8) of these interventions, illustrated in Table 1 below by the fact that between 1990 and 2000 the percentage of violence onsets in countries with a previous conflict increased from 67 to 90, raised significant questions in relation to the nature of aid. It became evident that merely imposing conditions of liberal democratic reforms on new or existing states was not going to achieve long-term development or peace.

Table 1 – Violence onsets since the 1960s[7]

Decade	Violence onsets in countries with no previous conflict (%)	Violence onsets in countries with a previous conflict (%)	Number of onsets
1960s	57	43	35
1970s	43	57	44
1980s	38	62	39
1990s	33	67	81
2000s	10	90	39

Source: Walter 2010; WDR team calculations (Note: Previous conflict includes any major conflict since 1945)

Rather, if development was to be achieved through the establishment of liberal democratic rule and liberal market-oriented economics, it was going to be necessary to make "early efforts to ensure stability, establish peace, resuscitate markets, livelihoods and services and build state capacity to manage these processes" (Bailey et al, 2009; p.8). In reframing the issue of failed states "in terms of poverty and the role of internal reform in its management" (Macrae, 1999; p.10),

[7] Few countries subject to recent conflict are now truly "post-conflict." The rate of violence onset in countries with a recent previous conflict has been increasing since the 1960s, and every civil war that began since 2003 was in a country that had a previous civil war (World Bank, 2011; p.3).

the focus of international post-conflict assistance shifted to more interventionist post-conflict reconstruction processes centred on the importance of state capacity in fostering and ensuring development. Furthermore, the events of 9/11 brought on an additional concern for security, not only within those failed states, but also at international level. Consequently, a new rationale emerged for "strengthening international engagement in fragile states" (Harmer and Macrae, 2004, in Bailey et al, 2009; p.3) through a process of state building.

Consequently, this section has highlighted two main points central to the argument of this thesis. Firstly, the development of international post-conflict reconstruction since 1945 has essentially focused on the state. Whilst the latest rationales for international intervention acknowledge the importance of bringing development to the societies of these failed or failing states, there has been little concern for the nature of social relations characterising the population, thus precluding the emergence of debates over the nature of institutions necessary to bring liberal peace in these countries. Secondly, this has translated into similarly little regard for "the degree to which local and international power dynamics shape the state, as well as the limitations of the normative discourses often applied to rights, law and representation in different contexts" (Richmond, 2014; p.3). The following section will explore how these two issues underpin the difference between state formation, which characterises the emergence of Western states, and state building as delivered by the international community in post-conflict countries.

2.2. State formation and state building

The two issues highlighted in the previous section underpin the paradoxical nature of interventions that take the Western state as their ideal-type for the reconstruction of countries after conflict, yet are seen as evolving within geopolitical frameworks that mark "enormous departures in practice [from that ideal-type] (Caporaso, 2000; p.1), where state building is abstracted from the society it is meant to govern. To this end, this section will begin by reviewing how the notion of liberal peace is articulated in the context of state building. Subsequently, in order to highlight the contradiction between state building in practice and the ideal-type state it is based on, this section moves on to reviewing how Western states have emerged and the close relationship between states and their population that characterised their emergence.

2.2.1. State building

As highlighted in the previous section, state building emerged in the 1990s as a response to the increasing occurrence of intra-state conflicts characterised by a collapse of state institutions leading to a breakdown in state-society relations. To respond to these new challenges, and address the failures of conditional assistance in bringing sustainable peace, in 1995 then Secretary General to the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali drafted the Supplement to the 'Agenda for Peace' – which was published in 1992 – where he affirmed that UN peacekeeping operations in countries affected by New Wars should also aim at "ensuring the original causes of war are eradicated", and since "the collapse of state institutions" is one of the main features of these wars, peacekeeping should also include "the building up of national institutions" (UN Security Council, 1995; II, 22).

Within this context, the critical issue of the conflict was re-defined in terms of states' institutional strength (Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.25), allowing the focus of post-conflict interventions to be centred on the necessity to rebuild state institutions' administrative capability and ability to command authority (ibid). States were seen as failing because they were "falling short of specific standards of social, political and economic performance" (Yannis 2002 in ibid) and, in order to prevent a relapse into conflict, it was necessary to rebuild institutions capable of providing public goods and services that contributed to improving the country's social, political and economic situation. As such, state building emerged as "the task of building functioning and durable states capable of fulfilling the essential attributes of modern statehood" (Dinnen, 2007; p.2), which included: providing security from external threats and maintaining internal order; raising and collecting taxes, delivering essential services such as health and education; the provision of transport and communications infrastructure; and, the prudent management of the economy (ibid).

The argument of state building, therefore, was firmly grounded in the belief that if state institutions were strong enough to deliver adequate services to the population and secure people's rights and obligations, social conflicts would be avoided, stability would be restored to the country and, consequently, to the international state system. As indicated in the previous section, this is what the implementation of liberal peace sought to address, developed around the notion that "the world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will

is in rebellion, where there is no tranquillity of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right" (Wilson, 1965 in Paris, 2004; p.41). Western states, statistical evidence seemed to prove, were capable of achieving such stability because they functioned as democracies where state institutions were democratically elected and allowed room for the people – including the more vulnerable and marginalised groups of society – to express their will (UN Security Council, 1992; p.21). In those countries, social conflicts were prevented from evolving into conflicts through processes of voting, negotiating, compromising and mediating, processes "enhanced and supported by the restraints on decision makers of competitive elections" (Rummel, 1995 in Paris 2004; p.43).

State building, therefore, emerged as a process that sought to build institutions that could replicate the success of Western democracies in preventing social conflicts from evolving into internal conflicts. However, one fundamental flaw underlines this rationale: the literature demonstrating the correlation between democracy and liberal peace "takes the existence of functioning states as a given" (ibid; p.46), viewing the state "not in its historical particularity, but abstractly, as an idealised decision-making subject" (Agnew, 1994; p.63). It assumes that the establishment of a democratic state in a post-conflict society, through democratic elections, will automatically bring about the processes of negotiation, compromising and mediating that underpin its success in avoiding conflict; in doing so, however, it abstracts itself from the key socio-political processes of building state institutions, that is, the development of state-citizens relations that characterised Western state formation. The following sub-section seeks to highlight this point by reviewing the processes that led to the Western democracies after which state building's ideal-type state is modelled.

2.2.2. State formation

In everyday parlance and, to a large extent, within international relations literature and policy, references to the state seemingly make use of the term as a taken for granted concept without ever really defining it. Whilst there is a wealth of information on 'fragile states', 'failed states' and 'post-conflict states', the content of this information is usually packaged around the notion of the state reduced to what characterises it, that is, a core set of institutions that are deemed more or less successful at maintaining control over the population within set territorial boundaries (Jessop, 2009; Jones, M., 2009). However, these approaches fail to

"specify what lends these institutions the quality of statehood and who can legitimately be described as an agent of the state" (Jessop, 2009; p.416). Indeed, states are inherently historical entities that have evolved with time to accommodate widely diverse relations of power within geographical spaces, and in order to understand the modern state system it is necessary to first outline the main phases that have led to its present form, for indeed, "collective terms like the state are empty words unless one can determine what corresponds to them in the empirical world" (Dusza, 1989; p.72).

a) Historical development of Western states

Across political science and geography literature (Elden, 2013; Mellor, 1989; Storey, 2012; Tivey, 1981), the earliest appearance of a form of political governance apparatus is related to the emergence of the *polis* within the Greek city-state, some time between the seventh and the sixth centuries BC (Papanikolaou, 1991). The word *polis* referred to "an independent political, economic, religious and social unit, with a limited population and a restricted geographic area" (ibid) that consisted in an urban centre – *asty* – and the surrounding periphery – *chora* – over which the urban centre had jurisdiction. It was not defined by set territorial boundaries; rather, it was shaped by the extent of the community of people who shared a strong commitment to the value of a common life (ibid), and belonging to the *polis* was not determined primarily by family relationships or status but rather through participation "in judgement and authority, which is to say that [a man had] some role in establishing or applying the laws by which the polis [was] governed" (Miller F.D. Jr, 1974; p.64). Women and slaves, however, were excluded from the political life of the *polis*. This system of political organisations spread through the Aegean and the Mediterranean (Miller, 1993; p.218), and was later reproduced in Renaissance Italy (Tivey, 1981; Mellor, 1989; Storey, 2012).

As the most powerful city-states, such as Rome or Athens, started encompassing other city-states within their territories, thus extending their control to ever-larger territorial boundaries, the concept of city-states slowly faded to give way to empires, such as the Roman Empire that emerged in 800 (Encyclopaedia Britannica[8]). Empires, or empire-states (Tivey, 1981; p.2), were typically ruled by

[8] Encyclopedia Britannia, "empire" (accessed 15/07/14): http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/269851/Holy-Roman-Empire

one ruler – e.g. emperors, kings, etc – and marked a temporary rupture from the concept of government developed by city-states. Indeed, empires "overrode local rule by military force" (ibid) and led to territories that were often so vast in extent that the old structure of government, based on the relationship between the core – where the government is – and the periphery could no longer contribute to effectively maintaining control and power over an ever-spreading number of people. As a result of this rule, however, empires started facing challenges regarding the provision of food and other supplies, on which the periphery was significantly dependent, and, more generally, maintaining the administration of the vast territory (Mellor, 1981; p.44).

As such, it became necessary to fragment the territory so as to regain control, thusly providing the basis for the emergence of the feudal state where power was "local and personal" (Mellor, 1981; p.44). The power relationship was based on a system of protection in exchange for allegiance between the King and his subjects through the assistance of different classes of people, distinct from the masses in their direct relationship with the monarchy. Thus, because local bodies provided sustenance and security, rather than the monarch directly, political loyalty lain at different levels – e.g. town, province, guild, overlord or religious body (Tivey, 1989; p.18). The feudal system, however, slowly eroded under the pressures of two forces, according to Tivey (1989; p.20). On the one hand, rationalism[9] stood against the idea of a society organised around a monarchy and a system of privileges, and therefore argued in favour of the abolition of all the customs that regulated the relations between the lord and his tenant – e.g. serfdom, rights of tenure (ibid; p.21). The ideals that drove the French revolution and the abolition of its monarchy were grounded in rationalist thinking.

On the other hand, the introduction of capitalism further contributed to eroding the system of monarchy and privileges. Indeed, "as the commercial and agrarian interests came to dominate social and economic life, they exerted pressure for greater involvement in the management of the state" thus leading to the development of a "contractual state, where power was shared in a defined and constitutional form, recognising at least the rights of the upper and middle ranks of society" (Mellor; p.46). Finally, with industrialisation the masses started working in factories, becoming "a paid worker, a man not tied to land or locality" (Tivey, 1989;

[9] "A disparate body of ideas on governance, economics, laws and relation; but all focused on one central article of faith: that man had a nature obedient to laws, self-regulating and generally benign" (Tivey, 1989; p.20)

p.29), thus contributing to the erosion of the feudal system based on land ownership and forming the basis for the emergence of the modern state.

The brief overview of the development of Western states outlined above brings to the fore important elements that have seemingly remained a constant feature of these developments throughout the centuries, that is: the emergence of the state as the product of power relations within a given society – e.g. amongst residents of the *polis*, between emperors or monarchs and their subjects, etc; the state as a system of control of the population – e.g. emergence of ruling elites representing the link between the king and his subject; and, the territorial extent of authority – e.g. *asty* and *chora* of the *polis*, the empire, the fiefdoms. The following sub-section explores the main theories on the emergence and the nature of the state, highlighting the fact that the point of view from which one seeks to understand the state can have significant consequences on the way in which one conceives the purpose of state institutions and their relation with the population they are meant to govern and control.

b) Theories of the state

The above shows that the state is a complex web of relationships between one or many agents of the state, the society it seeks to control and the space wherein this power relation is taking place; no one theory can capture these complexities within a single framework (Jones, M., 2009; p.409). As such, the following review of the literature, by no means exhaustive, seeks instead to provide the main theoretical debates clustering them, acknowledging that there also exists a variety of ways in which these theories can be clustered[10], each method attempting to tackle states' complexities in different ways, contingent upon "the particular research problems being addressed, the time frame in which they are being explored, and the kinds of explanations ultimately being sought" (Jones, M., 2009; p.412). Since, within the framework of this research, it is the nature of the relationship between the state, space and society that is being investigated, the selected theories are organised borrowing from the clusters identified by Jones, M. (2009), that is, Marxist and Historical Sociology.

[10] For instance: Jones, M. (2009) organised them as 'Marxist', 'Historical sociology' and 'post-structuralism'; Tilly (1975) argued that theories available could be organised as 'developmental', 'functional' and historical'; and, Storey (2012) clustered them under the labels 'organic development', 'functionalist development' and 'inter-state'

The **Marxist perspective** on state formation revolves around the argument that "the state is formed by, and acts in accordance with, the forces of capital and class, which are intrinsically interlinked through the ongoing territorialisation of political power" (ibid; p.411). Karl Marx's vision of state formation was inherently related to economic modes of production and the division between those who own the means of production and the labour force: the state emerges as a result of a privileged ruling class, in possession of the means of production, creating the state apparatus to serve its own interests by preventing other classes from accessing power and therefore reproducing social inequalities. In this sense, "socio-spatial relations are constructed and constituted according to the political-economic circumstance in and through which they are produced" (ibid), the main function of the state system being the organisation of labour and the reproduction of a class system (McLellan, 1995 in Dal, N.D; p.2). Marx's theory, however, says little about the formation of the state and its relation to the territory, as it appears that its territorial boundaries are already fixed.

Charles Tilly's theory of state formation, although rooted as Marx's in its attention to the accumulation of capital, provides more insights on how states have emerged. According to Tilly (1985; p.181), states emerged as a product of ruling elites waging wars against each other so successfully as to gain power over gradually extended territories – war making; however, as the territory they protected extended, it became necessary to raise capital in order to continue the enterprise of war – extraction. As such, war-making elites established systems for the extraction of capital from the population residing in their territory – such as tax collection agencies, exchequers, account keepers – offering protection from the enemies in return – protection. The resulting system of capital extraction in return for protection from the enemy within a given territory is what ultimately led to state making. As such, Tilly (ibid; p.170) defines states as "relatively centralised, differentiated organisations the officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory", thus offering an account of the legitimisation of state power and the gradual extension of such power across a territory that came to be defined in relation to the boundaries of other territories ruled by other war-making elites.

Nevertheless, despite Tilly's important contribution, his approach to the state remains that of an organ of power driven by economic means and removed from

the social relations of the territory it controls through coercive means. To this end, the **Historical Sociology approach** provides more of an insight, as theorists included in this category "are interested in the polymorphous crystallisation of state power" (Jones, M., 2009; p.411), the territorial boundaries of which come to be defined by the ensemble of social powers which make up state institutions (ibid).

One of the most cited theorists in this category is Max Weber, for whom "power and struggle are primordial components of social life" (Dusza, 1989; p.73) and concrete social actions "give rise to particular structures in which power is institutionalised and in the framework of which power is contested" (ibid). In this sense, state institutions are constituted as a means through which historical power relations between ruling elites are expressed – between rulers and estates in feudal times, then between different polities as the feudal system eroded – thus lending a more historical approach to the development of the modern state through time. However, in Weber's view, state power is centralised and remains autonomous from the population through the monopoly of the means of legitimate coercion within its territory (Weber, 1922 in Palumbo and Scott, 2003; p.4). Thus, once the state is established, the *demos* – the people – have little power over state institutions; rather "it is governed and changes only the manner of the selection of executive leaders and the extent to which the *demos* […] is able, via so called 'public opinion', to influence the content and direction of administrative activity" (ibid; p.9).

Similarly to Weber, Michael Mann conceptualises the state as "an arena, the condensation, the crystallisation of social relations within its territories" (Mann, 1989 in Moran, 1998; p.160). For him, the state is the result of the expression of a society legitimating a body external to its relations that is responsible for establishing set rules in order to ensure the survival of said society (Moran, 1998; p.160). The state is autonomous from the different social groups in that it performs functions that "may be greater or smaller than the sectional interests of social groups" (ibid). Nevertheless, Mann acknowledges that society is not unitary but made up of "a complex set of overlapping networks" (ibid; p.161) where multiple forces may exert influence in order to achieve what he believes to be the core sources of social power, that is, economic, ideological, military and political

resources[11]. As such, in order to ensure the stability of the state, ruling elites need to develop an ideology that penetrates civil society through the establishment and repetition of social practices. Therefore, Mann takes Weber's useful starting point of the crystallisation of social relations in the arena of the state, and argues that the need to have monopoly over the four sources of social power is the basis to clearly move away from a state ruled by economic elites interested in capitalist accumulation alone. Furthermore, the introduction of the ideological social power provides an innovative relationship between the state and the population thus far absent in the other theories.

Durkheim's position on the emergence and the role of the state is grounded, much like Weber's, in the critique of the liberalist belief that modern societies are driven by economic interests, creating as such selfish individuals that are no longer united in a "conscience collective" (Palumbo and Scott, 2003; p.3). In his view, the state emerges as a sovereign apparatus, which main role is not that of preventing individuals from exercising their freedoms and rights, but instead it "creates and organises and makes a reality of these rights" (Durkheim, 1957 in ibid; p.9). However, unlike Weber and Mann, Durkheim did not think that the state existed in autonomy from society, "necessarily and inevitably [lying] in the hands of *officialdom*" (Weber, 1918 in ibid); rather, he sought to conceptualise a state which force is counter-balanced by social checks and balances within society through the education of the individual as an involved citizen concerned with collective interests and the development of 'secondary associations' that bring people together and provide an intermediary between their common interests and those of the agents of the state (Palumbo and Scott, 2003; p.10). Therefore, in Durkheim's view the state is, much like for Weber and Mann, a result of the crystallisation of social relations, but he differs from them in that he believes that once created, the role of the state is to create citizens by "transforming pluralistic concerns to some common universalistic commitments [and by putting] the protection of the democratic individual at the heart of the political process" (Prager, 1981 in ibid; p.17).

[11] As described in his four volumes on *The sources of social power* where he traces the historical formation of the state

c) The state in the framework of this research

The account of the main theories of the state elaborated above provides a useful starting point for understanding the main characteristics of the Western state. Tilly's theory that "war made the state and the state made war" (Taylor and Botea, 2008; p.27) contributes to explaining the emergence of the state apparatus in conjunction with flexible and ever growing territorial borders; nevertheless, the critique of the Marxist's structural approach to the nature and role of the state, inherent to the Historical Sociology approaches, serves here to provide the basis for a conceptualisation of the state more grounded in the social relations of its population. The theories developed by Weber and Mann are key here in defining the state as the product of ever changing social relations, thereby advancing a vision of the state that is not fixed but contingent upon the characteristics of a society at a given point in time; however, the state that emerges from these theories remains too autonomous from the population, characterised by institutions which main role is to maintain authority and control over the population through the monopoly over the legitimate means of violence. To this end, Durkheim's conception of a state that emerges out of the crystallisation of social relations, but which institutions aim at creating a sense of common interests within the population of the territory, provides more useful insights into the direction this research wishes to take; that is, that Western states need to be understood in the context of their emergence, which is characterised by a long history of interaction between state and society within a wide variety of social, cultural, historical and political contexts (OECD, 2010; p.17). Consequently, "the state and the political system are bound up with the broader geographical ensemble of social relations and one cannot adequately describe or explain the state, state apparatus, state projects, or anything else associated with the state, without referring to its relationship with such ensembles" (Jones, M., 2009; p.409). It is the nature of this relationship that the next sub-section endeavours to explore.

2.2.3. The state as container of society

The sub-sections above hint at a relationship between states and society underpinned by the idea of social relations being fashioned and controlled by a territorial entity; the nature of this relationship, however, as the theories on state have revealed, has remained flexible and evolved through time. For a large portion of the literature on state formation (Caporaso, 2000; Flint and Taylor, 2011;

Jessop, 2009; Kratochwill, 1986) the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648[12] represents a key historical turning point for the nature of state-society relations, as they are understood in today's Western states.

a) The territorialisation of the state

By establishing a new European order "parcelled up into 300 sovereign units" (Flint and Taylor, 2011; p.121), the Treaty of Westphalia recognised each state's sovereignty to forge policies to rule inside its own territory whilst simultaneously preventing other authorities from interfering with those same policies (Caporaso, 2000; p.1). Under this new European order, the notion of territory gained significant importance for it ceased to be merely understood as a flexible geographical boundary that delineated the extent of a sovereign's rule; instead, it became a fixed delimitation of a state's authority within that territory that moved beyond the notion of land "in the political-economic sense of rights of use, appropriation, and possession attached to a place" (Elden, 2013; p.323) to define a "political technology" (ibid) where population control, for the sake of this same population's security, is exercised by a sovereign state. In this context, the notion of sovereignty, much like that of territory, also gained a new meaning as it shifted from referring to the sovereign, that is the ruler of a group of people, to characterising the extent of political authority of a state within its territory.

Fixing the boundaries of the state and ensuring its sovereignty, that is its authority over the population across its territory, had important implications for the relationship between a social group and the authority responsible for decision-making – regarding rules, security, and going to war or political economy – till then historically focused on the local level. In ancient Greece, for instance, the *polis* "assumed an identity and a form which reflected the totality of its citizens as a body, regardless of their individual inclinations, their ancestral origins, their professions or their social positions" (Papanikolaou, 1991; p.26), that is, the polity; belonging to the *polis* was not determined by a territorial delimitation, but rather the extent of the polity delimited the extent of the *polis* so as to ensure direct participation of all citizens. Similarly, in medieval Europe, "communities were united only by allegiances and personal obligation rather than abstract individual equality […] in a geographically circumscribed territory" (Agnew, 1994; p.60).

[12] Treaty that brought to an end the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the Dutch and the German phase of the Thirty Years' War (http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/641170/Peace-of-Westphalia ; accessed on 01/10/13)

Sovereignty was held by the sovereign but effective rule happened at the local level and was determined by particular issues and contexts (Caporaso, 2000; p.22); this resulted in shifting allegiances between multiple authorities in widely diverse jurisdictional matters and implied that rule was "not limited by a conception of permanent borders within which such rule applied and outside of which it did not apply" (ibid). The introduction of a fixed space of sovereign rule changed this dynamic, replacing local rule with a wider reaching identity rooted in "the principle of spatial exclusion" (Walker, 1990 in Agnew, 1994; p.60).

The Treaty of Westphalia, therefore, marked a turning point in the constitution of a polity. No longer defined by local interests and rule, it became characterised by the distinction between what was internal to the territory and what was considered external (Tilly, 1985; p.184), forming a potential threat to the territory. The notion of security in a world divided into fixed territorial units (Agnew, 1994; p.60) came to play a central role in the justification of the existence of the state and became a defining feature for the cohesion of society. For in order to ensure security within a territory, it became necessary to create a political community that could encompass all the previously existing local alliances, bringing together a much wider population within the territory of the state under the common interest of protecting themselves from others. In this context, the political community deriving from the territorialisation of the state gave "people a means of locating themselves in the world and of distinguishing themselves from others" (ibid; p.226), thus legitimising the sovereignty of the state.

b) From local polity to political community

The territorialisation of the state, therefore, required that the newly established state authority form, out of the wide variety of local polities shaped by local alliances and different forms of authority, a political community coterminous with the boundaries of the territory. It involved a process of "intense interaction, bargaining, tension and conflict between and among different state and societal actors that resulted in people coming to accept the state as the highest authority" (OECD, 2010; p.16). To this end, the state had to develop, amongst different social groups characterised by close alliances, an implicit contract, proximity of social relations and exchanges (Beauchard and Moncomble, 2013; p.45), a strong commitment to its mode of governance through citizen engagement in policy making and implementation (OECD, 2010; p.16). That is, it had to create a new,

invisible link throughout its territory that linked these different local polities together into a political community characterised by invisible bonds, mobility, the manifestation of collective regularity and a common commitment to the same rights and duties (Beauchard and Moncomble, 2013; p.45) within the territory of the state.

In this sense, the local polity that defines different social groups is the product of social relations, defined both by everyday interactions within a specific setting and in opposition to others that are not part of the social group to which people identify. The daily interaction of people within space contributes to the construction of routines shared amongst a group of people, routines that through time "generate a communal way of seeing the world in consistent terms, sharing a host of reference points that provide the basis for shared discursive and practical habits" (Edensor, 2006; p.528). These routines are not only determined by the interaction of people, but they are also the product of the environment in which they are shared, for indeed people who live in the mountains will form different patterns of interaction than people who live by the sea – the former dictated by the harshness of the weather conditions whilst the latter shaped by the rhythms of, say, fishing life. Through these daily routines and interactions, therefore, "the group's image of its external milieu and its stable relationships with this environment becomes paramount in the idea it forms of itself, permeating every element of its consciousness, moderating and governing its evolution" (Halbwachs, 1950; p.2); that is, the space defines the polity and the polity defines the space.

As such, local polities are ever changing, constantly fragmenting, emerging and conjoining with each others (Edensor, 2009; p.242) in order to tackle a changing environment. As they do so, they create new routines and memories that are common to multiple groups, thus gradually extending to create a new polity within an extended space, without however threatening the nature of each individual group. As such, whilst polity emerges naturally as a local phenomenon shaped by the space in which daily interactions take place, it is not fixed in time nor space; rather, it can come to include new social groups, "such that a smaller identity may be contained within a larger identity and that identity may in turn be contained within a yet larger identity" (Kaplan, D.H., 2009; p.252).

In this context, the development of a political community out of these varied local polities involves the penetration of state institutions in people's everyday life in

order to induce a sense of self-awareness that cuts across small-scale social groups to foster a wider community. It implies the development, at the scale of the territory of the state, of "a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself" (Guibernau, 1996; p.47). Within this context, the political community therefore presents five key characteristics:

- Psychological – that is, the consciousness of forming a group that induces people to "cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people" (Mills 1997 in Cline, 2002; p.4);
- Cultural – sharing with other people "ways of life, language, oral and written literature, music and song, non-verbal communication, religion or beliefs, rites and ceremonies, sport and games, methods of production or technology, natural and man-made environments, food, clothing and shelter and the arts, customs and traditions" (UN, 2009; p.3);
- Historical – creating a narrative that brings a social group together on the basis of "historical events and characters [which] assume huge significance" (Storey, 2012; p.76);
- Political – building an institutional system that promotes participation of all citizens by facilitating people's ability to readily express their will (UN, 1992; p.21);
- Territorial – creating a representation of the imagined territory of the state in the citizens' mind.

If polities are socially constructed and multiscalar, then state institutions can intervene to institutionalise shared patterns across the territory of the state by favouring intersubjective communication between different social groups within its borders (Jenkins, 1996 in Edensor, 2006; p.528). State institutions can do so through the creation of the military, a system of education and media that promote shared values, languages and a common civic culture (Penrose, 2009; p.227). Moreover, since local polities are also defined by the space people interact in, state institutions can establish adequate infrastructure in order to create a collective awareness of the political community through mobility and collective

awareness of sharing the same benefits, the same repetitive practices and experiences within a given space at a given time (Edensor, 2006; p.532). The negotiation between the state and society to create an invisible political community out of the varied local polities is underpinned by the notion of social contract.

c) Redefining state-society relations through social contract theory

Following the territorialisation of the state after the Treaty of Westphalia, monarchs became increasingly involved in the management of the political and economic activities of their territory through a central agency responsible for creating new rules. However, the need to identify with a wider entity within a given territory, as opposed to a local one determined by context and needs, brought about the necessity to question anew the relationship between the population and authority. Indeed, the notion that a sovereign state principally characterised as an entity that successfully claims the legitimate use of the means of violence, and represented by a ruler, no longer held sway in a new European order where state's authority pervaded every aspect of the economic, political and social life within a fixed territory. Slowly, therefore, the population of these new states began questioning the conferring of sovereignty by divine right, arguing instead for a system of government that should be representative of the people – instead of an elite few – and in the interests of the people (Penrose, 2009; p.224). As a result, between the eighteenth and nineteenth century all European monarchies started falling.

The shift in the relationship between the sovereign territorial entity and the people within that territory consequently "represented a monumental shift in political thought and the application of these ideas demanded clarification of just what was meant by 'the people'" (Penrose, 2009; p.224). The emergence of social contract theories[13], in the sixteenth century, sought to answer this question by redefining where state's legitimacy and sovereignty lain (Hickey, 2011; p.6) through the articulation of the relationship in terms of a social contract between the state and the people. However, because the different strands of social contract theory go as

[13] Hickey (2011) organised – based on Freeman (2007) – social contract theories in terms of social or rights-based and liberal or interest-based approaches to contractarianism. The social approach "views social contracts in terms of the rights and obligations of individuals, both against political authority and each other" (Hickey, 2011; p.6), and in this category he includes, amongst others, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls. It is grounded in the conception of a state which aim is to ensure social justice within its society, and society itself is made up of individuals that are motivated by impersonal aims (ibid; p.8). Conversely, the liberal approach, which includes writers such as Hobbes, von Hayek and Buchanan, is much more grounded in liberalist and neoliberalist notions of society where "rational agents are presumed to maximise their advantage or self-interest" (Black, 2001 in ibid; p.7). Within this view, the state is particularly concerned with the maintenance of order and security, and society is characterised by individualistic behaviours and meritocracy (ibid; p.8).

far back as the sixteenth century and are deeply grounded in the historical context in which they were formulated, each theory seeks to answer different questions regarding the nature of the relationship between states and their population[14] (Boucher and Kelly, 2003; p.1). It would therefore be beyond the scope of this literature review to attempt to give a full picture; rather, the following review firstly presents the distinction between early social contract theorists – such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau – and modern social contract theorists – such as Rawls and Buchanan – and then moves on to introducing the main strands of theory applicable to the nation state within the framework of this research.

The starting point of early social contract theorists was an attempt to understand "the terms of political association" (D'Agostino, Gaus and Thrasher, 2011; p.14). Situated in the historical context that witnessed the territorialisation of the state, the main theorists of this early period – Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau – sought to understand the rationale behind the consent given by a group of people to move from what they called the State of Nature (SoN) – that is the natural condition of mankind – to that of a "body politic" (Locke, 1952; p.50) ruled by a state. Although the conceptualisation of the SoN varies significantly from one theorist to another[15], the main idea behind these theories was that at a moment in time a pre-political society decided to form a body politic ruled by a government in the interest of the people – here, again, the reasons for this government range from the need for protection of individual property to moral values. As such, "the desire for security, in one guise or another, and improved material and cultural benefits, acts as the catalyst to transform a potentially hostile SoN into multiple political units, the legitimacy of which is based upon authority and not force" (Boucher and Kelly, 2003; p.13). The close relationship between the authority and the people remains evident in these theories, perhaps because they pre-date the revolutions that brought an end to monarchical rule and the feudal system, thus referring to sovereign units of state authority that are pre-eminently local. These theories, however, came under severe scrutiny for their characterisation of the SoN as inherently apolitical and for assuming that at some given point in time the content of a social contract was agreed upon. Instead, as the theories of the state presented earlier in section 2.2.1 illustrated, "historically, no such contractual

[14] Some attempted to address the creation of society, civil society or a sovereign, whilst others looked more closely at issues related to procedural rules of justice or morality (Boucher and Kelly, 2004; p.1)

[15] E.g. Hobbes saw it as a permanent state of insecurity and war, whereas Rousseau understood it as a time of individual freedom threatened by insecurity

moment existed" (Paz-Fuchs, 2011; p.3); rather, man is by nature a "political animal" (Aristotle, 350 BCE; section 1253a) and the decision to create a sovereign state within fixed territorial boundaries was the outcome of external processes of war and peace between elites, not the result of a mutual consent within the population of that territory. As a result, the idea of the social contract lost impetus for some time.

Social contract theory enjoyed a renewed interest following the publication of John Rawls' *A theory of Justice* (1971). Key to this publication was the move away from the idea of an original consent given by a social group to be ruled by a state, to concentrate instead on justifying the choice of government institutions that have been implemented. In this sense, it circumvented the issue of initial consent that undermined early social contract theorists, by focusing instead on the rationale behind the social agreement on "what constitutional order or social institutions are mutually beneficial and stable over time" (Buchanan, 1965 in D'Agostino et al, 2011; p.2). Thus, the central tenet of twentieth century, contemporary, social contract theorists is that of justifying the choice of state institutions through a process of checks and balances that requires "good faith on the part of officials to explain and justify the legal order to those bound to it" (Rawls, 1993; p.57); it is a deliberative matter (ibid; p.3) underpinned by the notion that people are all born under a state – that is, there is no choice of consent – but they have the power to deliberate on state institutions' ability to promote "justice as fairness" (Rawls, 2001; p.3).

In his theory, Rawls' point of departure is a hypothetical situation where the citizens of a state are asked what is the least advantageous situation they are prepared to accept if they had no notion of what their position in society would be; this is what he calls the 'veil of ignorance', an ideal type situation the outcome of which is justice. On the basis of this hypothetical assumption, citizens can undertake a series of checks and balances against state institutions to ensure that they provide the correct framework for guaranteeing social justice in society. At the core of this conception of justice, is Rawls' belief that since "inequality in positions [in society at birth] is both highly likely (perhaps inevitable) and very useful, each would want income and wealth generating positions to be open to all on some reasonable principle of equality of opportunity" (Martin, 2003; p.252). It is not therefore a matter of simply redistributing financial and material resources, but rather first and foremost to ensure that everyone, considering their position in

society at birth, has equal access to opportunities[16]. For the purpose of this research Rawls' theory of justice is used to understand how the institutions of the state have evolved, in Western countries, from the moment of the Treaty of Westphalia through to today.

2.2.4. States building and political community

The historical evolution, presented in section 2.2.1, of the relationship between a sovereign authority – whether a people, a king, or a state – and the population, has shown that the nature of such relationship has been grounded in local interactions based on needs and contexts. Consequently, whilst the extent of polities may have determined spatial boundaries, spatial boundaries did not necessarily determine the polity; territory, authority and social groups evolved together within flexible, constantly moving territorial boundaries, whilst legitimation of authority happened at varying scales – city, empire or fiefdoms.

The introduction of fixed territorial boundaries, within which one entity held the maximum authority – the state – brought about the necessity to legitimise such territorial power through the construction of a political community coterminous with the new fixed boundaries of the state. This process, however, much like that of state formation, did not happen overnight, and here Rawls' theory of justice is useful in explaining how the necessity to find a system of government that suited the interests of all competing local polities within a fixed territory was at the core of the legitimisation of the state project. It brings to the fore the role of deliberation in shaping a political community where, through a system of checks and balances, the population within a given state territory can determine whether the state system is a just one, capable of fairly representing the interests of all pre-existing local polities. In this sense, Rawls' contribution is that of solving "a justificatory problem by converting it to a deliberative problem" (D'Agostino et al, 2011; p.3) to justify state rules and constraints. Therefore, through the contestation of monarchical power, the population of the new states exercised pressure for the establishment of a system that would allow them to maintain a stake in the decision-making – government by the people, to varying degrees.

[16] A later reworking of this theory, which he called "the democratic interpretation" (ibid; p.253) also took into consideration people's natural abilities; here, he argued that everyone also has different natural abilities but that the distribution of these abilities is a collective asset and therefore people should be given access to the adequate positions to fulfil this potential so that everyone can benefit in society. This vision, however, reflects Rawls' vision of individuals as inherently motivated by the common good, and has been rejected on that basis for the purpose of this research.

The ensuing state system, consequently, aims at ensuring equal access to opportunities and freedoms for all the social groups within the territory through its institutions. It does so by intervening in "spatial, material, performative and representational dimensions of everyday life …[that] facilitate communication and establish a sense of national belonging" (Edensor, 2006; p.526). In other words, the state system penetrates people's everyday life in a myriad of spatial and material ways that facilitate all social groups' access to opportunities and freedoms, allowing them to participate in the state project, thus continually creating and maintaining a political community (Kaplan, D.H., 2009; p.248).

This is what state building originally intended to achieve through the implementation of liberal peace in post-conflict countries. The establishment of democracy in those countries aimed at fostering "the evolution of the social contract upon which lasting peace can be built" (Boutros-Ghali, 1996; p.7). It was seen as the only means capable of engendering, through the implementation of conditions in which people can readily express their will (UN Security Council, 1992; p.21), the development of a political community that brought "the social stability needed for productive growth" (ibid). The next section will explore how, despite these key concepts underpinning the state building process, the international community's taken for granted notion of the Western state, abstracted from the historical tensions that built it, has translated in practice into a state building process deprived of its necessary political community counterpart.

2.3. Understanding the impact of international state building on political community

The most recent failures to create functioning states in countries such as Timor Leste, Iraq and Afghanistan has brought on a new wave of criticism on "what and whom the state is for from the perspective of international actors, and how this is commensurate with the views of its citizens" (ibid; p.4), thus affecting its long term stability. In an attempt to contribute to such debate, the following section focuses on the relationship between the nature of liberal state building interventions and their impact on the process of building a political community across the territory of the state. Its starting point is the state as the ideal-type used for framing these interventions, as defined in section 2.2.2 and framed by four key concepts – which have emerged throughout this chapter: territory – as geographical boundaries determining the extent of authority; sovereignty – as authority; legitimacy – as right

to rule recognised by the population; and, citizenship – as the population's deliberative exercise that determines legitimacy. For each of these concepts, this section presents their meaning in the context of the ideal-type state, explores how they are actually interpreted in the realm of state building and finally discusses the implications of these interpretations for the construction of a political community.

2.3.1. Territory

Section 2.2.3 reviewed how the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia contributed to the creation of a new European order organised into territorially defined political units, legitimised by the creation of a political community that extends throughout the whole territory and under the sovereignty of one decision-making entity within those borders; that is, the state. Since then, "the model of the [Western] state […] has been 'globalised' and has become the prevalent form of political organisation" (von Bogdandy et al, 2005; p.587); however, in the past few decades, significant debates have emerged as to the meaning of the notion of territory arguing that different approaches can lead to considerably different outcomes in terms of the nature of the state itself.

a) State

One of the main fields yielding literature on the notion of territory in relation to the state is that of geography – be it political, human or in its own right. In this realm, the territory is essentially perceived as being the product of historical processes characterised by relations of power and authority that materialise physically as borders defined by human strategies. For instance, Elden (2013; p.10) understands territory as "dependent on a number of techniques and on the law, which are […] historically and geographically specific"; territory here is different from the mere notion of land or terrain in that the latter do not refer to any historical process, whereas the former implies the notion of political control, built through time, over the land and the population within it. Agnew (1994; p.54), understands territory much along the same lines, as the product of "different historical circumstances", but moves away from the notion of territory as a bounded space to argue that "systems of rule or political organisation need not be either territorial,

where geographical boundaries define the scope of membership in a polity a priori[17], […] or fixed[18]" (ibid).

The notion of territory as not being fixed but, rather, defined by the extent of the reach of political organisation reflects the historical development of the state as discussed in section 2.2.2. It echoes the process of state formation understood in the context of this research as the relationship between systems of rule and the population these rules apply to and are recognised by; in this sense, authority was not defined by a territory, but the territory was defined by the geographical reach of groups forming part of this relationship. The introduction of the fixed boundaries defining the state introduced the notion of "exclusive and inalienable rights to set pieces of land" (Penrose, 2009; p.225), but the historical process that led to the creation of a national level authority involved the negotiation of the different types of authority existing at different scales into a wider, territorial system of rules. The creation of the German state, for instance, started in the mid-19th century when the Prussian-dominated *reich* incorporated many small German-speaking principalities, each originally a small territorial state with distinctive origins, geographic scale and founding mythology (Agnew, 1994; p.64). Today, the federal system allows some of these social identities to continue to function within the wider German political community.

In the context of this research, territory is therefore defined as "the extension of the state's power" (Elden (2013; p.322), which can be coterminous with the territorial boundaries of the state if the development of the state has been successful, but also involves a combination of nested local, regional and/or federal authorities.

b) State building

As introduced at the end of section 2.1.3, state building emerged in the late 1990s in response to the growing concern about failed or failing states' inability to promote sustainable peace within their territory. The idea of state building pertains essentially to the domain of international relations and as its name indicates, is a state centric process where references to the territory of the state are made strictly in terms of the "territorial integrity" that must be fully respected (UN Security Council, 1992; p.5). It is a notion of the state underpinned by exclusive

[17] "For example in kinship or clan systems space is occupied as an extension of group membership rather than residence within a territory defining group membership as in territorial states" (Agnew, 1994; p.54)

[18] "… as with nomads" (ibid)

membership to one group governed by the state within its boundaries, and is grounded within a framework where "the principle of hierarchical subordination gradually gave way to the principle of spatial exclusion" (Walker, 1990 in Agnew, 1994; p.61).

In the context of international relations literature, therefore, the notion of territory is stripped of its political meaning and reduced to an understanding of fixed international borders to be preserved. The notion of security against others is key to this literature, thus viewing the state in realist terms as an entity that needs to protect its territory from foreign invasion and occupation (Mearsheimer, 1994 in Slaughter, 2011; p.1), concentrating on questions of war and peace (Taylor, 1996; p.1925). Although not an international relations theorist *per se*, Schmitt's writings on *The Nomos of the Earth* have been used within international theory to conceptualise the state as a spatially concrete unity within a particular division of the international order (Elden, 2013; p.95) and where "territorial preservation [is] seen as non-negotiable" (Elden, 2010; p.24). For example, whilst the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were justified by the fact that their states were failing to meet certain international standards, "questioning their spatial constitution was entirely off the table" (ibid).

c) Political community

As noted in section 2.1.3, the changes in the nature of conflict that took place in the 1990s, combined with the failure of ODA to successfully address the root causes of these conflicts, led the international community to reframe post-conflict reconstruction activities in terms of failed states. Liberal peace was seen as the key concept that would contribute to re-establishing trust between the state and its citizens and, as such, result in the development of more peaceful relations conducive to sustainable peace and post-conflict development. International policy documents, published by international organisations involved in governance and development, do reference the importance of the construction of a political community across the territory of the state for the establishment of legitimate and functioning states. The OECD (2010; p.15), for instance, indicates that for a state to be legitimate it is not sufficient to focus on normative rules; rather it is crucial to understand "whether, how and why people accept a particular form of rule as being legitimate". Similarly, the UNDP (2012; p.49), argues that states need to be able to "establish priorities, […] procure equipment and services and deliver services" for

all social groups within the territory if they "hope to restore public trust and confidence in the government" (ibid).

However, within the realm of international relations to which state building pertains, the 'international' is defined as "beyond society" (Taylor, 1996; p.1924), constraining state-society relations – and therefore political community – to a purely endogenous process separated from international interventions, and consequently justifying the possibility "to conduct state building operations from the outside without entering into the contested sphere" of political community construction (Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.26). In this sense, the building of a state within fixed territorial boundaries eliminates from consideration the geographically variegated forms of local polity pre-existent in the territory, to the benefit of territorially homogeneous ones (Agnew, 1994; p.62), precluding the creation of a political community across the territory of the state constituted through historical processes (Miller F.D. Jr., 1974; p.64). For example, in Afghanistan and Iraq the local polities present in the territory upon intervention were to be preserved at all costs (Elden, 2010; p.24) to the detriment of the emergence of new ones in response to the societal changes resulting from the conflict. The UN itself, in the Supplement to its Agenda for Peace, makes no reference to any process of social construction taking place in the countries benefitting from state building activities, and references to 'citizens', 'population' or 'civilians' strictly refer to either victims of violence or subjects of the state. This approach to state building, therefore, results in a "territorial trap" (Agnew, 1994; p.54) that disregards both the historical processes and the geographical scales that characterised the emergence of states in Western Europe.

2.3.2. Sovereignty

The fixed territorial boundaries characteristic of the state therefore imply, as noted above, the notion of authority over a given territory in order to ensure security against both internal and external threats. Originally placed within the hands of a sovereign, such authority came to be known as 'sovereignty'; however, the social changes brought on by the gradual fall of European monarchies from the 18th century onward, have resulted in a shift of sovereignty as being impersonated by the monarch and identified with divine cosmos, to sovereignty as being associated to the territory of the state and state institutions (Colins, 1989 in Agnew, 1994; p.61). Much like the notion of territory to which it is closely intertwined, the notion

of sovereignty is open to a wide array of different interpretations that can yield significantly different implications for the reconstruction of states affected by conflicts.

a) State

The notion of sovereignty as it is understood today in relation to the state is therefore territorial in nature, and is defined by a dualism between "the inherent source of power that alone can authorise the creation of a political order" (Jennings, 2011; p.29) and "the sovereign constituted political body that represents that power" (ibid); that is, the constituent power and the constituted power. Debates in the literature on sovereignty, however, have diverged on two important grounds: firstly, on what is the source of the power – the nature of the constituent; and, secondly, on the nature of the power held by the constituted.

For Hobbes and Bodin, for instance, sovereignty did not refer to a historical process characterising the evolution of the form of authority of the constituted over the constituent; rather, it was a new idea "intended to enable a degree of unification and centralisation of power in the emerging monarchies beyond anything which then existed" (ibid; p.29). In this sense, the constituted emerges out of a social contract with the constituent, wherein the latter relinquishes all the power to the former for the purpose of protection within the territory; the social contract here is a one time occurrence, and the constituted power is henceforth separated from the constituent and has no obligation towards the latter (ibid; p. 30). Concerned that such conceptualisation of the relationship between the constituent and the constituted could lead the latter to act against the good of the former, writers such as Rousseau sought to view the nature of this relationship in reverse terms, that is, "the only legitimate sovereignty [is] that produced by the full constituent power of the people" (ibid; p.31), whereby the authoritative powers of the constituted can be removed if they cease to represent the will of the constituent. These perceptions of sovereignty are both grounded in the notion of territory as defined by state boundaries, and refer to the state as an entity formed at a given point in time by the social contract between constituent and constituted powers. In this sense, sovereignty is ahistorical. Indeed, for Hobbes once sovereign power is constituted, it cannot be changed – it lies outside of society – and therefore no historical relations other than the constitutive one exists; in Rousseau, on the other hand, "any political order, having been previously created,

could never hope to truly represent the will of the constituent power of the moment" (ibid), and as such it can be broken and constituted anew. Moreover, the nature of the sovereign authority, in these cases, is "to enforce internal order and to protect against external threat" (Agnew, 2009 in Fregonese, 2012; p.2) and is understood as "an achievable condition of exclusive and homogeneous state authority over a territory" (Fregonese, 2012; p.2).

Both of these views, however, remain locked within a political logic underpinned by the opposition of constituent and constituted power, whereby the nature of either power rests in its ability to break down the system created by the other. Arendt criticised these perceptions by arguing that the two powers need not be mutually exclusive. In her understanding, constituent and constituted powers must be understood as closely intertwined, as they were in the Athenian *polis*, where constituent power always results in some kind of constituted power that forms the local polity and need not be sovereign at the level of the state. That is, in the absence of a state, people do not reverse to a SoN where violence prevails, but instead form different, smaller polities (Jennings, 2011; p.43); these can then be reconstituted into a state sovereign power, "to create a kind of community which might best ensure and protect [a people's] historically contingent conception of republican liberty" (ibid). Arguing much along the same lines, Agnew (2005; p.441) states that, "political authority is not restricted to states and that such authority is thereby not necessarily exclusively territorial"; rather the extent of political power is defined historically through a process of legitimation of authority between a constituent power and an ever spreading constituted power. For instance, the French, Russian and Hungarian revolutions started with local political councils that were subsequently co-opted, as their cause gained ground, in their respective revolutionary states (Jennings, 2011; p.42); subsequently, through a historical process that "did not occur overnight" (Agnew, 2005; p.441), elites were then forced to grant increasing infrastructural goods to ensure the legitimation of sovereignty (ibid; p.444). The nature of sovereign authority here is still characterised by order, but such order is maintained through the establishment of a mutually beneficial relationship between constituent and constituted powers.

Within the context of this research, therefore, sovereignty is understood as indicating state's "supreme authority within a territory" (Philpott, 2014; p.3) – that is, centralised power held by the state (Agnew, 2005; p.442) – historically developed through the negotiation of "socially constructed practices of political

authority" (ibid; p.441), which may be exercised "non-territorially or in scattered pockets" (ibid), in order to expand patterns of social association and interaction (ibid) across the whole national territory.

b) State building

The realism that pervades international relations literature, and consequently its application in the field of state building, is locked within a framework defined by a national/international polarity (Agnew, 1994; p.59), where sovereignty strictly refers to the centralised power held by the state in order to protect its territory from internal and external threats. Security is key, therefore, not only in terms of preventing external invasions of territorial borders – Schmitt's friend-enemy distinction (Jennings, 2011; p.36) – but also in relation to order inside the territory. This view of sovereignty has two important implications for the manner in which new states in post-conflict countries come to be recognised as sovereign by the international community and, consequently, for state building interventions.

Firstly, Schmitt argues that political life is defined by "the categorical fact that the possibility of violence can never be removed from life" (ibid), and as such sovereignty characterises the ability of the state to impose order within a bounded space under the control of a group (Elden, 2010; p.22). Political life, in this sense, is not about the negotiation of different interests in order to reach a situation that can suit the majority of the different groups within a territory; rather, it is about "absolute territorial organisation of political authority" (Agnew, 2005; p.439) where security – that is, the absence of conflict – prevails. Security, in this sense, is what Roberts (2008; p.538) refers to as "negative peace" and is one of the key conditions for the sovereignty of a state to be recognised by the international community. Secondly, as a consequence, in the context of state building interventions "modern states and political authority are seen as practically bonded together" (Agnew, 2005; p.439) – as argued, for instance, by Hobbes (1651), Schmitt (1985) and Locke (1952) – automatically superseding all other forms of political authority. As such, a country presenting other sources of authority within local polities, that may have pre-dated the emergence of the country or that may have emerged out of a resistance fight – e.g. in Timor Leste and South Sudan – but without a central power exercising authority within a state's territory, is seen as displaying a total absence of political organisation (Fregonese, 2012; p.5) and in need for international state building intervention.

Thus, sovereignty in the context of state building interventions consists of: "the notion of equal sovereignty of states, internal competence for domestic jurisdiction and territorial preservation of existing boundaries" (Elden, 2007; p.825). As such, these interventions abstract themselves from the more historical nature of sovereignty as constructed from below, replacing "millennia of development of complex political and legal forms of authority (and established modes for interpreting them) with one single modern and rational concept for all power – [state] sovereignty" (Jennings, 2011; p.30).

c) Political community

Too state centred, the type of sovereignty advocated and supported by international state building interventions is stripped of "the substance of territorial integrity, its social and economic content" (Schmitt, 1950 in Elden, 2010; p.23), which actually contribute to ensuring that state's authority is recognised and respected throughout the whole of its territory.

International state building practices' focus on security stems from the implementation of traditional liberal security mechanisms "that reflect realist preoccupation with the military and other disciplinarian arms of the state" (Roberts, 2008; p.551); in this sense, the authority of the state is not fostered through social relations as much as it is feared. In countries recovering from conflict, however, particular emphasis should be put on understanding the dynamics of social relations not only because they provide a crucial insight on traditional relations to authority, but just as importantly because the violence of the New Wars, no longer confined to the battlefield, "now flows visibly into houses, communities, schools, religious grounds and communal property" (Maynard, 1999; p.33), thus deeply affecting state-society relations.

State building should therefore take into account these cleavages in society and attempt to understand the way in which political authority is socially constructed as a result. This is what Roberts (2008; p.538) refers to as "positive peace", that is, "both the absence of war (direct violence) and the absence of social injustice (indirect violence)". The focus of positive peace is much more centred on the necessity of the state to command respect for its authority through the development of positive relations both between state institutions and the population, as well as amongst the population; this is achieved through the

construction of institutions that do not repress conflict but rather include forms of local authority, existing within smaller polities, in the deliberative process of democracy to build on the "territorial adjacency" and "common territorial histories of struggle and social organization" (Agnew, 2005; p.439) so that state sovereignty extends throughout the whole territory.

The imposition of a negative peace advocated by international state building interventions, however, can significantly hinder the extension of state sovereignty beyond a small political elite or ensure its spread across the whole territory. In Lebanon, for instance, international focus, after the 2006 war, on the inability of the state to maintain negative peace within its border overshadowed the importance of "understanding the everyday practice of sovereignty beyond official state accounts in the city of Beirut" (Fregonese, 2012; p.5). Indeed, state building failed to understand how Hezbollah's provision of infrastructure in certain urban areas of Beirut contributed to enhancing its role as a legitimate source of authority within some parts of the urban territory, therefore significantly eroding the reach of state's authority in those same areas. This territorial difference between sovereignty as understood in international state building and actual political authority across a territory is what has been labelled *de jure* and *de facto* sovereignty (Murphy 1996 in Agnew, 2005; p.437), the former referring to the type of sovereignty conferred by the international community whilst the latter referring to the actual recognition of political authority across a territory.

Therefore, international state building interventions impose a notion of sovereignty that fails to account for the nature of the relationship between the constituent and the constituted, as it emerged in Western nation states. It is fixed within an understanding of sovereignty that precludes the implementation of a state system that can accommodate historical and/or territorial forms of political authority in order to establish a dialogue that can allow for the negotiation of different interests and contribute to the legitimation of state authority. Ahistorical in nature, it fixes the understanding of future opportunities (Walker, 1990 in Agnew, 1994; p.64) to the "accepted binaries that mark realist views of sovereignty" (Fregonese, 2012; p.16) – that is, national/international and security/conflict – resulting in a *de jure* international sovereignty deprived of its *de facto* national counterpart.

2.3.3. Legitimacy

The distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* sovereignty, therefore, lies in the state's ability to "command loyalty" (Holsti, 1996 in Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.28) through the population's recognition of its authority across the whole territory. Such authority must derive "from a mutually acknowledged source of legitimacy" (Philpott, 2014; p.3), which varies significantly, however, according to how the state is defined in literature and practice and, consequently, to the nature of the relationship between the state and its population.

a) State

To understand the concept of legitimacy it is necessary to define the nature of the relationship between the state and its population – the constituent and the constituted – at the core of the state's basic nature (Jones, 2013; p.70). To this end, this research uses Peter's (2010; p.3) clusters of literature on legitimacy, that is: a descriptive account and a normative account.

Legitimacy interpreted according to the descriptive account "refers to people's beliefs about political authority and, sometimes, political obligations" (ibid). Within this strand of literature, the state is autonomous from the population in that the relationship is not mutually feeding but is top-down and as such, according to Weber – who conceived of the state in these terms as seen in section 2.2.2 –, legitimacy is rooted in the prestige that is lent by the population to the persons exercising authority (Weber, 1964 in ibid). Such prestige can stem from three main sources: traditional system of authority, charisma derived from faith in a person's abilities, or recognition of the legality of that person's position in power (Weber, 1964 in Spencer, 1970; p.123). In this sense, the source of political legitimacy is the consent of the people to be ruled by the person in power, and such consent is represented by the social contract between the ruler and the ruled – as Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke intended it, as seen in section 2.2.3. The function of political legitimacy, in the context of its descriptive understanding, is to justify coercive power used to ensure preservation against the SoN (Peter, 2010; p.10). This reflects Hobbes understanding of the social contract where "legitimate authority depends on the ability of a state to protect its citizens" (ibid), thus corresponding also to Weber's vision of the state as holding the monopoly of force and, therefore, supreme authority within a definite territory (Dusza, 1989; p.88).

Conversely, legitimacy understood as a normative concept refers to "some benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or authority and – possibly – obligation" (Peter, 2010; p.3). The relationship between the constituent and the constituted here is mutual whereby state institutions need to fulfil certain conditions in order to exercise power justifiably and result in the population's obligation to obey. The source of political legitimacy, in this sense, is much more related to a Rawlsian understanding of the social contract; that is, legitimacy is constituted and maintained through a system where the policies of state institutions are constantly submitted to a process of checks and balances where the population assesses the fairness of those policies. Consequently, the function of political legitimacy is that of justifying political authority "through an ongoing evaluation of the performance of a political regime" (ibid; p.7), the outcome of which will determine the "joining consent" (Rawls, 2007; p.125) given by individuals who "consent to join this or that existing political community" (ibid).

Understanding political legitimacy in terms of 'either/or' descriptive and normative explanations has, however, been criticised by authors such as Habermas (1979) and Beetham (1991) (in Peter, 2010; p.5). According to them, a view that is strictly descriptive omits the importance of understanding what constitutes legitimate power – that is, legitimacy is a justificatory process, not just a given – whereas a view that is strictly normative "neglects the historical actualisation of the justificatory process" (Peter, 2010; p.5) partly grounded in people's beliefs. Rather, political legitimacy is constituted by both descriptive and normative characteristics: the historical process underpinning the development of political institutions contributes to justifying the nature of appropriately constrained collective decision-making procedures (Peter, 2008 in ibid; p.24); whereas people's beliefs about what political authority should entail – also rooted in historical justifications – constitute the basis for the process of judging the fairness of the decisions made by the state. As such, legitimacy "defines which political institutions and which decisions made within them are acceptable" (Peter, 2010; p.17).

In order to understand how the process of legitimation of state authority is viewed in relation to the state, this research borrows from Hirschman's theory of exit, voice and loyalty (1970; p.18), which seeks to explain how politics and economics can be either "in harmony and mutual support" or "get into each other's way and undercut [their] effectiveness". Starting with a simple free-market situation where a customer is dissatisfied with the product of a firm, Hirschman describes how the

low cost associated with the opportunity of looking for that same product elsewhere – exit – often trumps the desire to express one's discontent with the product in the hope of seeing an improvement and sticking to the initial firm of choice – voice. Here, economics – that is, the ability to exit easily – eclipses politics – that is, voicing one's discontent. Hirschman subsequently analyses the dynamics of exit and voice within the realm of politics, arguing that for voice to prevail over exit the customers must (a) be willing to trade-off "the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of an improvement in the deteriorated product" (ibid; p.77) and (b) estimate that they have the ability to influence the organisation; positive fulfilment of these conditions can incur loyalty, which in turn will encourage the use of voice rather than opt for an exit.

In the context of the state, loyalty is the equivalent of legitimacy, and it is incurred when the right institutions are in place to give the population a sense that it can have a say in how the decisions are made and what kind of decisions are being made. If such institutions are not in place or do not reflect, at least in part, the way in which people are used to voice their concerns in relation to political authority, a feeling of powerlessness in relation to their situation can arise where voice is no longer a choice and exit is preferred; in this case, exit can materialise either as people leaving the country – which, in his view, is often done by those "who could best help it fight its shortcomings and its difficulties" (ibid; p.79) – or by resorting to different, more local types of authority. An alternative scenario can also emerge if loyalty to the country has been fostered also through the construction of a political community in the past through the creation of routines, habits and history across the territory of the state. In such cases, when voice is no longer possible but exit is not yet the preferred option, boycotting becomes a third choice, "undertaken for the specific purpose of achieving a change of policy on the part of the boycotted organisation" (ibid; p.86); this can take the form of strikes, demonstrations or, in its extreme version, conflict. As such, in Western states, the revolutions or significant societal changes that took place in the 17th and 18th centuries have led to the creation of institutions that favour the use of voice – point (b) above – whilst history has contributed to creating a sense of political community – encouraging point (a) above; as such, when institutions in, say France today, fail to provide a viable option for voicing the population's concerns, state-wide demonstrations take place – e.g. pro/anti gay rights, European Union constitution, the war in Iraq, etc.

Consequently, legitimacy is the state's ability to "engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for society" (Lipset, 1959; p.86) by providing a balance between the options of exit and voice. Just how it does so will be discussed later in this section under the notion of citizenship.

b) State building

Sovereignty within the realm of international relations, it was argued previously, is construed exclusively in terms of a state's ability to maintain security within its territory through the exercise of authority. Accordingly, absence of such authority is seen as a threat to the international state system and justifies international intervention to rebuild a state that is capable of exercising its power to guarantee security – understood as negative peace. The type and the manner in which such a state is being rebuilt, however, is heavily contingent upon the definition of the object of reconstruction (Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.23) and, as such, its objective; the resulting impact on the potential for exit and voice can therefore have significant consequences for the legitimacy of the rebuilt state.

In the absence of a generally agreed definition of state building, a wide variety of approaches have thus been applied that are largely dependent upon different understandings of the role of the state and/or the extent of mandate held by the organisations carrying out state building activities[19]. Nevertheless, despite these differences, the varying approaches to state building all have in common an understanding of the state in Weberian terms, that is: "a set of reasonably stable institutions capable for regulating the societies and territories they govern, extracting the resources needed to sustain themselves, and providing services to their population" (Jones, 2013; p.70). As such, state building is generally carried out following an "institutional approach" (Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.23) focused on

[19] In section 2.1.3 it was argued that the shift in the nature of conflict that occurred in the 1990s resulted in an increasing role for international organisations in post-conflict reconstruction; as such, international organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the UN have become particularly active in the field of state building – for instance in Kosovo, Timor Leste and Cambodia – alongside national governments and bilateral organisations – for instance the US in Iraq and Afghanistan. The research carried out by Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell and Sitea (2007), on the meaning of the notion of peacebuilding in twenty-four governmental and inter-governmental bodies, adequately illustrates this point: For instance, whilst generally all-encompassing UN organisations emphasise the need to undertake a wide range of activities to assist "transitions from war to peace" (ibid; p.38) – including providing the tools for building on the foundations of peace (ibid) – more economic oriented World Bank and IMF focus respectively on socio-economic processes at large and restoring the disrupted economy; US bilateral agencies, on the other hand, reflect the country's generally liberal doctrine of ensuring liberty and security through good governance, the establishment of security forces and economic development – see appendix 1 for the full list of organisations and definitions.

rebuilding the state's administrative capability (ibid) according to the following checklist of core functions (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005; p.6):

- Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence;
- Administrative control;
- Management of public finances;
- Investment in human capital;
- Delineation of citizenship rights and duties;
- Provision of infrastructure services;
- Formation of the market;
- Management of state's assets;
- International relations; and,
- Rule of law.

Within this framework, the legitimacy of the state is not based on a mutually constitutive relationship between the state and its population; rather, it is much more akin to a descriptive approach where legitimacy is understood as being guaranteed by the legality of the authority in power, established through a two-step process. Firstly, the premise that the previous state system had to be dismantled – since it failed to fulfil international standards of liberal democratic values – or created – in the case of the emergence of a new country – implies that international actors undertake state building in a context that is considered to be a *terra nulli* (Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.40). In this sense, new institutions are established to replace indigenous forms of authority seen as having failed to maintain control of the territory and unable to fulfil the list of core functions highlighted above. Secondly, once the basic institutions have been built, and security – negative peace – in the country is restored, democratic elections are organised to ensure, in the eyes of the international community, that a new state is elected legitimately.

In this sense, the process of state building – as opposed to that of Western state formation – has therefore little historical awareness (Richmond, 2014; p.4); it focuses essentially on issues of public administration, security, rule of law, economic development and service delivery – as illustrated in Figure 3 below – thus depoliticising the justificatory process for the development of institutions by reducing them to "assemblages of bureaucratic, coercive, judicial and other institutions, with representative bodies guiding their work" (Jones, 2013; p.70). As

such, it separates the political – that is, the antagonism always present in a society and which forms the basis of the constituent – from the politics – that is, the institutions that organise human coexistence and represent the constituted (Mouffe, 2000; p.149).

Figure 3 – Domains and actors in the state building process



Source: Fritz and Menocal, 2007; p.24

c) Political community

The ahistorical nature of the state building interventions highlighted above is, however, a contradiction in terms. It uses the state as an ideal-type for state building, characterised by a sovereign state within fixed territorial boundaries, but abstracts itself from the fact that the legitimacy that characterises sovereign Western states today is rooted in a historical process of evolution "that has furnished territorially bounded populations with elite leadership, different regions, religions, histories and sociologies […]" (Roberts, 2008; p.541), which have produced types of governance that, whilst all democratic in nature, are underpinned by different types of social contracts. It is an approach that takes the

state as it is today – with its liberal democratic characteristics and its position in a globalised world – and attempts to replicate it without consideration for the mutually constitutive nature of state-society relations on which it rests.

Within this approach, therefore, state institutions are being built away from the political nature of the social relations they are meant to organise and control, removed from the varied socio-cultural context where different sources of legitimacy coexist, compete, conflict and, occasionally, interact with other sources of power and interest (OECD, 2010; p.40). The faith entrusted by the international community in the ability of a Western-style democratic system to provide an opportunity for voice over exit to the population of the country, therefore, gravely overlooks the fact that, in highly politicised and divided contexts, how and by whom these institution are built can lead to the institutionalisation of deeper cleavages. In Iraq, for instance, the choice of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) – the transitional government formed by the U.S, the United Kingdom and their allies following the invasion of the country – to build the new institutions in partnership with the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government, has resulted in the establishment of state institutions that are "seen by the Sunni population as an organ of Shiite power" (Lemay-Hebert, 2009; p.30). Consequently, the failure of the international community to involve the population in the process of choosing the type of institutions that would come to represent them within their territory has led to the establishment of governments which authority is recognised only by part of the population, thus severely threatening state legitimacy.

Furthermore, the assumption that holding elections will provide the state the legitimacy it needs to remain sovereign within its territorial boundaries is inherently flawed in two critical ways. Firstly, failure to understand the power dynamics between different groups, as well as the extent of their reach at the population level – through, for instance, politicised village chiefs –, can lead the international community to underestimate the extent to which animosities between two groups can lead to strong intimidation tactics by either group to coerce the population into voting for them. The resulting government may therefore appear democratically elected in the eyes of the international community, but it can hardly be deemed to represent the true will of the population. In Cambodia, for instance, both the 1993 and the 1998 elections were "surrounded by uncertainty and threats of violence" (Hughes, 2009; p.123) as the two main political parties violently rivalled against each other in their contest for state power. Secondly, the conflicting nature of

electoral races can pose serious concerns in relation to the quality of the debate and the ability, or willingness, of the population to participate. Indeed, locked within a framework of negative peace that prioritises security at all costs, the nature of the first rounds of elections organised under the trusteeship of the international community can severely limit the scope of the debate between candidates. Again, in the context of Cambodia's 1993 and 1998 elections, international democracy promoters privileged "choice over debate; discipline and regimentation over spontaneity and emotion" (ibid) by limiting debate between candidates and reducing the role of the population to that of voting (ibid; p.124).

Consequently, the institutions built by the international community as part of the state building process not only fail to reflect or take into account systems of authority and legitimacy that previously existed within the country; they also contribute to the establishment of institutions that do not, in effect, provide an opportunity for the population to adequately voice their concerns or participate in the deliberations over the establishment of the new system. As such, democracy and political autonomy are seen as "the end goal, rather than crucial aspects of the process of state building itself" (Chandler, 2007 in Roberts, 2008; p.541), yielding a type of legitimacy that is recognised internationally but fails to produce the basis for the population's loyalty to the state.

2.3.4. Citizenship

According to the previous sub-section, therefore, for a state to be able to exercise authority over its territory it needs to be able to foster the recognition of such authority within its population. This recognition is rooted in the two important pillars of legitimacy as elaborated in section 2.3.3 – (a) and (b): the institutional design ensuing from the state building process determines people's ability to influence decision-making and is, as such, "of considerable importance for the balance of exit and voice" (Hirschman, 1970; p.86); intrinsically unable to represent, at all times, the whole range of interests present at societal level, the institutional design needs to contribute to the development of a political community that encourages loyalty over exit. Whilst the previous sub-section was concerned with the former, this subsection focuses on the latter, that is, the ability of the state to build such loyalty through the construction of citizenship.

a) State

Leydet (2014; p.4) argues that there are two main models of citizenship: the republican and the liberal. The republican model originated in the Aristotle's Athenian *polis* and is based on the idea that self-identification as a member of a political community lies in the active participation to the processes of deliberation and decision-making (ibid). In this sense, citizenship is formed through active participation in the *polis,* as argued in section 2.2.2, and becomes "a source of identity by strengthening [a citizen's] sense of self-respect" (Rawls, 1972 in ibid; p.3) within the *polis*. This model is generally reflected in the writings of Aristotle and Rousseau for instance.

The liberal model, on the other hand, can be traced back to the Roman Empire and, later, the medieval city, where "citizenship meant being protected by the law rather than participating in its formulation or execution" (Leydet, 2014; p.5). In this sense, the citizen is he/she who resides within a pre-determined territory and whose individual freedom – from interference by other individuals or the authorities themselves – is protected by the laws enacted within that territory (ibid). The legal aspect of citizenship prevails here, as the political is regulated by the politics rather than shaping them, and membership is an individual right as opposed to a social exercise – T.H. Marshall, in his seminal essay "Citizenship and social class" (1950) is one of the main proponents of this model. The individual rights within the liberal model generally refer to: political, economic, social and cultural rights – see APPENDIX I for detailed description of rights.

These two models of citizenship, however, need not be seen in opposition, as the historical development of the Western state given in section 2.2.2 demonstrates; rather they correspond to particular stages in the evolution of the relationship between the state and society, which eventually culminated in the emergence of the state as the triumphant political form, where these two accounts are seen to coexist within a territorial sovereign system (Poggi, 1978 in Isin, 2008; p.269). Indeed, state institutions are necessary to guarantee individual liberties through the establishment of rights and duties – liberal model; however, such liberties need to be protected by ensuring that all citizens have access to the opportunities that allow them to participate in the established processes of deliberation (D'Agostino et al, 2011; p.4) that form the political community – republican model. It is this ability to participate – socially, politically and economically – that constitutes the

benchmark against which we assess how well our institutions are functioning (Miller, 2000 in Leyde, 2014; p.6), and that underpins the sense of belonging to a political community, which can be created and maintained amongst its members "only if basic standards of social justice are satisfied" (Habermas, 2001 in Leydet, 2014; p.19).

Social justice, therefore, is what reconciles the distinction between the two models; it sits at the centre of the relationship between state institutions, the impact of their policies on the citizens of a state and the resulting sense of political community that builds on the citizens' assessment of their institutions. Indeed, social justice, according to Barry (2005; p.16), is about understanding how "the major institutions […] allocate (or bring about the allocation of) rights, opportunities and resources" in a manner that is considered fair by the citizens. Akin to Rawls' conception of fairness as justice, fairness here refers to the distribution of material and/or psychological resources in a way that allows all the citizens of the state to have the same opportunities to fully realise their rights. Opportunity exists "if there is some course of action lying within [one's] power such that it will lead, if [one chooses] to take it, to obtaining the [right] in question" (ibid; p.20) [20]. Holston and Appadurai (1996; p.190) share this concern by drawing a distinction between formal and substantive citizenship, whereby formal "refers to membership in the nation state" and substantive "to the array of civil, political, socio-economic, and cultural rights people possess and **exercise**" [emphasis added] and which allow them to negotiate their belonging to the political community (Taylor, 2009; p.294).

Consequently, citizenship in the framework of this research refers both to the formal/liberal and to the substantive/republican aspects of the process of creating a sense of belonging, amongst the people living within a territory, which grants legitimacy and therefore sovereignty to the state. It is a constant negotiation of "inclusion/belonging or exclusion/not belonging" (Taylor, 2009; p.295) in response to processes of checks and balances on state institutions based on the material consequences of the actions of individuals, social groups and institutions (Chouinard, 2009; Staeheli, 2003). Cities, and the urban space in general, play an important role in these processes of identification, where the geography of distribution and allocation of resources by state institutions materialises into the creation of spatial dimensions where opportunities to effectively exercise one's

[20] For example, ensuring every child's access to education entails facilitating the child's access to the resources – for instance easy of access and safe transport to school – that give him the opportunity to access education.

rights can significantly vary and be in stark contrast, creating "difference-based, as well as geographically based proximities [that] can spawn new constellations of spatial association, or new modes of belonging" (Taylor, 2009; p.296). As such, for the sense of belonging to a political community to devolve to the local level and extend across the territory (Edensor, 2009; p.245), state institutions need to promote both substantive and formal citizenship in order to create urban realities that contribute to citizens' feeling that the system promotes social justice; only then does the place "exceeds its physicality [and] becomes […] an imaginary construct" (Taylor, 2009; p.296).

b) State building

Since the emergence of the New Wars in the 1990s, the belief that countries run according to democratic systems, and interconnected economically and geopolitically through the processes of globalisation, do not experience conflict has translated into the design of state building processes centred on the notions of liberal peace and democracy – as argued in section 2.2.1. The main tenets of these processes stem from the liberal political doctrine that has been widely applied in Western states since the 1970s, and which consists mainly of: the implementation of democratic processes – generally conceived as elections and constitutional processes; the establishment of free markets; and, the building of institutions with the aim of ensuring the rule of law, human rights and the development of a civil society (Paris, 2010; Richmond and Franks, 2007a; Richmond and Franks, 2007b). These therefore constitute the three main elements the core functions of the state aim to realise (Gilbert, 2009; p.195).

However, whilst Western states have reached liberal democracy through a long historical process of debating and contesting the meaning of democracy as the "rule by the people" – through constant negotiations of what is meant by 'rule' and 'the people' as well as who is included – the international state building process applies liberal democracy within the assumed framework of the territorial state (Barnett and Low, 2009; p.70) automatically bringing with it assumptions about membership to a political community, modes of governance and the benefits of a market-driven economy. Thus, within the state building process, democracy is no longer conceived as a constant "disagreement over basic definitions, concepts and institutions" (ibid); rather, it is designed as it if were an end in itself.

In practice, therefore, the citizen is no longer an agent who exercises his rights as part of a political community in order to keep checks and balances on the institutions that protect his freedoms; rather the state is the political container "within which individual rights and freedoms have been made achievable and understandable" (Gilbert, 2009; p.200) and within which security has become the key precept for the protection of these rights. This is particularly evident in the application of liberal principles to the economy, for indeed the main role of the state, consistently revolving around the idea of the citizen as an individual, focuses on security to protect private property and facilitate the conditions for individuals to thrive in their personal enterprises within self-adjusting markets – for instance, the notion of supply and demand. The application of rights within this framework follows the UN's universal understanding of human rights, in that they are accorded to all members of the polity (Leydet, 2014; p.9), and remains grounded in a notion of formal citizenship; here, the *laissez-faire* approach to the free-market is expected to regulate substantive citizenship.

More recent international state building interventions carried out in the late 1990s and early 2000s – for instance, Cambodia, Iraq or Timor Leste – have continued to pursue the goals of the liberal peace – individual, governance and market – but their approach has shifted onto an even more market-oriented, individualist application of its political and economic principles; that is, neoliberalism. Generally speaking, "whereas classical liberalism saw markets as naturally occurring phenomena, neoliberalism is premised on the idea that the conditions can be created that will encourage people to act in a more marketlike fashion" (Larner, 2009; p.386). In practice, a neoliberal approach to state building is characterised by (Brown, 2005; pp.40-44):

- The recasting of all dimensions of human life in terms of market rationality, so that the political is submitted to an economic rationality;
- The main role of the state is that of fashioning society around economic rationales, so that the health and growth of the economy are the basis of state legitimacy;
- The individual is fully responsible for him/herself as a citizen-subject, so that success and failure are recast in terms of economic rational choices; and,

- Checks and balances against state institutions' actions are carried out within a framework where good social policy is understood as one that creates the appropriate conditions for the development of a citizen-entrepreneur.

As such, the role of the states being built in the latest state building interventions has been "rolled-back" in relation to Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist institutions (Peck and Tickell, 2002; p.384), and "rolled-out" in terms of institutions created for the purpose of regulating neoliberal forms of governance (ibid)[21].

The strong neoliberal emphasis on economic growth has brought about an increased role for cities in the state building process. Indeed, the "World Report on the Urban Future 21"[22], which Jessop (2002; pp.465-467) analyses, points out that cities are key centres of economic, political and social innovation. Their position as sites of economic growth and competitiveness turns them into an interface between the local economy and global flows (ibid) – especially in countries recovering from conflict where most of the initial international economic activity takes place. Furthermore, as governance is slowly taken away from the state and devolved to cities in the action of rolling-back its interventions, cities are expected to increasingly adopt a managerial attitude (Purcell, 2008; p.11), competing – against each other and amongst different neighbourhoods within cities – to attract capital in order to promote growth; as a result, they are encouraged to become pilot sites to develop partnerships between the public and private sectors and between government and civil society" (Jessop, 2002; p.466). Finally, the networks, stemming from the opportunities for proximity and daily interactions created by cities, and the strong market influence should be used in order to replace state welfare. Therefore, whereas cities were once the sites of daily interactions within a political community, as well as sites for checks and balances on state institutions, the move from a system of formal state government to one of formal city governance arrangements with different non-state partners (ibid; p.12) has contributed to further institutionalising the citizen-subject.

[21] In Iraq, for example, this approach was particularly evident in the way in which, just weeks after US intervention to remove Saddam Hussein, the country was declared "open for business" (Bremer, 2003 in ibid; p.48). This implied, amongst other things, the opening of state borders to duty-free imported goods as well as multinationals, and the use of foreign direct investments (FDIs) to "replace and privatise state industry" (Brown, 2005; p.48). Within the framework of the rational, entrepreneurial citizen, new Iraqi citizens had little stake in the definition of these goals or the constitution of the institutions – since most were privatised; rather, they were expected to fit into the market system and use their newly acquired citizenship rights to improve their own socio-economic situation.

[22] A report especially commissioned for the Urban 21 conference in Berlin in June 2000 and written by the World Commission

c) Political community

The adoption of liberal and neoliberal – hereafter referred to as (neo)liberal[23] – policies within the state building process has significant implications for the process of building a political community across the territory of the state. Their focus on the individual, governance and market economics strongly affects the type of citizenship that is being fostered in countries emerging from conflict, and, consequently, also affects the nature of the relationship between the citizens and the new state. Indeed, the roll-back of the state translates into the devolving of some of the state's core functions through privatisation – of, for instance, education and health – as well as outsourcing – for example delivering infrastructure projects through tendering processes – as this is believed to produce more competitive markets and cut state funding in many sectors. Similarly, the provision of welfare, also considered a potential significant drain on state resources, is kept to a minimum and often distributed more in the form of peace dividends than as traditional social security. On the other hand, the roll-out of the state for the purpose of regulating (neo)liberal individual aims is reduced to that of denying, defusing or displacing "the possibility of political conflict, choice or decision" (Clarke, 2004; p.34) so as to ensure a secure environment in which citizens can fully realise their rights as citizens-entrepreneurs; it contends that whilst violence 'scares' capital away, long debates for decision-making delay big decisions targeted at increasing growth.

As a result, the emphasis on formal citizenship, which is expected to provide citizens with the rights necessary to perform within the new market economy, effectively translates into a situation where the state "leads and controls subjects without being responsible for them" (Lemke ND in Brown, 2005; p.43). Citizens are locked into a framework that encourages them to principally work for, and worry about, themselves in order to become successful entrepreneurs; human misfortune is interpreted as the failure of individuals to "navigate impediments to prosperity" (Brown, 2005; p.42), thus in cases where the circumstances hinder equal access to resources and opportunities, and where people fight for their daily survival in a system that excludes 'losers', social problems are criminalised (Giroux, 2005; p.8). The individual is therefore slowly "detached from social relationship" (Clarke, 2004; p.31), lost in a race for survival within a highly

[23] As each state building process demonstrates varying degrees of liberal and neoliberal policies, the term "(neo)liberal" is here used to encompass these variations.

competitive environment where social and economic powers have been depoliticised (Brown, 2005; p.43) and where "a fully realised neoliberal citizenry […] barely exists as a public" (ibid).

Furthermore, by contracting to, and partnering with, other organisations, the state shifts from government to "a technique of governing" (ibid; p.44). However, this form of governance means that where before people had leverage against the state - e.g. because people paid taxes for services and infrastructure they could complain to the state if those functions weren't performed successfully – they are now incapable of putting pressure on one or many of the partners providing those services: by being private, they do not hold the same level of accountability as the state did. Thus, an increasing democratic deficit comes to characterise these new states as "the market place rather than the ballot has become the medium of popular expression" (Storey, 2012; p.178).

Finally, an analysis of past interventions shows that "[(neo)liberal] state building has struggled to promote economic development in post-conflict states" (Barbara, 2008; p.310). Indeed, the high reliance on private investment, combined with a lack of material means characteristic of states emerging from conflicts, has meant in practice that in countries where this investment failed to materialise – since the market situation of countries emerging from conflict is often unattractive to investment – there has been a failure "to redress regional disparities or to promote redistributive policies that might reduce horizontal inequalities" (Putzel, 2005 in Barbara, 2008; p.310), thus leading to considerable developmental gaps (ibid; p.308). Moreover, as the majority of the population in these countries is generally trying to recover from the devastating effects of the conflict on their livelihood, investment in private enterprises usually relies on attracting Foreign Direct Ivestments (FDIs); this is, however, frequently done at the expense of attempting to provide the resources and opportunities necessary to develop the population skill-set and make the country more attractive to private investment, thus "aggravating local political tensions and complicating the prospects for indigenous economic development" (ICC, 2004 in Barbara, 2008; p.311)[24].

[24] For example, in East Timor Barbara (2008; p.312) argues that the lack of adequate attention by the government to its "small market, high costs, low skills base, poor physical infrastructure, and fragile legal institutions" has been a significant obstacle in attracting foreign private investment, at the same time as it has failed to provide its own citizens with opportunities – that is, skill-set – to contribute to the country's economy.

Cities, as indicated previously, have come to play a significant role as focal points of (neo)liberal economic, political and social development, they have "become key factors for the inclusion of countries into the international political economy" (Potter, 1990 in Esser, 2004; p.8). This unique position, in contrast with rural areas, makes them particularly interesting sites for analysing the impact of state building (neo)liberal policies on the development of a political community in societies which tissue has been deeply affected by conflicts. Indeed, the failures of the post-conflict (neo)liberal practices highlighted above materialise immediately in city contexts where shanties of migrants sprout next to the mansions of successful citizen-entrepreneurs, the factories of industrial state capitalism and the skyscrapers erected as smokescreens of national success to attract foreign investors (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.196). The stark contrasts that emerge therefore become symbols of state institutions' inability to ensure social justice through the provision of equal access to resources and opportunities for its citizens – substantive and formal citizenship; as a result, they produce new urban landscapes of difference where "new kinds of citizens engage each other in struggles over the nature of belonging to the national society" (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.196).

2.4. Conclusion – where is the political community in international state building?

Through a review of the development of international post-conflict reconstruction assistance, this chapter aimed to highlight the paradigm shifts underpinning the rationale for post-conflict interventions. Whilst initially, under the Marshall Plan, international post-conflict reconstruction assistance was delivered in a framework that respected the historicity of the emergence of the state, the geopolitical context within which it evolved led, however, to the emergence of a paradox. Indeed, maintaining the Western state as an ideal-type for the reconstruction of post-conflict countries, the nature of international post-conflict reconstruction gradually moved from financial state assistance to more interventionist approaches to the reconstruction of state institutions. As a result, locked into a territorial vision of the sovereign state (Richmond, 2014; p.10) and firmly grounded in the "unquestioning belief in the universality of [(neo)liberal] state structures and the technology of institutional transfer" (Dinnen, 2008; p.8), state building interventions operate within a framework where the historical relationship between state and society has lost its importance.

The second part of this chapter argued that whilst initially state building was elaborated within a framework that put liberal peace, and consequently democracy and social justice, at the centre of its rationale for intervention, the implementation of state building to date has significantly moved away from the processes it originally sought to strengthen. Through a review of the literature on the emergence of states, this chapter aimed to demonstrate the mutually constitutive relationship between state and society that defined the development of the state system on which today's world order continues to function. It placed the state back into its historical context, and argued that while states cannot be seen as a mere set of institutions controlling, protecting and regulating an internationally recognised territory, similarly the emergence of a political community cannot be taken for granted.

Rather, state and society are highly contingent notions at the heart of the development of the state (Dinnen, 2007; p.1). Their close relationship has been defined throughout history by the necessity of groups of people, living within flexible territorial boundaries, to organise themselves; such organisation was entrusted – through various means – to sovereign bodies – of different nature – who maintained their authority by legitimising their position of power. This chapter argued, however, that whilst these relationships were originally flexible and were constantly subject to change, the territorialisation of the state fixed them within a territory. As such, it forced sovereign authorities to establish systems of rule that could facilitate the peaceful coexistence of a wide variety of local polities. Within this new framework defined by fixed territorial boundaries, the notions of sovereignty and legitimacy acquired new significance: sovereignty progressively ceased to refer to a divine right to rule, and was replaced by sovereign entities' necessity to build respect for their authority across the territory; such authority now stemmed from the sovereign's ability to garner support from all the different social groups it governed through the establishment of legitimate rule.

Citizenship gained a central position within this new territorial organisation of power. The relationship of the population with authority was no longer restricted to that of subjects consenting to sovereign rule, but instead evolved to be mutually constitutive as defined by a social contract. Thus, as sovereign authorities gradually transformed into states, their institutions aimed at protecting citizens' rights – formal citizenship – in order to form a citizenry "better equipped to consider, discuss, and construct a social order based on justice" (Paz-Fuchs,

2011; p.7) against which to assess the fairness of state institutions. To facilitate such process, however, it is crucial that state institutions function to create a system providing citizens with the opportunities to access those rights – substantive citizenship. Consequently, within a fixed territorial framework, the ability of state institutions to foster substantive citizenship established dynamics that facilitated the interaction of a wide variety of social groups across different spaces within the territory, creating "constant processes of social construction" (Penrose, 2009; p.226) where local polities became nested into a political community that extended to the whole territory. The establishment of formal citizenship, on the other hand, extended the scale of state institutions' reach from the state to the local level.

Consequently, using the state's historically characteristic notions of territory, sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship – both substantive and formal – to define the relationship between state building and the construction of a political community – as illustrated in Figure 4 below – this chapter has demonstrated that the ahistorical nature of state building interventions can have a significant impact on the ability of the new states to create the representations of a political community in their citizens' minds. The consequences on legitimacy and sovereignty can therefore have a negative impact on the state building process itself and its initial objective of liberal peace.

Figure 4 – The relationship between state building and political community



Source: elaborated by the author

Urban spaces, as opposed to the territorial state, offer the opportunity to explore how the implementation of ahistorical state building processes within historically charged environments – socially, economically and politically – can significantly affect the development of citizenship across different spaces and at varied scales. They offer a context where the impact of (neo)liberal state policies materialises in the production of new spaces where inequalities between residents become too gross, and "the areas of commonality too few" (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.192), leading to the realm of the political, within which "identities are formed and new agendas are generated" (Barnett and Low, 2009; p.72), becoming increasingly divided. As a result, new "life-worlds [emerge] constituted by relatively stable associations, relatively known and shared histories, and collectively traversed and legible spaces and places" (Appadurai, 2003 in Esser, 2004; p.9), which contribute to the disintegration of social representations of a political community (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.192). The next chapter aims to develop an analytical framework that facilitates an analysis of the way in which these new urban spaces contribute to fragmenting local representations of citizenship and political community as citizens' lack of voice in their new state system leads to exit in the shape of "oppositional, marginalised or resistant identity-based belonging […] at least partially constituted and framed by the shared experience of social exclusion" (Taylor, 2009; p.295).

CHAPTER 3 – PNALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

“There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you can't take part; you can't even passively take part, and you've got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the apparatus, and you've got to make it stop. And you've got to indicate to the people who run it, to the people who own it, that unless you're free, the machine will be prevented from working at all!”

(Mario Savio, 1964)

3. Analytical Framework

This chapter builds on the previous argument that the notions of state and political community at the heart of the state project are characterised by a historical, mutually constitutive relationship; accordingly, in the context of international post-conflict reconstruction interventions, any decision affecting the nature of state institutions inevitably deeply pervades the societal and political dynamics (Lun, 2009; p.9) that constitute the development of a political community. On the basis of these assertions, this chapter sets out to develop an analytical framework aimed at facilitating the analysis of the impact of state building on the construction of a political community through an exploration of the construction of citizenship within urban spaces.

It begins by defining the relationship between the notions of state and local polity in terms of actual and virtual. That is, state institutions only exist as actual objects if the processes of polity construction, that emerge from citizens' day-to-day interaction as influenced by state policies, contribute to shaping citizens' virtual representations of belonging to a political community. It is, however, the scales and spaces of these representations that determine whether the state is successful in creating the imagined space of the political community (Taylor, 2009; p.296). As such, this chapter introduces the idea that whilst substantive citizenship favours the spatial extension of state authority, formal citizenship facilitates state's reach at different scales. Finally, social cohesion is introduced here to facilitate the articulation of political, economic and social dynamics at different scales and within different spaces in order to understand whether "various strategies and technologies of citizenship" (Isin, 2002 in Secor, 2004; p.353) might constitute themselves "differently from the dominant images given to them" (ibid).

3.1. Actual and virtual

According to Gilles Deleuze (1996), the concepts of actual and virtual are complementary and cannot be dissociated from each other; "purely actual objects do not exist" (Deleuze, 1996; p.148), but instead "every actual surrounds itself with a cloud of virtual images" (ibid). Objects, he argues, can only become actual if they are "actualised in sensible composites" (Deleuze, 1994 in Marston, Jones III and Woodward, 2005; p.425) through virtual representations. There exist, however, "a vast regime of differential potentialities" (ibid) through which virtual representations can actualise objects, so that virtual reflections of an object in one context may

differ significantly from virtual reflections of the same object in another context where “other combinations of potential and actual relations” (ibid) result in different actualisations of that object. Therefore, the actual is not in opposition with the virtual; rather, the two terms are mutually constitutive as the actual is mirrored in the virtual where all the possibilities for change of the actual lie, so that “there is […] oscillation, a perpetual exchange between the actual object and its virtual image: the virtual image never stops becoming actual” (Deleuze, 1996; p.149).

The relationship between the actual and the virtual is therefore akin to the understanding of the mutually constitutive relationship between the state and the political community at the heart of the ideal-type Western state. Indeed, since within the ideal-type state it is “impossible to lay a claim to a state without grounding this claim in the demonstrable capacity” to represent a political community (Penrose, 2009; p.226), states can only become actualised if their existence finds representations in the image of the political community. However, as seen in the previous chapter, the historical emergence of the state required the progressive encompassing of a wide variety of local polities within newly fixed territorial boundaries; this meant that each of these social groups, albeit sharing the same internationally recognised territory, reflected their own virtual image of polity served to actualise their own authoritative figure within specific spaces. Consequently, the process of state formation entailed the development of state institutions that could penetrate all these different groups, with the aim of fostering new potentialities to actualise authority at the higher scale of the state – that is, legitimacy – and across the whole territory – that is, sovereignty.

It is within this framework of actualisation of the state through the virtual representation of a political community that citizenship gained its central position. As argued in 2.3.4, in order to expand the spaces and scales at which its authority is recognised, a state needs to foster both substantive and formal citizenship amongst its population. Substantive citizenship is the virtual image of the state’s ability to promote social justice across its territory. Social justice, however, is highly contingent upon the context within which state policies are implemented; that is, the wide variety of social, economic, historical and political contexts within which state policies are implemented across the territory, represent a vast regime of potentialities that significantly affect how these policies materialise. As such, whilst certain emerging physical environments facilitate access to opportunities, therefore

fostering the virtual image of substantive citizenship, others might instead hinder such process.

Formal citizenship, on the other hand, is the virtual image of the state's ability to reach its citizens at different scales with the establishment of a system where citizens can exercise the rights they have accessed through the realisation of substantive citizenship. That is, state institutions must allow enough room for citizens to exercise their social, economic and political rights so that they can build virtual representations of their membership to the state. The actualisation of the state takes place when both substantive and formal citizenship are realised so that citizens across all spaces and scales build representations of a sense of belonging to the imagine space of the state (Taylor, 2009; p.226); only then does state sovereignty extend across the whole territory and legitimacy reach all scales of society, turning the state into an actual object.

In the context of this research, urban spaces are the *locus* where the materialisation of state policies affects the "material actualisation of potentialities" (Marston et al, 2005; p.425); that is, as described by Isin (2007; p.212), urban spaces represent both the wide variety of physical environments shaped by the materialisation of state policies – *urbs* – and the resulting multitude of combinations of potential and actual relations (Marston et al, 2005; p.425), contingent upon those environments, that define formal and substantive citizenship – *civitas* (Isin, 2007; p.212). As such, the inequalities emerging from the (neo)liberal processes of state building may result, as seen in the previous chapter, in the creation of contrasting urban spaces where access to opportunities, and therefore the ability to exercise one's right, vary significantly. Consequently, if the state building process produces areas with limited spaces and scales of interaction that allow groups of people to participate only on highly unequal terms or are denied access altogether (Kabeer, 2005; p.22), these groups may create new representations of *civitas* resulting, not from their ability to participate in the new state, but from "their attempts to challenge these exclusionary processes and bring about change" (ibid); such process can happen at the local scale, thus resulting into exit – as people build different social identities – or at the scale of the state, resulting into boycott – whether as demonstrations or sparking new conflicts.

The interaction between *urbs* and *civitas* will therefore determine whether emerging virtual representations of citizenship will result in the actualisation of the

state through its political community, or whether fragmented representations of legitimacy and sovereignty will fragment the urban territory and therefore threaten the actualisation of the state. Consequently, the use of urban spaces as the *locus* for analysing the different potential representations of the political community provides the adequate context to understand how state building can the construction of a political community in ways that undermine the success of international post-conflict reconstruction assistance; for indeed, "the exclusions and discriminations that occur within society" (DRC, 2006; p.5), and materialise in the *urbs,* "affect state capacity to be responsible, legitimate and accountable to all" (ibid), that is *civitas*. Figure 5 below illustrates how actual/virtual and *urbs*/*civitas* fit within the relationship between state building and political community as elaborated in section 2.4.

Figure 5 – State building and political community as actual and virtual



Source: elaborated by the author

3.2. Scale and the social construction of space

The articulation of the mutually constitutive relationship between states and the political community around the notions of actual and virtual, brought to the fore two important dynamics for the construction of the ideal-type state: the state is actualised when it succeeds in building "the social imaginary" (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.192) of a political community in its citizens. Building a political community, however, requires that the state successfully penetrates society

establishing structures and implementing policies that facilitate the negotiation of several loyalties existing at several virtual "spatial scales" (Kaplan D.H, 2009; p.252) – that is, loyalty across different spaces and at different scales. The following section therefore reviews the literature on scalar thought as a mode of geopolitical organisation, and argues that the notions of space and scale, whilst distinct, are interrelated and key to understanding the relationship between state building and political community.

3.2.1. Scalar thought

The notion of scale gradually emerged in the 17th century as dominant groups sought to consolidate their territories (Isin, 2007; p.215) in the context of the progressive establishment of the international state system. As states became "containers of society" (Agnew, 1994; p.68) within a new organisation of European order characterised by fixed territorial boundaries, scale emerged in parallel to mapmaking (McMaster and Sheppard, 2004; p.3) as a "technique of government" (Isin, 2007; p.215); that is, the establishment of maps and scales allowed them to organise their territory according to nested administrative units that ranged from the local – household, neighbourhood – to the urban – city, metropolitan area – to the much wider national and international scales – state, continent (McMaster and Sheppard, 2004; p.4). Sovereigns – and, subsequently, states – used these administrative units for the purpose of "transmitting, containing, controlling, regulating and instantiating power relations" (Isin, 2007; p.217).

According to Isin (ibid; p.215), to facilitate this organisation of the territory under the new international state order, scale was articulated in a three-step process (ibid; p.215): it became ahistorical, as though the distinction between local, urban, regional and national had always been a given; it was formulated in exclusive terms, in that the relationship between the different scales was not mutually constitutive; and, it was framed exclusively in hierarchical terms, with "the state as the creator of all scales" (ibid). As such, from the 17th to the mid-20th century, geographic scale became "a familiar and taken-for-granted concept" (Delaney and Leitner, 1997; p.93) across a wide variety of disciplines, such as political geography, international studies and urban planning.

The notion of scale as described above remained unquestioned in its application across these fields for nearly three centuries. However, its acceptance as a "nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing sizes" (ibid) progressively brought

to the fore questions as to the nature of scale seen in solely hierarchical terms; rather, for the state to be actualised it needs to create "in the minds of [the population] a kind of mental map or image" (ibid; p.94) through the penetration of a wide variety of spaces at different scales, each actualised by their own virtual image. It is the relationship between virtual representations of social identity and the local spaces in which they are constructed that triggered increasing critiques of scalar thought.

3.2.2. Critique of scalar thought

In the middle of the 1970s, the notion of scale came under severe scrutiny in a wide variety of fields. Human geographers, for instance, began questioning the notion of spatial scale as distance – that is, urban scale is bigger than local scale because the distances are wider on maps; they argued that, for instance, whilst "black and white neighbourhoods may only be across the street from one another, […] the effective social distance separating them, as indicated by minimal social interaction between them, can be enormous" (McMaster and Sheppard, 2004; p.15). In the field of urban planning, writers such as Lefebvre (1974) contested the notion of scale as spatially fixed, conceiving it instead as spatially produced through "the characteristic political-economic processes of a certain societal system, such as capitalism" (ibid). Finally, within the field of political geography, writers such as Taylor (1982) and Smith (1984) recast scale as a political project, a container of ideologies and identities within given spaces of control.

The introduction of the spatial concern into the notion of scale is what came to be known as the "spatial turn" (Soja in Ehrenfeucht, 2002; p.9). Critics were concerned, as highlighted above, with the exclusively hierarchical understanding of scale; they sought, instead, to reconceptualise scale as the product of the relationship between social interactions and the spaces in which they take place. As such, Swyngedouw (2004 in Marston et al, 2005; p.418) argues that, "scale configurations change as power shifts, both in terms of their nesting and interrelations and in terms of their spatial extent". Similarly, Jones (1998, in ibid; p.416) stated that scale is not "an ontological structure which 'exists', but […] an epistemological one – a way of knowing or apprehending". The spatial turn, therefore, moved away from the notion of scale as "ontologically given" (Delaney and Leitner, 1997; p.93) to introduce instead the notion of scale as "socially produced" (ibid).

To say that scale is socially produced as a result of social interactions within different spaces has important consequences for the relationship between states and the political community; it brings to the fore once more the mutually constitutive nature of the two concepts, reconciling the verticality of the state "as an institution somehow 'above' civil society, community and family" (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; p.982) and its spatiality as fused with the political community "located within an ever widening series of circles that begins with family and local community and ends with the systems of nation states" (ibid). Indeed, spaces and scales are virtual representations of how the state affects the physical environments within which social interactions take place, and how such environments shape behaviours, thinking and identity consciousness (Soja in Ehrenfeucht, 2002; p.10) amongst citizens. Thus, to create a political community out of the nested smaller scales of polity emerging in local spaces, it is crucial that places and spaces are no longer taken as "self-evident and static backdrops, sets, or stages on which human events happen" (Taylor, 2009; p.296); rather, places need to be "recast in dynamic relationship with the people that inhabit them" (ibid) so as to understand how state policies affect formal and substantive citizenship, and how, in turn, these affect the spaces and scales where local polity is constructed.

3.2.3. The social construction of polity, spaces and scales

Following from the spatial turn described above, scale is understood in the context of this research as being "constituted through its historically evolving positionality within a larger relations grid of vertically 'stretched' and horizontally 'dispersed' sociospatial processes, relations and interdependencies" (Brenner, 2001 in Marston et al, 2005; p.418). That is, horizontal and vertical relations are intrinsically interwoven, and for the state to succeed in maintaining control of the population at all scales, it needs to be able to penetrate and shape relations across all spaces. To do so, Marston (2000; p.221) argues that there are three main principles to understanding the construction of scale, drawn from Marx and Lefebvre: firstly, scale is a virtual representation of "a way of framing conceptions of reality" (Delaney and Leitner, 1997; p.94) resulting from social interactions; secondly, this virtual representation is the product of, and materialises into, "everyday life and macro-level social structures" (Marston, 2000; p.221); and, thirdly, because scale is socially constructed and social relations are subject to

constant changes, it is transient by nature, open to contestation and change. These principles are analysed in more details hereafter.

Bringing back the notions of actual and virtual, the first point made my Marston is that the scalar administrative units devised by the state, to control and organise its population, can only become actual objects – that is, they only function – if they are actualised by virtual representations of the citizens they are supposed to control. Formal and substantive citizenship are key to this relationship. That is, if the state wishes to reach its population at all scales, it needs to act on the spatial relations that characterise its population: socially constructed local polities. As argued in section 2.2.3, local polities are constituted through engagements and practices of interactions that take place between different groups (Massey, 2004; p.1). These interactions are facilitated by the development of a substantive citizenship grounded in a notion of social justice, which allows people to build representations of belonging to a wider, just political community. The successful development of a substantive citizenship across the whole territory will subsequently facilitate citizens' relations with the state as it provides them with the tools to participate in the checks and balances against the state, thus developing a representation of formal citizenship. Consequently, whilst substantive citizenship enables the construction of a political community across all spaces, formal citizenship facilitates the relationship between states and citizens across all scales.

Shaping substantive and formal citizenship, however, "begins with the notion that space is socially produced, that we make our geographies, shape our spaces from the local to the global; and they simultaneously shape us, shape our behaviour and our thinking, shape our identity and our class consciousness" (Soja in Ehrenfeucht, 2002; p.10). That is, state policies inevitably shape the physical environments in which scalar and spatial relationships take place; the "practices, trajectories and interrelations" (Massey, 2004; p.1) produced by these physical environments contribute to creating representations of social justice based on "more or less unjust or oppressive geographies" (Soja in Ehrenfeucht, 2002; p.10) that feed the development of substantive citizenship. However, the development of substantive citizenship also contributes to shape spaces; that is, unjust geographies, compounded with an inability to trigger the necessary changes through formal citizenship, can lead to representations of smaller spaces and scales of interactions by the citizens. When these spaces and scales are in opposition to the

state established structures, these structures fail to foster their representations and therefore fail to be actualised.

Indeed, the notion of citizenship, as understood within the context of this research in its substantive and formal form, is a process that "assembles identities […] and disciplines space" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985 in Secor, 2004; p.352). Therefore, if the state creates, whether willingly or unwillingly, spaces of difference within a wider territory – substantive citizenship – and the state system does not allow room for citizens' ability to influence decision-making – formal citizenship – then citizens might assemble to organise against unjust geographies; that is, new spaces and scales of identities are formed around "politics of everyday practices, the tactical trajectories through which citizen-strangers trace unintended, heterogeneous spatial stories within and against an imposed political terrain (de Certeau, 1984 in Secor, 2004; p.353). Therefore, citizens' representations of spaces and scales are contingent upon the historical, economic, social and political context within which state institutions implement policies that shape different physical environments; as such, the state's ability to actualise spatial identities such as places, regions, states (Massey, 2004; p.1) through citizens' virtual representations of spaces and scales, is regularly contested and "inevitably historically changing" (ibid) as the spaces and scales of citizenship vary.

The state-centric approach adopted by international post-conflict reconstruction assistance, however, remains fixed within the pre-spatial turn scalar hierarchy. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the space of the political community is merely the one defined by the internationally agreed territory, and scale refers uniquely to the establishment of nested administrative control units. As a result, this approach abstracts itself from the many potential representations of citizenship that state policies in different political, economic, social and historical environments can produce; the actualisation of the state may therefore be significantly threatened by an absence of the development of a political community across scales and spaces. Figure 6 below illustrates how scale and space fit within the relationship between state building and political community as elaborated in section 2.4.

Figure 6 – Space and scale as substantive and formal citizenship



Source: elaborated by the author

3.3. Social cohesion

The previous section has highlighted that, through its impact on physical environments, state policy can influence the spaces and scales at which citizens build their representations of formal and substantive citizenship; this, in turn, can significantly affect the virtual representation of the political community and, consequently, the actualisation of the state. This has considerable implications for the argument, developed in section 2.3, that state building contributes to shaping the institutions and policies of post-conflict countries; it implies that "decisions affecting local communities are increasingly made elsewhere" (Soja in Ehrenfeucht, 2002; p.7). The following section introduces social cohesion as a tool that facilitates an analysis of the interrelation between scalar and spatial processes in order to understand, within the context of urban spaces, how an ahistorical approach to the construction of the state system can not only miss, but also run counter, to the processes of local polity construction inherent to societies.

3.3.1. Debates on social cohesion – a framing tool

The concept of social cohesion has gained particular attention in the policymaking sphere since the early 1990s. It has been used both at the national – e.g. Canadian research on identity, culture and values[25], Dutch government's invitation to social scientists to analyse social cohesion – and international – e.g. OECD, European Union – levels to warn against the negative effects of economic restructuring and to bring more attention to societal cohesion "in order to sustain that very restructuring" (Jenson, 1998; p.3). Yet, despite such widespread national and international attention, a study carried out by the Canadian Policy Research Network (CPRN) on mapping social cohesion[26] reveals that not only was there, as of 1998, still little academic research exploring the concept, but that the definition of such concept remained elusive at best, and confusing for the most part. Table 2 below offers an overview of three different definitions that reveal social cohesion as a complex web of inter-connected elements.

Table 2 – Examples of definitions of social cohesion as of 1998

Source of the research	Definition of social cohesion
Canada's Policy Research Sub-Committee on Social Cohesion[27]	The ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity within Canada, based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among all Canadians.
Commissariat général du Plan of the French government[28]	Set of social processes that help instil in individuals the sense of belonging to the same community and the feeling that they are recognised as members of that community.
OECD[29]	The link to social cohesion is the belief that, "... it is safe to assume that most people prefer a world where life is characterised by stability, continuity, predictability, and secure access to well-being. Societies with such attributes garner more easily the commitment and adherence that sustain societal cohesion over time"

Source: Adapted from Jenson (1998), pp.4-5

[25] Canadian Heritage (1996), Canadian Identity, Culture and Values: Building a Cohesive Society, 13 September

[26] Jenson, J. (1998), Mapping Social Cohesion: the State of Canadian Research, CPRN Study No. F/03

[27] Policy Research Sub-Committee on Social Cohesion (PRSub-C) (1997), Social Cohesion Research Workplan, March.

[28] Plan – Commissariat Général du Plan (1997), Cohésion sociale et territoires, Paris: La Documentation Française.

[29] OECD (1997), Societal Cohesion and the Globalising Economy, Paris: OECD.

These definitional variations raise two important points in relation to social cohesion, as identified in a follow up to the CPRN study published[30] in 2002. Firstly, the wide variety of debates has allowed for a wide range of interpretations that are all heavily dependent on the entry point of the research[31]; it is thus more accurate to qualify social cohesion as a 'quasi-concept' (Bernard, 1999 in ibid; p.1), which "serves usefully as a *framing concept* [original emphasis] for thinking through the complexity of policy issues" (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002; p.V). Its main attribute is that it serves as an instrument to correlate different aspects of society and the economy, reintroducing "non market variables into accounts of human behaviour" in order to draw attention to "neglected non-market conditions of economic growth and social development" (Mayer, 2003; p.109). Secondly, social cohesion is used in policy and academic circles to "make sense of a wide range of challenges" (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002; p. VI), in opposition to "single-focus policies such as anti-poverty, employment, community development, and so on (all of which are in themselves complex and multidimentional) do not seem to work as they should" (ibid).

Within the context of this research, therefore, social cohesion provides the adequate tool to analyse the impact of state building on the construction of representations of citizenship in post-conflict societies: it recreates the connection between scales and spaces, between state policies and local polity construction, and comes to fill the gap left by too much emphasis, put in the past decade, on the role of social capital (Goodhand, Hulme and Lewer, 2000; p.391) in post-conflict reconstruction. Indeed, social capital is seen, within the context of these interventions, "as providing the basis for communities […] to act together to address violence and disorder" (World Bank, 2011; p.31) through "networks, norms and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam, 1993 in ibid). It has come to be criticised, however, for "paying scant attention to issues of power, inequality and social differentiation" (Goodhand et al, 2000; p.391) as conditions fostered by state policies and that can potentially affect the development and nature of social capital.

[30] Beauvais, C. and Jenson, J. (2002), Social Cohesion: Updating the State of the Research, CPRN Discussion Paper No. F/22

[31] For instance, research focusing on social cohesion as a factor contributing to growth or well-being understand social cohesion in terms of social capital (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002; p.V), whereas other analyses focusing on strategic action for fostering social cohesion approach the concept from an agency point of view and focus on the actors – e.g. state, civil society (ibid; p.IV).

As such, social cohesion maintains the spatial dimension of local polity construction through notions of trust, belonging and well-being within communities – as illustrated by the definitions presented in Table 2 – and complements it with the scalar dimension by providing a link to understand the effects of the state's circumscribed role in supporting development (Barbara, 2008; p.309), within the framework of (neo)liberal state building, at the local scale. Urban spaces, this research argues, are the appropriate *locus* to analyse social cohesion for they are "prime sites where identities are staked, belonging is negotiated, and rights pursued" (Secor, 2004; p.353).

3.3.2. Definition of social cohesion in the context of the research

a) Defining social cohesion

In the context of this research, the actualisation of the state is premised on the virtual representation of the image of the political community in its citizens' mind; such image is grounded in the state's ability, as highlighted in the notion of liberal peace, to build socially just environments where people can develop representations of substantive citizenship – across spaces – and, consequently, formal citizenship – across scales. As such, this approach "stresses the disintegrative effects of social inequality and exclusionary dynamics with regard to access to resources and markets, in contrast with solidarity and the reduction in wealth and income disparities that are required to create equal opportunities and a sense of fairness and belonging" (Miciukiewicz et al, 2012; p.1858).

The introduction of social cohesion within the framework of this research, therefore, serves as a tool to understand how the implementation of state policies within different social, economic, political and historical environments can lead to the creation of contrasting environments of opportunities – substantive citizenship – thus upholding or running against the social contract between state and society and leading to different representations of formal citizenship – through the ability to exercise one's social, economic, political and cultural rights. In this context, the definition of social cohesion developed by Forrest and Kearns (2001; p.2129) is particularly adequate as four of its five domains – as illustrated in Table 3 below – reflect these dynamics. The domain of "place attachment and identity", however, has been removed from the context of social cohesion for the purpose of this research; rather, it will be used instead in the following section to understand how

social cohesion dynamics at urban level can contribute to, or hinder, the creation of a political community.

Table 3 – Domains of social cohesion

Domain	Description
Common values and a civic culture	Common aims and objectives; common moral principles and codes of behaviour; support for political institutions and participation in politics
Social order and social control	Absence of general conflict and threats to the existing order; absence of incivility; effective informal social control; tolerance; respect for difference; intergroup co-operation
Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities	Harmonious economic and social development and common standards; redistribution of public finances and of opportunities; equal access to services and welfare benefits; ready acknowledgement of social obligations and willingness to assist others
Social networks and social capital	High degree of social interaction within communities and families; civic engagement and associational activity; easy resolution of collective action problems
Place attachment and identity	Strong attachment to place; intertwining of personal and place identity

Source: Forrest and Kearns (2001; p.2129)

b) Understanding the four elements of social cohesion

A society can claim to have **common values and civic culture**, Forrest and Kearns (2000; p.997) argue, when it is characterised by, on the one hand, common aims, objective, moral principles and codes of behaviour, and, on the other hand, a "widespread support for political institutions and general engagement with political systems and institutions" (ibid). Post-conflict countries, however, are generally characterised by a societal tissue that has been torn by years, sometimes decades of war, and where common aims, objectives, moral principles and codes of behaviour might have been lost or, as war created societal cleavages, been recreated at more local scales. As such, the establishment of state institutions in post-conflict countries also entails building institutions that provide citizens with political arenas that are "open and sufficiently democratic to have the potential to reach consensus on the collective action and policies"

(Miciukiewicz et al, 2012; p.1859); this way, through collective participation, different groups can mediate their differences and build new common aims and objectives, whilst state institutions promote common moral principles and codes of behaviour.

As argued in section 2.3, however, international post-conflict assistance delivered as state building does not prioritise the establishment of a state system that can best represents all the expectations of its diverse society. Rather, faced with "ridiculously short timetables" (Ayoob, 1995 in Taylor and Botea, 2008; p.31), state building processes establish institutions that most efficiently deliver the core functions of the state, as dictated by Western liberal democratic concerns, and that often bear little resemblance to citizens' expectations. As a result, to understand whether a society is cohesive, it is not enough to look at the effectiveness of state institutions as they are being 'advertised' by the state and international community; it is also crucial to understand citizens' representations of the system's ability to foster formal citizenship through an investigation "citizens' knowledge of the system, their feelings towards it and their judgement of it" (Almond and Verba, 1963 in Kearns and Forrest, 2000; p.997).

The analysis of state formation, presented in section 2.2.2, highlighted that states are actualised when "the authority of the governing organisation is accepted, governments are trusted, and […] collectively agreed rights and responsibilities are mostly met" (Kearns and Forrest, 2000; p.997). For these conditions to be met, the state needs to be able to maintain **social order and social control** through legitimate and recognised means. That is, if the state develops regulations and institutions that favour dialogue within and between communities affected by conflict, inequality and unequal distribution of power are less likely to result in violent conflict. Furthermore, it increases citizens' sense of security and fairness, therefore building trust in state institutions and facilitating social control. If, on the other hand, state institutions are designed, within a (neo)liberal framework, to protect individual rights and repress conflict criminalising those that are seen as failing to take part in the system – failing to become citizen entrepreneurs, as seen in section 2.3.4 – and disrupting it through violence, they fail in creating representations of a common project. Rather, unfair social control procedures encourage passive citizenship and estrangements amongst "quasi-members of society (those people with partial involvement in the formal labour market, low educational qualifications, low involvement in voluntary associations and poor

health)" (ibid; p.998), a lack of voice that might in turn lead to exit or boycott "expressed as disorder or petty crime" (ibid). This is particularly relevant in countries emerging from conflict where relations to state authority are often marred by years of state violence.

Indeed, as seen in section 2.2.1, in the context of liberal peace the ability of the state to maintain social order is often directly related to its ability to promote social justice by increasing **social solidarity** and **reducing wealth disparities** (Wold Bank, 2011; Goodhand et al, 2000). That is, violent conflicts, as much as relapses into violence in post-conflict countries, are seen as a result of income and wealth inequalities that bring about "a breakdown of in social cohesion through the stress, frustration and family disruption they cause, in turn leading to problems of crime and violence" (Kawachi and Kennedy, 1997 in Forrest and Kearns, 2000; p.999). Consequently, as argued in section 2.3.4, it is crucial for post-conflict states to promote social justice through the development and implementation of policies that foster equal access to opportunities through a fair delivery of services. This, in turn, leads to a more harmonious economic and social development that contributes to building a representation of state institutions as promoting democracy through substantial and, consequently, formal citizenship – as access to opportunities facilitates access to economic, social and political rights. However, the establishment of (neo)liberal states, through state building processes, can severely damage this goal through its market *laissez-faire* approach; therefore, in order to ensure social cohesion, new states need to promote social solidarity by promoting the development of social obligations amongst the population, for "the most impressive developmental progress historically has not come through free markets alone but through state intervention and strategic political economy reflecting popular aspirations" (Murray, 2009; p.379).

Social capital plays a key role in understanding whether the state's ability to promote the three previous domains leads to the development of representations of formal and substantive citizenship that cut across "identities and loyalties at several spatial scales" (Kaplan, D.H., 2009; p.252). Much like social cohesion, there exists now a vast literature on the notion of social capital (Ostrom, 1994; Putnam, 1995; Lin, 1999; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Fukuyama, 2001; Adler and Kwon 2002; Mayer, 2003) and there is a wide variety of definitions that vary according to the point of emphasis of the research field (see APPENDIX II for a comprehensive list of different definitions). For the purpose of this research, a

combination of two definitions will be used to define social capital as "the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in one's social networks[32]" (Woolcock, 1998; p.153) that are developed by "individuals spending time and energy working with other individuals to find better ways of making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible" (Ostrom, 1994; p.528). The combination of these definitions accurately reflects the social aspect of this notion – people's interactions – and the economic aspect encompassed by capital – as a result of these elements people are capable of achieving economic ends they would not have achieved alone.

Therefore, in countries recovering from internal conflict, understanding the stock of social capital characterising society can become a decisive factor in the success of a state building intervention. Indeed, in these societies networks of information and trust are often already well established as a result of pre-colonial societal organisation – such as traditional leaders, kinship ties, etc – or networks that have emerged as coping mechanisms during the conflict – such as resistance movements, political affiliations; understanding how they function, and using them, would facilitate the state's ability to reach its citizens across all spaces. For instance, Robert Putnam (1993) carried out a research in Italy to understand why the regional governments set up in the 1970s were successful in promoting democracy in some regions, whilst failing in others. The results of the research showed that "some traditions of civic engagement are the hallmarks of a successful region" (Putnam, 1993) where pre-existing systems of information – such as newspaper readership –, networks of trust – such as membership in choral societies – and norms of reciprocity – such as engagement in common matters – have facilitated adaptability to the new system.

Similarly, the ability of international organisations to understand pre-existing social arrangements is critical to establishing a system of governance that distributes resources and opportunities in a manner that facilitates the coexistence of customary and state-based governance (Cummins, 2013; p.144); this, in turn, will determine whether the emerging state will permeate all scales of society or whether new hybrids of governance will emerge. In this context, Ostrom (1994; p.528) provides the example of government engineers in Indonesia who attempted to improve the operation of a water system by removing the old system and

[32] This definition itself encapsulates the main elements of the definitions of the major contributors to social capital theory

replacing it with a more modern one; the failure of government officials to take into consideration traditional farmers' allocation of water meant that they were no longer able to allocate it fairly in the way that had previously been agreed upon and which was more efficient for everyone.

Consequently, for social capital to facilitate the development of social cohesion, "top-down efforts are usually needed to introduce, sustain, and institutionalise 'bottom-up' development" (Uphoff, 1992 in Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; p.14); this is what Woolcock and Narayan (2000; p.7) refer to as the 'network' approach'[33]. It argues that there exist two types of community ties – community understood here as a local polity – that is, 'bonding' – intra-community relations – and 'bridging' – inter-community bonds. Intra-community ties might emerge more easily between people interacting daily within given spaces, but these ties might sometimes lead to communities that are very closed-off if they are not complemented by inter-community bonds. The latter, however, might not materialize as easily as the former and may, therefore, be engendered by national policies aimed at facilitating interaction between the different communities. Indeed, relations between different communities that are 'bonded' might at times be contentious – for historical, security and/or socio-economic reasons – but conflict need not be a negative thing; rather, if the right processes are in place conflict "can create opportunities for bridges to other networks and can displace relations that tend to build dependency, limit access to new information and opportunities and retard change" (Colletta and Cullen, 2000; p.93).

The impact of international state building interventions on shaping state institutions is critical in defining the ability and willingness of the state in facilitating bridging between communities. Indeed, the current focus on (neo)liberal projects, with their emphasis on market driven approaches and individualism, often incurs significant resistance from communities where the state does not reach society or does so in a negative way (Richmond, 2014; p.10). As a result, more hybrid forms of governance emerge instead to respond to state building projects that fail to engage with "history, identity, social justice and emancipation" (ibid) thus producing socio-economic inequalities; these bonds, in turn, reinforce bonding at the expense of bridging so that "poor people may have close-knit and intensive stock of 'bonding'

[33] There are different schools of thought regarding the way in which social capital can be understood and facilitated; the main ones identified by Woolcock and Narayan (2000; pp.6-15) are: Communitarian view (social capital is inherently good); Network view (bonding and bridging); Institutional view (social capital is facilitated by government institutions); and, synergy view (social capital is both bottom-up and top-down)

to get by but be lacking 'bridging' to get ahead" (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; p.3). It is the difference between bridging and bonding of social capital that determines whether a state is capable of developing social cohesion across different spatial scales or, on the contrary, is creating spaces of difference where strongly cohesive bonded neighbourhoods are conflicting with one another, thus fragmenting the images of the state territory. The analysis of social cohesion within urban spaces is therefore useful in determining at what spatial scale citizenship is developing and the relative strength of the contrasting local polities operating at each scale (Kearns and Forrest, 2001; p.2129).

3.4. The construction of citizenship in urban spaces

The introduction of social cohesion in this research's analytical framework serves as a tool to understand how the state policies, emerging from international state building processes, can affect the spatial scales within which citizens interact and build their representations of citizenship. It highlighted that the extent of these states' ability to promote voice, ensure social order and control and facilitate access to opportunities in order to reduce inequalities, can lead to either positive or negative social cohesion – depending on whether social capital is exclusively bonded or both bonded and bridged. Analysing social cohesion, therefore, enables an understanding of the virtual representations of spaces and scales citizens build through their daily interactions within the physical environments where state policies materialise. Urban spaces, this research argues, are ideal sites to carry out an analysis of social cohesion emerging from state building (neo)liberal practices, for everyday spatial interactions amid growing inequalities determine "the common ways in which hegemonic notions of citizenship are both accommodated and disrupted across [these] spaces" (Secor, 2004; p.365).

3.4.1. From cities to urban spaces as sites for local polity construction

Section 2.2.3 argued that polities emerge at the local level as the product of everyday interactions between people living within given spaces; it is the reorganisation of the world order into territorial states that made it imperative for these local polities to become nested in a political community congruent with the territorial borders of the states they found themselves in. It introduced the notion of citizenship as "that identity which subordinates and coordinates all other identities" (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.187), aiming to erode all other forms of hierarchies in favour of a social contract binding citizens and their state in a

territorial relationship characterised by equality of rights (ibid). The creation of the territorial state codified the political community through the establishment of formal citizenship.

Nevertheless, political community remains a relational concept, and even the political communities of the state continue to be defined by a multitude of interactions that take place in a wide variety of spaces. These spaces have, through time, come to represent "symbolic areas and sites, serialities, constellations, pathways, dwelling places, and everyday fixtures" (Edensor, 2009; p.242) shaped by historical relationships of economic, social and political struggles. Thus, as the thoughts and movements of a group have come to be ordered, through time, by these spaces of interaction (Halbwachs, 1950; p.3), the spaces themselves have become the physical expression of images and representations of a local polity. This is what Halbwachs (1994 in ibid; p.72) called "social frameworks of memory"; that is, the internal points of reference that are grounded in an individual's interactions with other people and which constitute that individual's identity (Arraou, 1999; p.73). They are the product of individual memories that emerge and exist in relation to an ensemble of notions, that many other individuals possess, built around individuals, groups, places, dates, words and language forms (ibid; p.73). As such, frameworks of memory vary according to places, with their historical and physical context, thus entwining imaginings of place attachment with understandings of identity and one's place in the world (Taylor, 2009; p.296).

In this context, the construction of a political community requires the ability to devise policies and governance systems that can bind together these different spaces so that the existing scales of belonging (Taylor, 2009; p.295) come to be encompassed within the notion of citizenship; that is, state policies need to be designed so as to ensure that no space of interaction precludes a social group from being able to access the resources and opportunities inherent to the rights of a citizen of the state. Formal citizenship can only contribute to the development of a political community if it is grounded, at the local scale, in inclusive relations guaranteed by a socially just substantive citizenship.

Cities, in this context, are particularly interesting sites for exploring the ability of state policies to foster the kind of formal and substantive citizenship that characterises the political community, for they are a concentration of "the non

local, the strange, the mixed, and the public" (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.188) producing local polities that "decisively expand and erode the rules, meanings, and practices of citizenship" (ibid). This is particularly evident in post-conflict countries where the establishment of (neo)liberal states, as well as the rapid urbanisation that accompanies post-conflict development, attempt to establish a social order where "traditional ties to the community – shared space, close kinship links, shared religious and moral values – [are] replaced by anonymity, individualism and competition" (Forrest and Kearns, 2001; p.2125). In this context, cities become sites where social power, material wealth and authorisation of belonging meet with contestations over marginalisation and exclusions (Taylor, 2009; p.295) producing new forms of substantive citizenship in opposition to a strongly individual formal citizenship.

The use of the term 'city', however, would be inappropriate in the framework for this research because generally references to the city merely refer to its physical characteristics – *urbs*. Rather, in the context of this research the city shapes different forms of citizenship through both its *urbs* – such as houses and roads – and its *civitas* – which citizens acting within these spaces contribute to shaping (Rousseau, 1923; p.244) as the virtual arena where the "drama of life" (Mumford, 1937; p.92) takes place. Consequently, the term 'urban space' is used in order to combine both the physicality of the city as well as the social relations that such physicality produces, and which produce it, thus reflecting the notion of a *civitas* with flexible imagined boundaries according to citizens' representations of their political community and belonging at different spatial scales.

As such, the notion of 'urban' refers here to "an area of continuous development" (Demographia website)[34] characterised by a "density of human structures such as houses, commercial buildings, roads, bridges, and railways" (National Geographic Education)[35] and referring to towns, cities and suburbs (ibid). It is through the urban that state policies materialise through their social, political and economic impacts. 'Space', on the other hand, recalls the idea of *civitas* shaped by processes of exclusion and inclusion through which individuals "articulate themselves as *citizens, strangers, outsiders* and *aliens* as possible ways of being as identities and differences" (Isin, 2007; p.222). 'Space' does not exist in itself

[34] http://demographia.com/db-define.pdf (accessed 28/08/13)

[35] http://education.nationalgeographic.co.uk/education/encyclopedia/urban-area/?ar_a=1

(Duncan and Savage, 1989; p.181), but is instead the virtual product of the interaction of social, political, economic and historical relations that take spatial forms wherein the political mobilisation of social groups is distributed (ibid) to "give birth to bodies politic and social" (Isin, 2007; p.222). It is the constitution of ever widening spaces that determines the emergence of the political community, and, conversely, it is the construction of a polity limited to a local scale that turns a space of interaction into a place of attachment, which furnishes to those social groups a sense of belonging as well as a sense of community with others (Pacione, 2009; p.22).

In other words, in the context of this research 'urban space' is used not only in its "actual form with a spatially enclosed structure (*urbs*) but also includes its virtual form as relations, symbols, imaginaries, representations, categories, ideas, and ideals (*civitas*)" (Isin, 2008; p.266) that contribute to shaping individuals into citizens.

3.4.2. Formal and substantive citizenship in post-conflict urban spaces

Urban spaces are therefore key sites to explore how state institutions can affect the construction of different formulations of citizenship (Staeheli, 2003; p.98) through the implementation of (neo)liberal policies that cause significant developmental disparities – e.g. criminalisation of certain areas, favouring of others, privatisation of services – particularly visible and tangible in the way in which they shape spaces of interaction into "interlacing grids of difference" (Secor, 2004; p.358). But whilst in Western countries there already exists a vast range of literature dealing with the impact of state policies on urban space (Lefebvre, 1974; Brenner, 1999; Marston, 2000; Purcell, 2007; Isin 2007), these have been much less explored in countries recovering from internal conflict.

Instead, this research argues that it is precisely in countries where the social fabric has been damaged by years, sometimes decades, of war, and where it is imperative to (re)build a sense of political community across the whole territory, that the analysis of the construction of both formal and substantive citizenship in urban spaces is particularly useful. Indeed, the rapid social and economic development of the capital of the country – and, at times, other main cities – attracts large numbers of people who never had to interact before – in fact may even be in conflict with each other for historical reasons – and who suddenly find themselves sharing the same urban space and having to compete against each

other to become citizen entrepreneurs. Thus, it is by understanding the politics of everyday practices enacted by citizens interacting in these spaces that one can become aware of the emergence of unintended and heterogeneous "spatial stories within and against an imposed political terrain" (de Certeau in Secor, 2004; p.353). The following points therefore articulate how a combination of historical developments and state building impacts on the urban environment can contribute to the creation of different urban spaces within a given urban area.

a) Urban spaces' historical development

In countries undergoing state building processes, it is key to understand how different physical contexts carry within them the history of social relations that characterise the local polity of the people living and interacting within them as citizens on a daily basis. These interventions need to recognise that the construction of political community is a perpetual re-adaptation between spatial and temporal conditions (Arraou, 1999; p.71); that is, every time there is an impact on the physical context where relationships take place, the place transforms social representations and social representations, in turn, contribute to transforming the place (Halbwachs, 1994 in Arraou, 1999; p.76). This implies, therefore, understanding the relationship of an area with the colonial past as well as the migration patterns that have shaped its population's characteristics.

Whilst the significant urbanisation that characterises post-conflict urban environment often leads to an ever-increasing urban sprawl – see APPENDIX III – the core of the urban space that already existed during colonial times is often the result of a divided world where "the settler's town is a strongly built town, all made of stone and steel… The town belonging to the colonised people […] is a place of ill fame" (King, 2009; p.321). South African urban areas are a particularly good example of these spaces of exclusion, where apartheid has been built into the urban fabric to ensure a clear division between white citizens and non-citizens of other ethnic backgrounds. But the distinctions need not be as clear-cut and visible to be represented in the minds of the population; for instance in Dili – Timor Leste – one area has been clearly marked by its being the locus of colonial power – Portuguese and Indonesian – whilst another emerged as a result of Indonesian techniques of population control, thus significantly impacting the way in which the areas are connected and developed within the urban space.

Migration patterns also have an important impact on social frameworks of memory for they determine whether an area is homogeneous or heterogeneous. That is, whilst in some areas groups of migrants develop a bonded social capital that attracts more migrants from their same areas of origins – homogeneous areas – in other areas the historical, political and development contexts impede the development of such bonded social capital and therefore receive migrants from more diverse areas of origin – heterogeneous areas. Indeed, "migrant social capital resources can work in different ways for different groups of individuals or in different settings" (Garip, 2008; p.592). For example, in Dili there are areas that are known to be particularly homogeneous and where, as a consequence, customary conflict mediation and resolution processes continue to have much more legitimacy than the new justice system; conversely, in more heterogeneous areas these customary ties may be eroding, but the new justice system may not yet have become effective, thus creating a justice gap that can significantly affect security in the area.

b) State building's impact on urban development

The sudden, important flows of rural-urban migration that often characterise post-conflict urban areas can prove to be a considerable strain on the institutions of newly elected and established governments; indeed, the elaboration of an urban development plan, that would substantially contribute to the management of these flows, demands technical and financial resources that are not readily available – for instance, lack of skilled personnel, different development priorities. When these deficiencies are compounded with (neo)liberal policies that promote public-private partnerships for development that are strongly determined by a market *laissez-faire* attitude rather than a stronger state-wide vision, urban development very quickly shapes urban spaces according to market priorities and historical relations, rather than human development needs.

Indeed, the implementation of (neo)liberal policies contributes to creating new windows of opportunities where patronage can have devastating impacts on service and infrastructure delivery. For instance, corrupt political elites in Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire, during the 1960s and 1970s used state resources to deliver benefits – as public services – to clients in return for political support (OECD, 2010; p.38). This attitude can be particularly evident in relation to areas that have historically been more related to colonial or state power, since they are often more

central than others, therefore attracting more investment and development. Furthermore, if the political elite of the new state is essentially related to one ethnic, religious or social group, and this elite – or people connected to the elite – choose to reside in those areas, these areas may benefit from more infrastructure development than areas that do not possess such connections.

In this context, the nature of the governance system established as a result of the state building process plays a significant role in tilting the fragile balance between voice and exit/boycott. As argued in section 2.3.3, the way in which state institutions are built during the state building process – that is, who is involved, how and to what extent this reflects popular aspirations – as well as the timing and nature of the elections – that is, whether people are fully free to choose or the reasons why they elect their leaders – can at times produce systems of governance that promote, much as what happened in Iraq, patronage through traditional kinship ties or power relations tied to resistance (OECD, 2010; p.28). Consequently, if the system does not provide for adequate institutions – either at local or national level, or both – for citizens to voice their concerns in relation to the state of development of their area, there is little that the local leaders – whether they are part of the new decentralised system or are customary leaders that still hold a lot of power in people's imaginaries – can do to trigger top-down changes and improvements. In this context, the issue of repression *in lieu* of security has a strong impact on people in poor areas who feel disenfranchised and outside the project of the state; that is, as citizens resort to contestation and conflict in response to their voices remaining ignored, these outbursts of violence are not treated as symptoms of a much bigger societal issue, but are instead categorised as "civil disobedience" (Zinn, 1968) thus assigning them "their 'proper places' in the established order, and therefore, de-politicis[ing] them" (Dikeç, 2002; p.95).

c) Creating urban spaces

The understanding of the state articulated in chapter two highlighted the fact that, in order to be able to create the overlapping networks of experience that characterise the building of a political community out of multiple local polities (Edensor, 2006; p.537), states need to build institutions that penetrate local worlds to create national habits, routines, representations and images that incorporate local experiences into the national […] mosaic (ibid). The implementation of social, political and economic rights alone cannot achieve this goal, for indeed the fact

that state institutions are built to ensure the implementation of rights does not mean that these rights will lead to opportunities for the whole population (Barry, 2005; p.19). Rather, states that are too weak or indifferent to develop institutions and policies that can adequately ensure social justice – through equal access to resources and opportunities for citizens to exercise their rights – have "a profoundly different effect on community life […] than governments that respect civil liberties, uphold the rule of law, honour contracts, and resist corruption" (Woolcok and Narayan, 2000; p.3). Consequently, the combination of historical developments with the impact of (neo)liberal policies on the urban environment, as described above, create fundamental differences in the urban fabric of an urban area.

In fact, some areas' connections with political elites and/or position in the wider urban area facilitate their access to crucial infrastructures and services that in turn provide them with better resources to access opportunities and exercise their rights as citizens. For instance, in these areas citizens benefit from a good education system that provides them with writing, reading and critical thinking skills – resources – which they can then use in order to access the employment market as well as information about the government – opportunities – so as to exercise their economic and political rights. As such, through their political, economic and social interactions, which extend not only to other areas of the urban environment but also to participation in state-wide debates, citizens in these areas build new representations of their belonging to a political community; that is, by exercising their formal rights they develop new bridges that link them to new polities, so that they feel that they are tackling the world around them with manoeuvres that are familiar to other people with whom they do not necessarily interact directly (Frykman and Löfgren, in Edensor, 2006; p.532). Here formal citizenship is complemented by substantial citizenship in a process that creates wide urban spaces of interaction.

Conversely, people who reside in areas where deficient patterns of infrastructure and service delivery result in a lack of education and employment opportunities, may fail to imagine themselves as part of a bigger political community than their own. Indeed, their inability to access adequate employment and education opportunities may result in their increasing disconnection from the economic and political development of the country, thus limiting their potential to "grasp the significance of interests beyond the narrow horizons of their own selfish concerns"

(Palumbo and Scott, 2003; p.10). Furthermore, the lack of development in their area may easily translate into an urban fabric that differs significantly from other more included areas; as such, “familiar institutions, chain stores, post offices, public houses, workplaces, sports venues, entertainment centres, parks, service stations, streets and numerous other regular settings” (Edensor, 2006; p.537), where national habits can be enacted, repeated and assimilated at numerous points throughout the territory (ibid), do not exist – or are in short supply – in those areas. Finally, economic development calls economic development, and when a lack of economic opportunities is combined with a lack of political and/or social connections, then the economic development of certain areas may become significantly hindered.

The type of citizenship that develops in these sites is therefore inevitably very different from the national project. Instead, far from the wider political community promoted by state institutions, citizens in these areas accumulate different repetitive practices and experiences that produce collective assumptions and unreflexive orientations (ibid; p.532) defined by, and confined to, bonded spaces of interaction of these social groups. Their lack of mobility across the urban environment affects how they organise, assemble together (Isin, 2008; p.266), turning them into “active participants in the production of difference, identity and citizenship” (Secor, 2004; p.358) as they shape representations of a local polity intrinsically linked to their daily interactions, and which limited extension beyond its imagined boundaries contributes, in turn, to the creation of urban spaces of exclusion.

Consequently, the failure of state institutions to shape urban spaces that can facilitate, through shared routines, habits and practices, the representation of a wider social group pertaining to a political community results in a fragmented loyalty across the urban territory. When this is compounded with the presence of institutions that fail to engender the belief that they are the most appropriate ones to facilitate citizens’ checks and balances on their government, then voice and loyalty slowly give way to the possibility of exit. Indeed, urban spaces can be seen, in the context of this research, as spaces of “attention orientation” (Bickford, 2000; p.356) that shape “citizens’ sense of what people, perspective, and problems are present in the democratic public” (ibid); however, if within those spaces they understand that their voice cannot contribute to such democratic public, but that the social capital they develop by acting together is much more effective in

improving their living conditions, citizens will “no longer fight for change from within” (Hirshman, 1970; p.83). Rather, they are likely to create new, alternative forms of citizenship through urban spaces that act as “pretext and context, form and substance, stage and script” (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.202), thus creating places of attachment that contribute to fragmenting the sovereignty of the state across its territory.

3.5. Conclusion – Articulating the research’s analytical framework

Grounded in the notion, developed in chapter two, that the mutually constitutive nature of state building and political community makes it essential to understand the impact of state building on the construction of a political community in post-conflict settings, this chapter has sought to develop an analytical framework that articulates the different theoretical tools helpful for analysing such relationship.

The notions of actual and virtual have been introduced in the framework to describe, in theoretical terms, the mutually constitutive relationship between the state and the political community. The state, in the context of this research, is understood as being actual: based on the notion that territory is not merely a terrain but rather the product of historical circumstances that have come to define the boundaries of political spaces, for the state to function its institutions need to build representations of state authority in the imaginaries of its citizens throughout the whole territory. In other words, for state institutions to be actualised, it is imperative that the state fosters a political community that bounds the whole territory under its authority in its virtual representation and effects (Isin, 2007; p.212).

In chapter two, the political community was articulated as the product of social relations that take place in everyday settings and through which people define themselves “in terms of attachment to geographic entities above, below, and including the scale of the nation state” (Flint, 2012; p.3). The emphasis, in such articulation of the concept, is on the idea that individuals construct their belonging to a local polity as a result of their daily interactions; however, depending on whether these take place face-to-face, virtually and/or through the consciousness that they are carrying out habits, routines and patterns that are being reproduced at the same time by other individuals in the country, this will result in more or less nested polities. At the core of the notion of political community within the state, therefore, lies the notion of scale, that is, the ability of the state to command the

loyalty of its population by ensuring that formal citizenship is actualised in such way that substantive citizenship is continuously reconfigured from the bottom-up (Secor, 2004; p.365) so as to create an ever-widening series of scales of belonging that start from the local and reach the national scale (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; p.982).

Formal citizenship, in this context, refers to the ability of state institutions to ensure that social, political and economic rights are not merely stated in documents that draw the contours of the state's social contract, but are also implemented in such way that citizens are able to exercise those rights. This relationship between the state and its citizens is what was defined in chapter two in terms of legitimacy, that is, the ability of citizens to keep checks and balances on the actions of the state by voicing their concerns so as to influence national debate. However, for formal citizenship to enable the process of legitimation of state institutions it needs to be complemented by substantial citizenship; the latter emerges when state institutions develop and implement socially just policies that ensure citizens' access to the resources and opportunities they need to be able to exercise their formal citizenship rights. For indeed, "even where groups may have full citizenship, this may not be enough to prevent them from being treated as second-class citizens" (Storey, 2012; p.63), whether purposefully through various forms of discrimination or merely as a result of economic, political and social policies enacted within (neo)liberal frameworks where the state has little room for manoeuvre.

Thus, the right and possibility for citizens to voice their concern alone cannot guarantee that, if one or many local polities do not deem the conditions in which they live adequate, they will choose voice over exit or boycott; in this sense, formal citizenship is no longer a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship" (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.190). Instead, it is crucial for states to build territory-wide loyalty through the creation of socially just living conditions for all citizens, so as to ensure that state institutions are represented, in the imaginaries of the population, as embodying the interests of all different local polities across the territory. It is in the relationship between social justice and the development of a substantive citizenship that lies the nature of sovereignty as the recognition of authority across the whole territory; that is, if state institutions succeed in reaching out to all social groups in the territory, the spaces in which authority is socially constructed through everyday practices expand from the local space to the territory of the state. Indeed social justice, this research argues, can be ascribed to actions by institutions that

can then be judged “by their effects on the distribution of rights, opportunities, and resources” (Barry, 2005; p.18).

As such, social cohesion was introduced in the framework of the research as the tool to analyse the effect of state institutions on the creation of virtual sovereignty and legitimacy. By reconciling the need to understand both social and economic effects of state policies on the population of a state, as the basis for liberal peace, social cohesion provides in this framework the link between the impacts of the state and the virtual image these impacts contribute to creating in the imaginaries of the citizens, so as to reveal “the fragility and partiality of liberal conceptions of ‘the public’ and ‘the subject of rights’ (Secor, 2004; p.365). Furthermore, the combination of multiscalar and multidimentional elements, that characterise social cohesion as a tool of analysis, make it particularly adequate for exploring the impact of state institutions on the urban environment as *urbs*, the representations of state authority these *urbs* engender in citizens’ imaginaries and, consequently, the spaces of substantive citizenship that emerge within different urban spaces; the *civitas* of urban spaces is consequently used to understand whether state institutions are contributing to the construction of political community or undermining it. Figure 7 below provides an overview of the analytical framework for this research.

Figure 7 – Analytical Framework



Source: elaborated by the author

In the context of state building and political community discussed in chapter two, this framework serves to explore how, through the patterns of service delivery, security and individualism established by (neo)liberal strategies in cities, processes of dissolution of existing solidarities and creation of new polities take place. The (neo)liberal practices implemented in the process of state building stress "autonomy, the ability to act without constraint or attending to others" (Young, 1990 in ibid; p.367) leading to inequalities and exclusions that result in different strategies of everyday life, different interactions and negotiations between citizens, which themselves "produce territories" (De Certeau, 1984 in Secor, 2004; p.360). More specifically, within urban contexts, this framework serves to explore how post-conflict states, undergoing state building processes, fail to penetrate citizens' everyday lives through the creation of urban spaces where citizens can exercise their rights within the family, the workplace, the home or the street (Edensor, 2006; p.529); as such, local polities are prevented from being contested and transformed between different social groups – the bridging of substantive citizenship – resulting in a state that "is all but meaningless to its citizens – perhaps except as a national symbol, as a system of governance mainly aimed at (sometimes) alien forms of rights and law and a way of organizing institutions, markets and security" (Richmond, 2014; p.3).

CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY

“Remember your humanity and forget the rest”

(Russel-Einstein Manifesto, 1955)

4. Methodology

The aim of this chapter is to describe the methodology developed by the author in order to apply the analytical framework articulated in the previous chapter for the purpose of understanding the impact of state building on the construction of a political community in the context of post-conflict countries. The first part of this chapter frames the objective of the research by clearly stating the gap that has been identified in the literature and policy on international state building and the development of a political community. Using this gap as its starting point, the chapter subsequently moves on to articulating the objective of the research and enunciates the research questions that have been developed in order to guide the investigation that aims to fill the gap. The second part of this chapter frames the research methodology in theoretical terms, using social constructivism, the processes of abduction, deduction and induction as well as the exercise of reading the urban fabric, in order to illustrate the intellectual processes around which the methodology of the research has been organised. Finally, the last part provides a description of the research methods that have been used to answer the research questions presented hereafter.

4.1. Framing the objective of the research

4.1.1. Research purpose

The initial interest that sparked the intellectual process for this thesis lies in the author's long-standing concern for the growing evidence on international state building missions' failure to establish post-conflict states which capacity, institutions and legitimacy are driven by state-society relationships (OECD, 2008; p.1). In the process of investigating the causes of such failure, the interchangeable use of the terms state building and nation building, in both academic and international policy literature, brought to the fore the need to undertake a more in-depth analysis of the differences between the two processes in order to argue more convincingly about the dangers of focusing international efforts solely on state institutions to the detriment of societal processes. The intellectual process that led to the development of the analytical framework, however, progressively moved away from the notion of nation building – as focused on nations; rather, the fieldwork in Timor Leste highlighted the importance of citizenship and the construction of political community out of different local polities. As such, the focus

of the research was shifted to the mutually constitutive nature of state building and the construction of a political community.

Since the elements that characterise these concepts are multiple and closely intertwined, they require that any analysis of their mutually constitutive relationship be set within a context where a wide variety of study fields – such as political science, sociology, history and international relations – apply. Thus, the literature review provided in chapter two has introduced cities as important sites in which to analyse the encounter of state building activities with the daily realities of indigenous social processes inherent to the construction of political communities. By placing citizenship as the nexus between the different key notions underpinning the relationship between states and society – that is territory, sovereignty and legitimacy – it explored the potential for international state building interventions to negatively affect the process of constructing a political community key to establishing sustainable peace in post-conflict countries.

In this light, a further review of the literature on state building and urban post-conflict reconstruction revealed that the two fields have generally approached post-conflict reconstruction in 'either/or' terms. In the international relations and political science literature on state building, the focus is generally centred on national level dynamics and institutions (OECD, 2008; UN Security Council, 1995; World Bank, 2012), with reference to the local context generally restrained to that of an essential variable to take into consideration – but without much further consideration as to how. Conversely, urban development and urban planning literature situated in the field of post-conflict reconstruction has shown a tendency to focus in particular on the processes of urban planning in divided cities (Anderson, 2010; Bickford, 2000; Bollens, 1998; Bollens 2007) or the importance of cities in both triggering and solving conflicts (Esser, 2004), without, however, drawing links between the impact of state building policies on urban areas and, therefore, the development of local polities within the urban spaces of a state. As a consequence, both centres of interest have shown the potential to have perverse outcomes, where localism can contribute to reinforcing state-society cleavages whereas the elimination of local community, to the benefit of a notion of national citizenship, risks precluding active participation in the process of state building (Holston and Appadurai, 1996; p.191).

Only in recent years has there been a growing body of literature highlighting the importance of local and indigenous processes in complementing state building strategies (Beall, Goodfellow and Rodgers, 2011; Chandler, 2012; Fregonese, 2012; Lemay-Hebert, 2009; Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2014; UNDP, 2012; World Bank, 2011). Similarly, in the urban planning literature there has been a rising interest in relation to the importance of urban environments as critical sites for understanding the impact of (neo)liberal state building policies on the development of a democratic society (Bollens, 2013; Esser, 2013). It is therefore in this context that the research framework developed in chapter three of this thesis comes to fill a gap identified regarding the relationship between (neo)liberal state building processes, their impact on the urban environment, and the importance of the ensuing socially constructed urban spaces for the relationship between state building and political community.

4.1.2. Objective of the research

In light of the literature review, theoretical framework and research purpose outlined thus far, the objective of the research is*:*

To understand how the process of state building affects the process of developing a political community in the context of post-conflict urban spaces. Using the case study of Dili, the capital of Timor Leste, the research focuses on investigating how the impact of state policies at local level contributes to shaping different spaces of daily interaction and how these spaces, in turn, affect people's representations of their sense of belonging, thus resulting in the construction of multiple polities at different scales – local, urban, state – which can potentially hinder the emergence of a political community across the territory of the state. Grounded in a social constructivist approach, the research takes place in two areas, within Dili's urban space, presenting different socio-economic, historical and development characteristics, and uses semi-structured interviews with a wide variety of people in order to explore how a combination of environment and state actions can shape the spaces and scales of people's allegiances – that is, citizenship – and, consequently, affect state sovereignty and legitimacy.

The following section presents the research questions elaborated in order to further define the objectives of the research.

4.1.3. Research questions

On the basis of the research objective stated above, the author elaborated a set of research questions to facilitate the process of investigating how the disconnection between the states emerging from international state building and the societies they produce emerges in post-conflict urban environments, and how this can contribute, as a result, to significantly undermining the development of the virtual political community through which the state should be actualised.

Firstly, the research sought to explore the process of institutional development within the context of international state building, therefore the first research question asked:

How do international state building practices affect the nature of post-conflict state institutions?

To understand these dynamics, two subsidiary questions have been outlined that guided the research process:

Who takes part in the process of institutional development?

How do these institutions reflect pre-existing historical and political dynamics?

Secondly, the research sought to understand the relationship between the process through which institutions have been designed and the impact of such process on the development of state policies within the country's historical context, therefore the second research question asked:

How do the policies emanating from these institutions affect the core functions of the state?

Answering this question required gathering a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the state process of policy making through the investigation of two subsidiary questions:

How are state policies defined by the institutions designed within the state building process?

How do these policies affect the social, political and economic development of the post-conflict context of the country?

Finally, as the investigation moved from the state level to the urban level, the research sought to understand the nexus between the urban environment shaped by state policies and the urban spaces emerging from daily interactions in these environments, therefore the third research question asked:

> *How does the relationship between the urban environment emerging from state policies and social cohesion affect the spaces and scales of socially constructed polities?*

However, in order to facilitate the establishment of a connection between social cohesion and the socially constructed polities emerging from the materialisation of state policies with urban spaces, three subsidiary questions have been developed:

> *How does the urban fabric emerging from historical and state building developments affect social cohesion in different urban spaces?*
>
> *How do these urban spaces contribute to shaping people's spaces and scales of interaction?*
>
> *How do people's spaces and scales of interaction shape their sense of belonging to a political community and, consequently, their representation of the state?*

These research questions emphasise the impact of state building processes on the building of state institutions and, subsequently, the impact of those institutions on the urban environment and the construction of polities within. As such, it is important to specify that the aim of this research is not that of selecting specific state building policies and studying their impact on people in an urban environment; rather, the overwhelming interest of the research lies in exploring citizens' narratives emerging from the case study analysis and understanding their implications for the spatial scales at which the processes of polity construction take place. The case study developed in the next three chapters will serve to apply these research questions in practice and, on the basis of the outcomes of the analysis of the fieldwork findings, will contribute to understanding whether the research framework successfully articulates all the connections between different spatial scales or whether further refinements are necessary to implement it elsewhere.

4.2. Theoretical approaches guiding the research methods

The aim of this section is to articulate the theoretical approaches that have been used to guide the intellectual process of testing the research framework on a chosen case study.

4.2.1. Abduction, deduction, induction

In order to understand the impact of state building on the construction of a political community, the author built an analytical framework that explores social cohesion in urban contexts in the hope of discovering a new hypothesis that can contribute to improve state building processes in post-conflict countries.

The interest in "forming an explanatory hypothesis from an observation requiring explanation" (Flach and Kakas, 2000; p.7) is what Peirce (1958) had in mind when he formulated the idea of 'abductive observation'. In his view, the abductive observation comes to the observer 'like a flash' (Peirce 1958 in ibid), it is an intuition that behind the new observed facts there potentially is a new order of things (Reichertz, 2004; p.163). However, Peirce himself recognised that abduction alone is insufficient for creating a new order around the new observed surprising fact(s); rather, it merely asks what possible explanation there can be around this(ese) fact(s) (Minnameier, 2010; p.242).

In order to overcome the limitation of the abductive observation, Peirce included it as part of a three-phase system of observation, rule making and testing. Indeed, since abduction allows for the emergence of new facts that, however, need a new order or rule to "remove what is surprising about [them]" (Reichertz, 2004; p.163), it is necessary to create a new rule that can be reproduced in a general context, that is, it is necessary to enter a process of deduction aimed at making predictions about these new facts (Minnameier, 2010; p.241). Subsequently, this new rule needs to be tested against reality through an inductive process in order to explore whether the theory works or requires further refinement. In Peirce's view (1958 in Flach and Kakas, 2000; p.8), the induction process requires the observer to put a question to Nature: if the experiment does not work, a new step has been taken into acquiring knowledge on the surprising facts; if, however, the experiment against reality succeeds, then the new rule is further engrained. In other words, "induction consists in starting from a theory [emerged from abductive observation], deducing from it predictions of phenomena, and observing those phenomena in order to see how nearly they agree with the theory" (ibid).

In the context of this research, therefore, the initial observation that emerged from the literature review on state building and nation building is that the two concepts are being used interchangeably and that, as a consequence, the process of state building can have a negative impact on the societal processes at stake. Further exploration of the literature on post-conflict reconstruction revealed that research carried out at the more local level of post-conflict urban areas held significant potential for investigating how the notion of political community, at the core of state formation, is contingent upon varied ideas and interpretations as well as actions and reactions (Hague, 2005; p.7) across different spaces and scales. Thus, at the abduction stage, the research questioned how these two approaches to post-conflict reconstruction could benefit from being interconnected.

Investigating such potential meant moving into the realm of deduction; that is, in order to be able to make predictions (Minnameier, 2010) about the way in which international state building processes affect the construction of a political community in the context of post-conflict urban areas, it was necessary to develop a framework that would organise, and facilitate an analysis of, all the different elements potentially affecting the mutually constitutive relationship between states and political community. Consequently, social cohesion was introduced into an analytical framework with the purpose of attempting to deduct a rule of how state building in urban spaces can affect territory, sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship through the constitution of local polities that can undermine the political community.

Finally, a process of induction was necessary to test whether the analytical framework, developed to create a rule – deduction – to understand the processes in question – abduction – could indeed contribute to filling the knowledge gap identified in the literature review. For this purpose, the analytical framework has been tested within the context of a case study country: if the analysis of the fieldwork findings appear to provide a clear link between the elements identified in the framework, then a new theory can potentially be elaborated; conversely, if the fieldwork findings reveal caveats in the organisation of the framework, a new process of abduction-deduction-induction needs to take place to further refine the research.

4.2.2. Reading the urban fabric

Within the framework of this research, the connecting element between the processes of state building and the construction of a political community is grounded in the idea that the local polities they are constituted from are processes of belonging in constant flux; they originate within spaces of every day interactions but, within certain conditions aimed at facilitating bridging over bonding, these polities can continue extending to ever-widening spaces. In the context of the ideal-type state used in the context of state building, however, this bottom-up process can only develop if it is facilitated by top-down practices that create, through the development of habits, routines, memories, etc, the representation of an imagined political community in the minds of people who may never meet but reside within the single territory of the state. In other words, it involves the implementation of a substantive citizenship that creates the conditions for a formal citizenship to emerge, so that the memories, sensual experiences and interpretations, that transform a space into a place, create in the minds of citizens the idea of a political community attached to the territory of the state (Hague, 2005; p.4). In this light, so as to understand the dynamics whereby "interpretation and narrative […] give identity and it is identity that transforms space into place" (ibid; p.4) the research methodology needed to include a reading of the urban fabric where these relationships took place.

Much like the rest of the investigative methods used for the purpose of this research, the exercise of reading the case study's urban fabric revolved around a three-phased process of abduction, deduction and induction. Indeed, as stated by Jane Jacobs (1961; p.440), in order to understand cities one must think about the processes at play within an urban space – that is, abduction – then "seek for 'unaverage' clues involving very small quantities, which reveal the way larger and more 'average' quantities are operating" (ibid) so as to attempt to create rules that fit the new facts learned from the processes observed – that is, deduction – and, finally, "work inductively, reasoning from particulars to the general" (ibid), thus testing the new rules in all three different areas – that is, induction. Consequently, reading the urban fabric entails that the observer does not limit her/himself to an appreciation of the built environment, focusing solely on the physical features of the areas; rather, as implied by this research's definition of the urban space as something that is lived, produced and reproduced by people's everyday activities, reading the urban fabric also requires that the observer engages with the

population in order to understand how their interactions within it contribute to producing different – or similar – representations of their state. This is what Kallus (2001; p.130) refers to as "objective" and "subjective" reading of the urban fabric.

The *objective* reading is what Allan B. Jacobs (1984; p.34) understood as the search for a "combination of clues, the patterns and the breaks in the patterns that are most useful in gaining an understanding of the dynamics of an area", that is, the first stage of observation of the processes within an urban space. These clues range from the observation of people, buildings, streets patterns and service infrastructure to the analysis of the uses of land, landscapes and buildings (ibid), for A.Jacobs believed, just like J.Jacobs, that one can tell many things about an area just by looking at it: "something of its history, when it was built, for whom, what physical, social and economic changes have been taking place, who lives there now, major issues and problems that may exist, and whether the area is vulnerable to rapid changes" (Jacobs, A. 1984; p.32). The objective reading was complemented by photographs taken by the author during each field visit; these photographs aimed to "create the experience of process, to evoke a feeling of tone and texture of entering another culture" (Harper, 1987 in Banks, 2008; p.97). Together with the text accompanying them, the photographs of the research areas helped construct initial perceptions of the social processes at play (Ali, 2004; p.271) in the spaces of polity construction.

The objective reading of the urban fabric presents, however, only an initial basis on which to formulate hypothesis on any clues observed through the analysis of these processes. Therefore, in order to be able to formulate rules that may explain these observations, it is necessary to complement the initial exercise with a *subjective* reading of the urban fabric, that is, colouring the objective observations with "the voices and opinions of people living in the city as related to their everyday life experience" (Kallus, 2001; p.136). Indeed, through interviews with all the different groups inhabiting those spaces – e.g. male/female, employed/unemployed, youth/elderly, etc – it becomes possible to understand not only people's interactions with each other and how these contribute to creating images of local polities – bonding – but also how they relate as a group to other areas within the same bigger urban area through their abilities, opportunities and willingness to travel across other urban spaces and interact with new groups – bridging. In other words, talking to people also opens up the opportunity to identify their movements through the wider urban area, thus offering the observer an insight into the "spatial

stories" (Secor, 2004; p.357) created by people's mobility, stories that contribute to linking or fragmenting spaces of interactions to shape "the variously fluid and fortified boundaries of urban space that provoke a range of identity performance" (ibid).

It is the spaces emerging from people's movements and interactions, that offer the observer the opportunity to create new rules on the impact of state building – through the objective reading of the urban fabric, that is the impact of the state policies on the people's every day life – on the construction of a political community – through the subjective reading of the urban fabric, that is how these impacts affect the way in which people build representations of each other and the state.

4.2.3. Social constructivism

The subjective reading of the urban fabric, therefore, is grounded in the notion that citizens' interactions, through time and space, turn these spaces into places where a group has developed a local polity and ascribed it to their physical environment; that is, since polities "are a social construct, ascribed by people to an area, not natural and not objective" (Hague, 2005; p.10), in order to understand how social groups develop bonding and bridging relationships it is necessary to explore their relationship with the built environment and the meanings they ascribe to it. Since, within the analytical framework developed for this research, social cohesion has been included as the tool necessary to investigate how state policies can impact people's interactions in the urban environment, at the methodological level it was necessary to frame the fieldwork with a theoretical approach that understands social relations –and the emergence of local polities – in their context.

As such, social constructivism was chosen to assist in the interpretation of people's voices and opinions about living in the city (Kallus, 2001; p.136) for the purpose of understanding the spaces and scales at which they construct their sense of belonging to a polity. Indeed, social constructivism "offers a framework for thinking about the nature of social life and social change" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; p.393) by focusing on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture and political arguments in shaping intersubjective meanings (ibid; p.392). Intersubjective meanings, as "shared meanings among individuals whose interaction is based on common interests and assumptions that form the ground for their communication" (Rogoff, 1990 in Kim, 2001; p.3), emerge through

individuals' daily interactions within constantly changing spaces thus shaping shared beliefs at the core of local polities (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; p.393). These intersubjective meanings correspond to what was referred to in the analytical framework as frameworks of memory.

In this sense, social constructivism therefore rejects the notion of objective truth (Jackson and Sorensen, 2006; p.167); rather, within "the social constructivist worldview" (Creswell, 2009; p.8), the products of relationships between individuals are social facts characterised by their absence of "materiality but exist only because people collectively believe they exist and act accordingly" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; p.393). Consequently, within the framework of this research, state policies have an actual impact on the urban environment in which people interact – *urbs*; *urbs* become spaces of daily interaction between individuals and social groups where varying degrees of social cohesion develop across space and time, thus contributing to the constitution of intersubjective meanings that ascribe a virtual identity to a place. In other words, the articulation of formal and substantive citizenship in the notion of social cohesion – through wealth disparities, social order and control, common values and civic culture, social capital – provides the nexus between the physical environment and the virtual *civitas* ascribed to it; the social constructivist approach is here introduced to facilitate the conceptual transition from virtual – political community – to actual – state building.

4.3. Research methods

4.3.1. Selection of case study

Yin (2009; p.8) argues that the selection of a research method – for instance experiment, survey, history or case study – can be done on the basis of three principal elements framing the type of research being carried out, that is: the form of the research question – in terms of how, why, who, what or where; whether the research requires control of behavioural events – that is, changing variables; and, whether the research focuses on contemporary events – as opposed to solely historical facts. In these terms, the choice of the case study as a methodological approach to research is an obvious one when the research asks how and why a contemporary event, over which the researcher has no control, has taken place. In other words, if the research questions and purpose point to seeking explanations for a current state of affairs, then the case study is the adequate methodology.

Indeed, a case study can be defined as an empirical inquiry "that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context" (ibid; p.18) without clearly defined boundaries between phenomenon and context. Moreover, it is a particularly adequate method of investigation when the research contains more variables of interest than data points, thus relying on multiple sources of evidence, and where the prior development of theoretical propositions guides data collection and analysis (ibid). As such, within the context of this research, the case study was the most appropriate methodological approach to investigate the viability of the analytical framework in answering the research questions; the exploration of the multiple relationships within this research – between international state building, state policies, their impact on the built environment and the outcome of these relations on people's construction of their belonging to a political community – in fact required not only the analysis of historical documents to understand what happened in the past, but also extensive interviews at both state and urban level to understand the impact of these events on a contemporary situation.

The reasons outlined above for selecting the case study also serve to explain why some limitations, generally attributed to case study approaches, have been managed within the context of this research. Case studies can be seen as providing "little basis for scientific generalisation" (ibid; p.15), however in this context the aim was not to select a widely representative sample to enumerate frequencies but to test, expand and generalise theories (ibid). Criticism has also been expressed in terms of the validity of case studies in assessing how much the variables matter to the outcome (George and Bennett, 2004; p.25); the aim of this research, however, was that of assessing whether and how state building had an influence on the construction of a political community, not how much.

Consequently, for the purpose of this research, the case study of Dili, the capital of Timor Leste, has been selected. The remainder of this section aims to present the rationale behind the choice of Timor Leste, as a country, and of Dili as an urban context. Furthermore, this section also provides the justification for the decision to subdivide the area of research into three areas within Dili and the rationale for the selection of the specific case study areas.

a) Timor Leste

Since its independence from Indonesia in 1999, Timor Leste has gathered significant international media and academic interest as one of the first countries to be, for a given period of time, under direct international governance. Indeed, during the transitional period between 1999 and 2002 – date of the first official elections held in the country – the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) "exercised full legislative and executive authority […] running both the security forces and an international peacekeeping mission […] while seeking to build new governmental institutions for the emerging state and overseeing the formation of a constitutional assembly in 2001" (Leach and Kingsbury, 2012; p.2). In the early 2000s, the extent of the UN's involvement in Timor Leste was unprecedented and was only matched, during approximately the same time, by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). As such, since the end of the mission, there has been extensive literature on the successes and failures of UNTAET; but a review of the literature reveals that, although what was originally hailed as an international success has now been recognised for what it is – an ambitious attempt by the international community to be heavily involved in the state building project of a new country, with its subsequent successes and failures – the focus of the research carried out thus far centres essentially, much like the state building process did, on institutional and political issues at large.

The view from the ground, however, concerning how these processes have been experienced by the population and continue to impact their daily lives today, has been the focus of too little research, much less the consequences of these different experiences on the legitimacy and the sovereignty of the internationally built and backed institutions. But the social and political crises that have taken place in Dili in 2002, 2005 and 2006 (dos Santos Monteiro, 2010; p.40) bring to the fore issues of social divisions compounded by competition for resources (Leach and Kingsbury, 2012; p.5) that regularly threaten the stability of the new institutions; they make it clear that the sustainability of the state building process does not lie solely in the hands of the international community and the institutions, but also on the ability of the population to feel connected, not only to their state, but to each other as well. As such, the interesting and unique circumstances of the UNTAET mission, combined with the gap in the research on the country highlighted above, provide an excellent rationale for choosing Timor Leste as a

case study country for the analysis of the relationship between state building and the construction of a political community.

Timor Leste is also a very interesting case because it was a territory before it was ever a country in its own right. Indeed, the Portuguese arrived on the island of Timor at the beginning of the 1500s and found a territory divided into small, interconnected kingdoms. The division of the island into East and West Timor took place in the mid-1600s with the arrival of the Dutch – who had colonised Indonesia and were seeking to expand their control over the entire archipelago – and was officialised by a border treaty between the two colonisers in 1859. The official division of the island also marks the birth of the territory of Timor Leste – 'leste' means 'eastern' in Portuguese – but the birth of the country itself was to come only a century and a half later, as the independence handed by the Portuguese to Timor Leste's population in 1975 – when they were forced to retreat by the Carnation Revolution taking place back home – was condemned to be short-lived by the Indonesian military invasion of the territory in December 1975.

Timor Leste became officially a country in 1999 and its first state was born in 2002. The birth of the political community itself, however, remains a complex endeavour, for whilst internationals and East Timorese affirm that the twenty-five years of resistance against the Indonesians have given the population the strong bond characteristic of a political community, the reality on the ground ten years later suggests that it is not as straight-forward a process as it appears. Rather, a combination of political divisions originated during the brief independence of 1975, combined with social divisions emerging from increasing unequal opportunities, have started to create cleavages within the population that reveal a tension between the very western oriented development of state institutions and the very demanding process of shaping a political community out of varied histories, alliances and languages.

Finally, at a personal level, the choice of Timor Leste was also motivated by its geographical position in an area where the author already had research, working and living experience. Having spent six months working on the ceasefire process in the Philippines in 2006, the author felt comfortable moving back to the Southeast Asia/Pacific region where she felt she could adapt to the culture. Furthermore, the author felt at ease with both national languages: she already understands Portuguese and Tetun was easy to learn within a short timeframe.

b) Dili

The rationale for the choice of Dili as the case study is two-fold. Firstly, as the capital of Timor Leste it has attracted large numbers of people, both internationals and nationals, which has led to very rapid growth and urbanisation: between 2001 and 2004, the urban population of Dili increased from 123,474 inhabitants to 175,730 (National Directorate for Statistics (NDS), 2004 in Jütersonke et al, 2010; p.18) and had reached a total population of 234,026 by the year 2010 (NDS 2013). For a country counting 1,066,409 inhabitants in 2010, the presence of 21% of its population on a 12km wide and 3km deep stretch of land (Carapic and Jütersonke 2012; p.14) has many implications. The main one is that Dili is also the most diverse district of Timor Leste, as shown by the migrating patterns illustrated in Map 1 and Map 2 below, thus forcing people from different backgrounds, traditions and histories to live closely together, side-by-side, and share their daily lives. Furthermore, as Dili is the political centre of the country where all the main institutions are located, it has also become the main location of political protests and violence, and the urban population's diversity is at times used in political discourse to ignite passions – as was the case in the 2006 crisis.

Map 1 - Population flows between districts in 2004



Source: Census Atlas, 2004; p.31

Map 2 – Population flows between districts in 2010



Source: Timor Leste Housing and Population Census 2010, Vol.7, p.17

Secondly, although the land area on which Dili stands is very clearly demarcated by its geographical characteristics – it is set between mountains on southern and eastern sides and sea on its northern and western sides, since it is a bay – it is never categorised as a 'city'. Rather, the history of migration compounded by the original governance divisions – it is constituted of six sub-districts, themselves subdivided into 48 *sukus* and 243 *aldeias*[36] – have led to Dili being considered by its inhabitants – both nationals and foreigners – as "a series of interlinked local *barrios* (neighbourhoods) or *aldeias* (hamlets or villages)" (ibid).

Consequently, Dili's very mixed nature, violent past and historically overlapping territorial and governance organisation, make it the most interesting urban context – rivalled only, far behind, by Baucau at the east of Dili – to carry out the fieldwork of this research.

c) The two case study areas: Liriu and Metin IV

This thesis has argued that the construction of political community within urban spaces is mutually constitutive in that, just as urban space is the product of history, development and interaction, so are local polities constructed through "social frameworks of memory" (Halbwachs, 1994 in Arraou, 1999; p.72) pertaining to different groups and including different histories, traditions and memories of past

[36] These administrative divisions stem from Portuguese colonial territorial organisation, which have been maintained through time. They are explained in more details in chapter five.

events. Therefore, the author chose to select two *aldeias* within Dili in order to explore how different urban environments shape local polities across different spaces and scales. To this end, the post-conflict urban environment characteristics identified in section 3.4.2 as likely to have the most significant impact on shaping the emergence of formal and substantive citizenship, were used as selection criteria: history of the *aldeia* and migration in that *aldeia*. Furthermore, because initial interviews at national level and literature review revealed that *aldeias* across Dili have experienced conflict – during the Portuguese, Indonesian and 2006 crisis periods – in different ways, the history of violence was added as a selection criteria to ensure a more comprehensive range of factors likely to affect the construction of social identities. Finally, to account for the developments that have taken place since independence, the geographical position within the wider urban context and the socio-economic characteristics of those *aldeias* were also used as selection criteria. Table 4 below provides a brief overview of the two *aldeias* that were chosen according for the four characteristics – these will be developed into more details in the case study part of the thesis.

Table 4 – Criteria for choosing case study areas

Aldeia	History of violence	Historical development	Socio-economic	Position in Dili
Liriu	Very little violence since independence	Developed during Portuguese times; administration staff residence	Generally high level of education and employment, with pockets of lower income	In the middle of Dili with good transport connections
Metin IV	Much violence since independence, which is still ongoing	Developed during Indonesian times; Indonesian military & Timorese	Low level of education and high unemployment	Isolated by the river with no transport connection and long walks

Source: Valenti (2014), p148

APPENDIX IV provides an overview of the national level as well as area interviews that have been carried out – a total of 74 interviews were carried out over the course of the fieldwork.

4.3.2. Period of research

The fieldwork for this research was carried out in three subsequent phases.

The first phase took place in May 2012 with a preliminary three weeks trip to Dili in order to establish a first contact with people in the field – this included both internationals working for bilateral and multilateral organisations as well as nationals working for local NGOs – and get acquainted with Dili's urban space, its different levels of development and its challenges. This visit also proved very useful in refining the focus of the research and gathering initial information to start preparing for the core part of the fieldwork. Indeed, first contact meetings – at this stage one could not speak of interviews *per se* – allowed the author to gather a general overview of the main historical points as well as the main challenges facing Timor Leste since independence.

The second phase took place from September 2012 to April 2013 and represented the core of the fieldwork. Since circumstances allowed, the author chose to live in the country over a period of eight months so as to have enough time to understand the dynamics of East Timorese's everyday lives in Dili, mostly, but also in other towns and rural areas across the country. Although a comparison between Dili and the rest of the country was not the focus of the research, it served to set Dili into a wider context and get a better grasp of the unique characteristics of life in the capital.

The second phase was sub-divided into two stages of research. The first four months, the author spent time interviewing a range of East Timorese and foreigners working in a variety of positions – e.g. civil society, NGOs, bilateral and multilateral agencies, presidential advisers and parliamentarians – in order to collect information regarding decision-making during the state building process as well as the challenges currently facing Timor Leste from different points of view. More informal discussions with East Timorese and foreign acquaintances also contributed to gather a good understanding of the dynamics within Dili and the varied characteristics of the different *sukus* and *aldeias*; this process facilitated the selection of the two *aldeias* for the case study research. The last four months constituted the essence of the fieldwork talking to people in the selected case study *aldeias* in order to gather their narratives of their lives in Dili as well as understand the dynamics at stake. During these four months, interviews with

people working at national level also continued, often triggered and informed by new data collected in the selected *aldeias*.

The third and last phase of the fieldwork took place in July 2013 over a period of three weeks. Sparked by the opportunity to come back to the country to present at a conference[37] a paper on the initial – rough – findings of the research, this final trip was a unique chance to get national and international academics' thoughts on these initial findings. Incidentally, it also provided the opportunity to fill some gaps in the research that emerged in the preliminary data analysis carried out in May/June – an analysis that was also informed by a further refinement of the analytical framework.

Secondary data was collected throughout the period of research from May 2012 to July 2013, as much of the information was available online in the form of journal articles critically analysing the state building process, but a number of books and project reports were more easily accessible on the ground speaking to the relevant persons.

4.3.3. Data collection: primary and secondary sources

The nature of the research is essentially qualitative, as it focuses on understanding the relationship between state building and the construction of a political community through an analysis of people's experiences and their relationships with others as well as with the state in an urban context. Thus, although it has been complemented in parts with a brief analysis of statistics gathered on Timor Leste, Dili and the areas of research, the methods used to build the case study and carry out the fieldwork are effectively qualitative research methods to gather **primary data**. These therefore included (Creswell, 2009; p.15):

- Open-ended questions;
- Interview data, visual data – photographs taken by the author; and,
- Themes, patterns and interpretations.

Figure 8 below illustrates the process of gathering data at three levels: national level; reading of the urban fabric; and, collecting information in case study *aldeias*. Gathering primary data at the *national level* was the author's entry point into the

[37] Understanding Timor Leste Conference, organised and co-hosted by the National University of Timor Lorosae (UNTL), Swinburne University of Technology and the Technical University of Lisbon: http://www.tlstudies.org/

fieldwork: it allowed, during the first trip, to clarify questions that had emerged from the literature review on Timor Leste and the state building process, and also provided a first overview of the main challenges facing the country in the reconstruction process. This primary information was subsequently fed back into further literature review and a refinement of the analytical framework. The second, more substantial, round of open-ended interviews with people at the national level, during the second trip, served to gather information on the challenges facing Dili as an urban space and to identify the gaps in the research concerning the country's capital. At this stage, the author sought to both consolidate the knowledge on historical issues undermining the state building process – through interviews with East Timorese – and understand the dynamics of migration as well as the tensions characterising Dili's urban space – this information was gathered through open-ended interviews with both foreigners and East Timorese working across all sectors. Consequently, the information gathered at the national level informed the drafting of a set of themes to be approached with the community leaders – i.e. *xefi suku*, *xefi aldeia*, youth leaders and *de facto* community leaders – in the case studies selected on the basis of information gathered and personal observations.

Reading the urban fabric was initially approached as an exercise of objective personal reading. Based on the information gathered through national level interviews on Dili's main areas of violence or peace as well as on migration patterns, the author undertook a series of walks around the potential areas of interests in order to gather a sense of the socio-economic characteristics and contrasts, as well as a first impression of people's lifestyles and dynamics in those areas. On the basis of these observations and further informal conversations with East Timorese, the two case study *aldeias* were selected. The subjective reading of the urban fabric on the conditions, challenges, historical development and infrastructure upgrading in the *aldeias* was subsequently gathered through interviews with community leaders and elderly *aldeia* residents. As shown in the figure below, when themes, patterns and interpretations (Creswell, 2009; p.15) emerged in the interviews or observations regarding the urban fabric, these were fed back into more interviews at the national level in order to understand their link with state policies and the state building process, and were then used once more to refine research on the ground.

Entry into the *case study aldeias* was planned as a two-stage approach in order to, firstly, follow East Timorese protocol and, secondly, offer the opportunity for people

living in those *aldeias* to get acquainted with the presence of the author. As such, a first official visit to the *aldeias* aimed at meeting with the main community leaders who acted as gatekeepers controlling researchers' access to the *aldeia* (Saunders, 2006) – that is, *xefi suku*, *xefi aldeia*, youth leaders and, where applicable, *de facto* leaders[38]. This first round of open-ended interviews was based on the main themes drawn from national level interviews and based on the objective reading of the urban fabric; open-ended interviews were chosen again, for this stage, in order to offer interviewees the opportunity to tell their story, offer their views on the situation in their *aldeias* and their country and, where needed, allow for new themes and patterns to emerge. The first official visit also served to ensure that community leaders approved the presence of the author in their *aldeia* and introduced her generally to the community, presenting her work and asking for their participation.

Information gathered in interviews with community leaders was then fed back into additional literature review on the themes and patterns that had emerged, potentially leading to other interviews at the national level with government officials or international organisations when, as previously stated, some themes required additional clarifications with regard to state policies and the state building process. A second round of interviews in the case study *aldeias* was then undertaken to talk to people living there and gather their views. In some areas people were selected at random, walking door to door, whereas in others the *xefi aldeia* provided support and contacts for meeting people according to the author's criteria, which aimed at ensuring a wide variety of views in the *aldeias*, as follows:

- Employment status – employed, unemployed[39];
- Employment sector – government, private, street vendor;
- Level of education – primary, secondary, university;
- Gender; and,
- Age group – youth between 15 and 35 years old, middle-aged between 35 and 50 years old, and elderly, 50 years and above[40].

[38] In some areas de facto leaders emerge as a result of the trust they inspire in people and, consequently, their constant involvement in community matters and conflict resolution.

[39] In order to ensure that both categories were interviewed, the author went to the areas both during the week, in order to speak to the unemployed and women, and during the weekend in order to get a chance to meet with the employed.

The interviews were, again, open-ended with broad and general questions so as to provide the opportunity for people to express their views and construct their meanings (Creswell, 2009; p.8) around the issues, challenges and aspects that were most significant to their conditions and lifestyles. Furthermore, in consistency with the other rounds of interviews, additional information on identified themes, patterns and interpretations (ibid) was fed back into a documentation review and other interviews with relevant people at the national level.

Consequently, what emerges from the data gathering process – and is shown clearly in Figure 8 elaborated by the author below – is that emerging patterns, themes and interpretations (ibid) were constantly fed back into a documentation review and additional interviews with relevant people at the national and international level. This feedback loop process was key in order to "inductively reorganise [information] into categories, patterns and narratives" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967 in Carapic and Jütersonke, 2012; p.5) so as to draw more clearly the connections between the daily experiences of state policies' impacts and their effects on people's interactions with each others and with their state. A copy of the guidance note used for research area interviews can be found in APPENDIX V.

[40] As indicated by article 3 of the 2004 law on "The election of suku chiefs and suku councils": "For the purposes of this law, a young person is an individual aged between 17 and 35 on the polling day, and an elder is an individual aged over 50 years on the polling day […]".

Figure 8 – Data gathering process



Source: elaborated by the author

Secondary data, or documentation review, essentially concerned information relating to the history of Timor Leste – mostly from 1999 onward, but also between 1975 and 1999 in order to understand specific processes that are known to continue to influence East Timorese politics today – as well as the development and critical review of state policies and the state building project. Additionally, when notified by an interviewee, the author also referred to project documents gathered in the field where information concerning particular dynamics within Dili's population or specific characteristics of Dili's governance might be available.

4.3.4. Limitations of research approach

a) Language

Timor Leste finds itself in a very peculiar situation in relation to the main languages spoken on the island. Although it is home to eighteen mother tongues[41] (Hughes, 2009; p.41), Tetun developed over the course of the island's history in order to allow communication between all the different groups and as such, most of the communication with East Timorese is carried out in Tetun. However, until fairly recently, Tetun has remained an oral language only, becoming written only since independence in 2002 when it was officially declared one of the two *lingua franca* in the country. The second official language of the country is Portuguese. This choice was made, in part, to consolidate the cultural relations with the ex-colonisers, but also because Tetun did not have the vocabulary used for administrative purposes. The issue of language differences in Timor Leste will be further discussed in the presentation of the case study country, however at this stage it is important to note that only a very small minority of people, outside government officials, currently speaks Portuguese. Therefore, for the purpose of collecting primary and secondary information, the author needed to be able to read and/or communicate in Portuguese and Tetun.

The author is French and has an elementary to intermediate level of Portuguese and therefore had no issues reading the documentation – much of the literature on Timor Leste is in English, French and Portuguese[42] allowing to circumvent the issue of Bahasa Indonesia – and carrying out a couple of interviews in Portuguese – most government officials also speak English. It was, however, more crucial that the author learn some basics of Tetun to be able to both function in her everyday life in the country and, if not carry out the interviews in Tetun, at least be able to introduce herself and loosely understand the responses of the participants in the case study areas. Fortunately, Tetun is a relatively simple and logic language, which meant that two weeks of intensive language classes at the beginning of September, and as much interaction as possible with East Timorese in order to practice, were sufficient to ensure that the author developed an elementary level. However, it was not sufficient to carry out case study area interviews alone.

[41] "Estimates of the number of indigenous East Timorese languages differ according to ways of classifying languages and dialects (Bowden & Hajek, 2007, p. 265): ethnologue (Gordon, 2005) lists 19 living languages, while Hull (1998) identifies 16 languages with dialectal variations." (Taylor-Leech, 2011; p.292)

[42] As the proceedings of the Understanding Timor Leste Conference (2009; 2011; 2014) demonstrate

As such, the author sought recommendations for a good interpreter, that is, someone who not only had a good level of English, but also could gather a good understanding of the research, "be socially aware and interested in other people's views" (Bujra, 2006; p.177) and be able to anticipate the questions following participants' responses. Luckily, the interpreter recommended presented all the aforementioned characteristics and developed a very good relationship with the author, to the point that she was, indeed, often capable to recognise when a follow-up question was needed or if clarification was necessary – either from the participant, if something was unclear, or from herself, if the response referred to something cultural or historical that needed to be explained to the author.

The author recognises the importance of discussing with the interpreter her views and understanding on the issues of the research in order to grasp potential differences "in understandings of words, concepts and worldviews across languages" (Temple and Young, 2004; p.171). This was addressed by allowing ample time, before and after the interviews and fieldwork day, to debrief about the interpreter and the author's understanding of the discussions as well as the non-verbal communication of the participants (Bujra, 2006; p.178). The author's basic knowledge of Tetun also allowed her to follow enough of the conversations between the interpreter and the participants so as to ask for additional clarifications when needed or ensure that all parts of the response had been translated. Moreover, each round of interviews – local leaders, community – was first carried out in the area where the interpreter was originally from[43], thus ensuring that she could familiarise herself with the process in an environment she was comfortable with.

Finally, as noted in section 4.1.3, the overwhelming interest of the research lies in understanding the narratives of the interviewees in the selected *aldeias*, not in collecting accurate data on facts and figures. As such, whilst the author acknowledges that "there is no neutral position from which to translate" (Temple and Young, 2004; p.164), and potential differences in interpretations have been discussed with the interpreter and taken into consideration, issues that may at

[43] This area was chosen for the purpose of testing the interviews with the interpreter and ensuring that (1) she understood the purpose and meaning of each question and (b) she familiarized herself with them in order to feel comfortable once entering the research areas. Material from these interviews has been put aside and will likely be used for further publications and research

times arise from the use of an interpreter – e.g. lack of specific details – were irrelevant in the context of this research.

b) Accessibility of participants in certain areas

Table 4 presented in section 4.3.1 offers an overview of the main characteristics of the *aldeias*, based on the criteria designed for the selection of the case study areas, and shows that one *aldeia* has been relatively peaceful in the past six years whilst one is still subject to episodes of violence. It was therefore to be expected that access to participants in the more violent *aldeia* might prove more difficult and that, due to the conflict dynamics of the place, some participants may be reluctant to express more freely their opinion.

Section 4.3.5 below will give a more thorough description of the steps taken to ensure that access to participants in Metin IV – the more violent *aldeia* – was not an issue for the author – and indeed, it generally wasn't. At this stage, however, it is important to note that there is one specific group that has been much less accessible in Metin IV than the others, and that is young men involved in the violence. This is due mostly to the fact that many of these young men are part of a martial art gang and that a significant part of the violence experienced by the *aldeias* – though not all – is a result of different martial art groups fighting each other. As such, these men are known to be much more reserved in relation to their opinions, not in the least because many of these martial art groups have political affiliations with some of the parties represented in the parliament. Furthermore, being a young white female amongst young Timorese men might have been an additional obstacle to getting information. This gap, however, has been partially filled by research carried out on urban youth violence in Dili by James Scambary who has been carrying out research in the country for many years and has been able to build a stronger relationship with people in those areas, including Metin IV as it is known to be one of Dili's most unsafe *aldeias*. The use of the word 'partially' is used here because conflict dynamics in Dili's unsafe *aldeias* are very complex and include a mixture of gang related and social jelousy induced violence, therefore the findings of a research are very much directed by the entry point of one's research and James Scambary's research has been particularly focused on martial art gangs. Nonetheless, this has provided excellent background to complete some of the gaps in this research.

Another potential issue regarding access to participants was the urban fabric distinguishing high-income households from lower income ones. In Metin IV much of the life of the *aldeias* happens outdoors, on people's front porches and gardens, at the *sede suku* – the office of the *xefi suku* – or on the streets, thus facilitating access to potential interviewees. Conversely, the urban fabric of Liriu presented some difficulties to access people, and whilst this will be discussed in more details in the case study areas' introduction in section 5, it is worth mentioning here the two main features that constituted a challenge to accessing participants: architecture and living habits. Indeed, Liriu was built during Portuguese times as the main living quarters for Portuguese administration staff, and as such many of the houses in Liriu are bigger than normal, surrounded by gardens and separated from the streets by medium-height fences or walls. These houses are now inhabited by high-income households, generally characterised by their absence during the week – since parents work and children go to school or university – and by a propensity to live within the property rather than on the streets. Approaching these households was therefore more delicate since it required entering their property, and more difficult since they were not often there. Makeshift fences often surrounded medium-income houses, although these were less of a deterrent and people were seen more often interacting with their neighbours in their gardens. Finally low-income houses were characterised by a sort of inward-looking compound-like feature, but their residents generally lived outside and were therefore very easy to access.

The aforementioned issues meant that in some areas access to participants required a little more time and effort, nonetheless the author and her interpreter managed to speak to a wide range of different groups and it was possible to draw patterns and themes from the interviews in each of the two areas.

c) Complexity of political, social and economic issues related to violence in Timor Leste

As briefly stated previously, the aim of this research is not that of analysing and critically assessing state building interventions in Timor Leste from an external point of view and across all sectors – that is, economic, social and political – but rather to understand what issues within the state building process are understood by the population as problematic in relation to their everyday life and activities. This approach therefore implies that the author link the themes, patterns and

issues, regularly emerging from the interviews at the research area level, to the way in which the state building process was carried out and how this affected the specific state policies relating to those issues. For instance, remote and/or violent areas lacking infrastructure relate to infrastructure projects being contracted out to private companies that refuse to work in those areas, and this organisational form is a direct result of international pressure for a (neo)liberal type of market-led development.

The author, nevertheless, acknowledges that each set of issues is also closely related to a wider context and issues within other realms of the country's political life as well as economic and social policies. For example, as mentioned above, the author is aware that violence in certain areas is not only related to issues of social jealousy repeatedly mentioned by the participants, but also to martial art gang dynamics. However, since the issue of social jealousy was more often pointed out than the one relating to gangs, the author chose to emphasise this aspect of the violence and relate the discussions with participants to state building policies. Therefore, since participants believed that social jealousy came mainly from the lack of opportunities for young people in the area, this was linked to both employment policies from the government as well as education policies – which are also related, as the case study analysis will show, to the way in which state building was carried out.

Finally, the author is aware that the issue of peace dividends – that is, state financial assistance – is a very important topic in a country where "nearly everybody regard[s] – or claim[s] to regard – himself or herself as a hero, each with responsibility for winning independence equal to that of others who had been involved" (Hughes, 2009; p.45). Furthermore, as people can see that some groups are getting more than others, it is evident that peace dividends have as much of a possibility to bring peace as they have to create further divisions within a precariously united society. Nonetheless, as for other issues, peace dividends were not brought up by participants as a major issue or impediment in the carrying out of their daily activities or participation in the new nation, consequently this topic has been merely investigate for context purposes rather than as a main thread in the research.

d) Over reliance on primary sources for historical facts

There is little to no documentation on the development of Dili as an urban area during Portuguese and Indonesian times. Whilst it has been possible to obtain Portuguese urbanisation plans from a source at the Ministry of Education, conversations with other researchers have revealed that the little secondary data that exists on Dili and its historical development is scattered and it is difficult to understand who holds it. Therefore, in order to provide the information on the development of the *aldeias*, presented in chapter seven, it has been necessary to rely on the stories shared by the interviewees. Furthermore, much of the documentation accumulated during the Indonesian military rule on life during those 25 years was stored in the government buildings that were burnt during the scorched-earth campaign carried out by the pro-Indonesian militias in the aftermath of the vote for Timor Leste's independence in 1999. Consequently, much of the information about those 25 years, as well as regarding the violence of 1999, has been destroyed, forcing researchers to rely heavily on testimonies and stories.

An in depth review of the literature on Timor Leste shows that, to a certain extent, general facts and traditions as recounted by East Timorese are quite consistent with each other: patterns and themes appear from the stories told and the little written information that can be found. Issues arise, however, in relation to historical dates, names, localities and specific facts. This can be seen in the discrepancies between the different dates given for specific events during Portuguese times in different documents – e.g. dates given in a chronology of Timor Leste's history presented in the journal Latitudes[44] differ in some respects from the chronology given by Irena Cristalis in her book "East Timor A nation's bitter dawn" or in the historical information included in the CAVR (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation)"Chega!" report (2005).

Additionally, Timor Leste being a very mountainous region where much of the population has dispersed itself during different episodes of violence throughout the history of the country – e.g. during Indonesian invasion in 1975, during the 1999 violence – it has been difficult to obtain accurate data on the number of refugees or displaced during those episodes. As such, much of the figures given are approximate – and some also diverge considerably from one document to the next, in which case the author chose to use the figures that were used most often.

[44] N°8, May 2000 (accessed 16/02/14): http://www.revues-plurielles.org/_uploads/pdf/17_8_4.pdf

4.3.5. Ethical considerations

The main aim of the primary data collection was, at national level, to gather a better understanding of the conflict dynamics as well as the state building process and, at the level of the case study areas, the interviews aimed at collecting people's perceptions of their living environment – its history, evolution, tensions –, their movements within Dili's urban space at large and their representations of Timor Leste's three governments since 2002. Whilst data gathering at the national level presented little to no risks for the interviewees expressing their opinion – since they were first and foremost asked to confirm facts or present their versions of events – the author understands that the data gathering process at the level of the research areas could have presented some grounds for concern; however, these potential issues were given due consideration and were dealt with in the following ways.

Firstly, whilst the author exchanged names with the participants as a way to build a rapport upon approaching them, the identity of the participants has remained confidential: the list of interviewees presented in APPENDIX IV has codified participants with numbers. As such, information reported in the appendix refers only to participants' gender, education level and employment status. Furthermore, the information gathered during interviews has been recorded solely on the author's notebook and has not been re-transcribed anywhere else – no interview has been recorded by the means of a digital audio recorder. Finally, since the aim of both national and *aldeia* interviews was to identify patterns, the analysis of the information and its use did not require at any time to mention the identity of the information source.

Each and every participant for the purpose of this research – whether at national or case study area level – was introduced, prior to commencing the interview, to the aims of the research by the author and, in order to ensure that the information was clear, her interpreter in the field. At national level, participants were initially approached through an email sent by the author, which presented the research aims into details and offered the participants an overview of both the topics and the questions that would be raised during the interview. This therefore left them the opportunity to decline or accept to participate in the research, although it is worth noting that all participants at national level felt the research was most needed in the context of Timor Leste and were particularly encouraging and happy to take

part in the endeavour. Upon meeting formally, additional information was offered regarding the research aims as well as confidentiality of the information gathered, such that participants could be fully aware of the nature of the research and their role within the primary data gathering process.

At the level of the case study areas, one of the two *aldeias* did not present any potential security issues since they have been relatively peaceful for quite a number of years – see table in section 3.2.1. Nonetheless, the author was conscious that, in order to ensure that people would feel as safe and comfortable as possible in sharing their views with the author and her interpreter, it was necessary to follow Timor Leste's implicit protocol that requires researchers to first approach community leaders as gatekeepers – in this case *xefi suku* and *xefi aldeia* – in order to explain them the research being carried out, what is expected of participants and how the interview process will be carried out. As far as the *aldeia* of Liriu is concerned, it has been very peaceful since independence – it is indeed regarded as one of the safest *aldeias* in Dili – therefore community leaders gave their consent very easily.

The *aldeia* of Metin IV was the biggest concern for the author as it is known to still be, at times, an unsafe area, and it was therefore essential, both for the safety of the author and her translator as well as to ensure access to participants, "to enter into partnership with a local counterpart who would assist in gaining access" (Barakat and Ellis, 1996; p.151). Consequently, the author first contacted the *de facto* community leader of the *aldeia* in order to explain to him the aim of the research and the role and use of the interviews to be carried out (ibid; p.154). He then spoke to the *xefi suku* who gave his approval to meet with us in the presence of the *de facto* community leader. After our first exchange, the *xefi suku* approved the aim of our research and gave us permission to come and speak to people, but did, nonetheless, accompany us the first morning of interviews in order for people to see us with him and know that he approved and it was safe to speak to us.

Consent from all the other participants in the research areas was gathered through a two-stage introduction. Firstly, the author presented herself and her interpreter to the participant in Tetun – name, nationality, reason for the presence – and gave a very brief introduction of the research being carried out; this stage served to show the participants that the author was not just a researcher with no knowledge of their culture, but rather that she had taken the time to learn their language and

understand their customs to make them feel comfortable in her presence. Secondly, once participants agreed to sit down with the author and her interpreter, the interpreter presented the details of the research and the aim of the interview in more details in order to ensure that they were clear about the reasons for our presence and agreed to share their opinion. This two-stage introduction worked very well to make people comfortable – they were particularly touched that a *malae* (foreigner) had learned their language – and only one person out of all the people approached did not give consent to their participation in the research – this was a young woman in Metin IV who was prevented from her mother to contribute.

The nature of the research carried out in the case study areas did not require any specific personal information from the participants; rather, it offered them the opportunity to express their opinion on matters generally relating to their everyday lives – matters that did not require them to specifically criticise or put anybody else's life in danger – and allowed them room, through the use of a survey guideline rather than a specific questionnaire, to discuss what they felt most comfortable with sharing whilst remaining within the realm of the topics in question. Therefore, the informal character of these interactions made people feel that they did not have to discuss any matter they felt would cause them stress or would put them or their family at risk. At any rate, East Timorese were generally very happy to participate in the study and offer their opinion on the topics presented to them; the vast majority gave a sense that they clearly understood what the aim of the research was about and they strongly supported it because they understood that it was their chance to be consulted at last on what they thought about their area, their country and their government(s). Amongst participants who had higher levels of education – i.e. university – there have been many who have also expressed their interest in reading the main findings from the research. Therefore, there was no doubt that people understood that participating in the research was also in their interest.

CHAPTER 5 – STATE BUILDING IN TIMOR LESTE

"If we accept that East Timorese nationalism grew in part out of the coercive effect of the Indonesian state then it is possible for a sense of modern simultaneity to be freed from the focus that Anderson gives to language alone. What is important is not the cultural artefact in itself – for instance a prayer book – but the subjective response to it; a silent acknowledgment that thousands of others are participating in the same process".

(Damian Grenfell, 2008)

5. State building in Timor Leste: colonial, military and international administrations

The aim of this chapter is to explore how the institutional and ahistorical approach to state building, within which international post-conflict reconstruction assistance operates, affects the establishment of post-conflict state systems – that is, research question number one. To this end, it introduces Timor Leste, the case study country chosen for the purpose of this research, through a review of the three subsequent exogenous interventions that have attempted to control Timorese society since the 16th century.

As such, following the structure used in section 2.3 for understanding the impact of state building on the construction of political community, this chapter begins by analysing the impact of Portuguese colonial administration and Indonesian military rule on the citizenship, legitimacy, sovereignty and territory of Timor Leste. On the basis of the historical context provided by these first two sections, the chapter then moves on to exploring how post-independence international state building, led by the UN, unfolded over the period of transitional administration. That is, continuing with an investigation of citizenship, legitimacy, sovereignty and territory, this chapter seeks to understand the extent to which UN decision-making processes acknowledged and anticipated the impact of the territorial, societal and political legacies of Portuguese and Indonesian rule on Timorese post-independence state building.

5.1. Portuguese colonial rule – "devide et impera"

Timor Leste, shown in Map 3 below, is located on the Eastern half of the island of Timor – bahasa word for 'East' – and is approximately 14,874km^2 (CIA, 2014) with a population of 1,066,409 inhabitants (GDS, 2010).

Map 3 – Map of Timor Leste

(Map removed for copyright purposes)

Source: United Nations (Map No. 4117 Rev.6)

Historically, the creation of the territory on which Timor Leste now stands owes much to the presence of Dutch and Portuguese colonisers, who shared the island from the early 16th century through to Indonesia's declaration of independence in 1945. Indeed, when the first Portuguese traders reached the island of Timor in 1515 – with the original aim of engaging into a spice trade with the neighbouring archipelago of the Moluccas[45] – the land was divided into approximately 40 autonomous kingdoms, each ruled by a king with absolute powers over his population (Ospina and Hohe, 2002; p.39). Upon their first two centuries of colonial rule, the Portuguese interfered very little with the indigenous territorial organisation, even when driven away from Oecussi – where they had first settled,

[45] Upon discovering that the island was rich in Sandalwood the Portuguese decided to settle and start a trade in Sandalwood. The resources were quickly depleted, however, but Portugal having eventually established a colony on the Eastern part of the island, they started instead coffee plantations.

on the Western part of the island[46] – by the Dutch in 1653 to relocate into Dili, on the Eastern part. It is only after the island's official division into West and East Timor – the former becoming part of the Dutch colony and, subsequently, Indonesia, whilst the latter renamed *Timor Leste*, in Portuguese – on 20 April 1859 (Cristalis, 2009; p.VIII), that the Portuguese colonial administration began considering the implementation of a more effective territorial management within what were now the official borders of its colony.

5.1.1. Citizenship

As most colonisers around the world, the Portuguese used the technique to divide and conquer in order to remain in power, thus creating two divisions within the population of Timor Leste that had a significant impact on Timorese identity. The first difference was that of *firaku* and *kaladi*, although there is still much debate going on as to whether these two terms originated in the indigenous language or whether they were a product of Portuguese rule. One theory is that *firaku* is a Tetun translation of the Portuguese word 'vira-cu', meaning 'turning the back', whilst *kaladi* is a Tetun translation of 'calado', that is quiet, two words that were used by the Portuguese to describe, respectively, the population on the Easter part of island – considered defiant in nature – and that on the Western part of the island – considered much more quiet and obedient (Carapic and Jütersonke, 2012; p.23). Another theory is that the translation actually happened the other way around: *firaku* is a Makassai word – dialect from Timor –, which means 'we comrades', and *kaladi* is a Tetun version of 'keladi', a Malay word referring to 'yam' (Castro Seixas, 2009; p.74). Regardless, these two words show that the Portuguese purposefully employed them to create a difference between the Eastern and Western population of Timor Leste.

The second 'othering' produced by the Portuguese during their colonial rule is the distinction between *Maubere* and *Assimilado*. This distinction has its origins in the Colonial Act passed in Portugual in 1930, which stipulated that the Portuguese nation "perform the function of acquiring and colonising overseas dominions and civilising the natives which are contained in them" (Mendes, 1940 in Taylor-Leech, 2008; p.157). Thus, the 'natives' that were civilised would become '*assimilado*', and those that weren't would be referred to as indigenous, or in Timor Leste as

[46] Even before their official denominations, the Eastern and Western parts of the island of Timor were defined by the 125th longitudinal line on the map which runs straight through the middle of the territory

'*Maubere*' – a word that was originally used in Tetun to refer to the people of the mountains. Amongst Timor Leste's population, this distinction not only managed to create a difference between those that could speak Portuguese and work with them and those who couldn't, but also took a Timorese word and gave it a negative connotation, therefore further affecting the identity of the people of Timor Leste.

Finally, the aforementioned distinction was reinforced by a language policy that was clearly aimed at fostering a "discursive construction of identity" (Taylor-Leech, 2008; p.154) rooted in the use of Portuguese being reserved only to the *assimilados*. In this context, Taylor-Leech (ibid) uses the notion of discourse as understood by Chick (2002) to mean the "ways of using language and other means of expression to construct social identities and social relations of power". For indeed although Portuguese was taught in schools, only those that were *assimilados* or *mestiços* – that is mixed-blood – were allowed to attend them, therefore making Portuguese not the language of the colony *per se*, but rather turning it into an identifier of the Portuguese-speaking Timorese elite.

Consequently, these policies of territorial administration and education show that the Portuguese "did little to promote either institutions or infrastructure that might advance a national identity or a nationalist cause" (Hughes, 2009; p.34) – in the early 1970s, 90 percent of the Timorese people were illiterate and only ten East Timorese held university degrees in 1964 (ibid). Instead, as in Rwanda where the *tutsi* were considered superior to other ethnicities, the distinctive Timorese identities drawn by the Portuguese, as well as Portuguese indirect rule through the *assimilados* contributed to determining who was inside and outside the nation (Buckley-Zistel, 2006; p.101); those that were outside the nation continued to live and interact within much the same spaces and scales as it had before the arrival of the Portuguese. As such, one cannot speak of substantive citizenship during Portuguese rule.

5.1.2. Legitimacy

In addition to the absence of substantive citizenship highlighted above, Portuguese colonial rule made no attempt at building a system of governance that allowed for any level of participation from the Timorese population. Rather, the Portuguese initially interfered very little with the indigenous system of governing and left the kings – *liuriai* – to rule their kingdoms. Kingdoms were divided into villages – *sukus* – headed by a village chief – *dato* – responsible for all the hamlets comprised in the village; oral stories from those times collected by Tanja Hohe and Sofi Ospina (2002; p.40) reveal that the relationships between kingdoms were characterised by numerous conflicts and peace agreements.

It is only one year after the official demarcation of East and West Timor, in 1860, that the newly appointed first governor of Timor Leste, Alfonso do Castro, decided that if Portugal was ever to take economic advantage of its colony – where it had introduced the production of coffee after indigenous sandalwood reserves had dried out – it needed to increase its control over the population and limit the fighting between kingdoms. As such, he devised a system of administration organised around the division of Timor Leste into 11 districts[47], each headed by a Portuguese commander whose main task was to maintain peace in the districts and work with the local *liurais* (ibid). In this sense, the indigenous organisation remained "largely untouched" (ibid).

Do Castro's successor, Celestino da Silva, took more significant steps in altering Timor Leste's traditional power structures upon his appointment in 1894. Indeed, in 1906 he replaced the payment of tributes the population had to make to its *liurais* by a system of taxation by head, the proceedings of which were then partly redistributed to the *liuriais* and the *datos*, with the aim of inducing the population to work and produce more rather than just for themselves (ibid). The introduction of this system was the first official move by the Portuguese to turn traditional powers into a link with the Portuguese administration, but did not yet impact on the legitimacy of the *liuriais* and the *datos* amongst the population; rather, it is the introduction, in 1908 and then 1934, of a Portuguese system of governance making use of the strong ties between the population and their *liurais* and *datos* that affected more significantly traditional relationships with authority. For clarity's

[47] Dili, Manatutu, Vemasse, Lautem, Viqueque, Allas, Bibissuco, Cailaco, Maubara, Batugade and Oecussi (Ospina and Hohe, 2002; p.40)

sake, these are outlined in Table 5 below and their impacts subsequently discussed in more details.

Table 5 – Portuguese administration structures (1860 to 1974)

Year	Administrative structure	
	Level	**Power holders**
1860	District	Portuguese commander
	Kingdom	*Liurai* (traditionally appointed)
	Village & Hamlet	*Dato*
1908	*Conselhos* (four units) & *Comandos militars* (eight units)	Municipal administration & Central administration (respectively)
	Sub-districts (*postos*)	(no information available)
	Kingdom	*Liurai* (traditionally appointed)
	Village (*suco*)	*Chefe do suco* (appointed by Portuguese)
	Hamlet	*Chefe do provoaçaõ* (appointed by Portuguese)
1934	Conselhos	Portuguese administrator
	Sub-districts (*postos*)	*Chefe do posto* (some *liurais* took up this post)
	Village (*suco*)	*Chefe do suco*

Source: adapted from Ospina and Hohe (2002; p.41)

The information gathered during Ospina and Hohe's research is at times inconsistent and incomplete because it relies essentially on people's memories and the oral history that has been passed on to them[48]. As such, some people remember the *liurais* as maintaining significant importance in terms of traditional – and at times modern – powers; they remember the Portuguese to have altered very little of the indigenous power structures and the *liurais* to have provided a good and fair link between the Portuguese colonial and the rest of the population. Other informants of the aforementioned research expressed their discontent with the power the *liurais* were given to become the link between the population and the Portuguese colonial rulers. In their opinion the *liurais* "did not pay attention to people's needs" and "they coordinated only with the Portuguese" (ibid; p.44). Similarly, some informants said that the Portuguese were very respectful of the

[48] Through the account of the informants of the study, it remains unclear whether the liurais were replaced, in 1934, with new, appointed, leaders or whether they remained and changed title. What is most likely to have happened, and what Hohe (2002; p.574) cautions, is that in some cases the sub-districts' borders matched those of the old kingdoms, and therefore liurais became part of the system, whereas when this was not the case, new leaders could be appointed.

local customs and systems, or at least did not interfere much with them, whereas others argue that the way in which the *liurais* were inserted in the new system of colonial administration – e.g. changing the titles of the rulers such as *liurais* at times becoming *chefe do posto* – was disrespectful to their ancestral system (ibid) and created conflicts

Therefore, the system of administration described above shows that the Portuguese did very little to penetrate Timorese society and provide them with an opportunity to define "which political institutions and which decisions made within them are acceptable" (Peter, 2010; p.17). Rather, the decision, very late into their colonial rule, to use customary forms of leadership in order to control the population managed only to maintain the status quo of the leadership system at best, and to create more animosity against the rulers in the worst case scenarios. The colonial system of rule enjoyed limited legitimacy only in the eyes of the privileged *assimilados* elite.

5.1.3. Sovereignty

The lack of substantive and formal citizenship characteristic of the Portuguese colonial regime therefore failed to create a system of nested socially constructed practices of political authority (Agnew, 2005; p.442). Instead, in the absence of a system that allowed them to voice their concern, and firmly grounded in social identities that very much reflected their nature prior to the arrival of the Portuguese, the population of Timor Leste simply remained characterised by a wide variety of autonomous polities that rarely sought to boycott the system in order to change it. As such, Portuguese sovereignty was neither pervasive nor violently contested.

Indeed, resistance to Portuguese colonial administration did happen, although the history collected thus far on that period of Timor Leste's history shows that it manifested itself mostly through episodes of violence in specific regions and was generally triggered by *liurais*. The lack of wide-spread, organised resistance against the Portuguese is generally attributed to the differences between the *liurais* who fought each other quite regularly, as well as to the use by the Portuguese, later on, of these differences to divide and conquer – that is, by integrating the loyal *liurais* in the new administration whilst replacing the disloyal ones. Only two episodes seem to have triggered a more widespread and organised resistance.

The most important one is known as the 'Manufahi war', named after the kingdom – located on the southern part of the island of Timor – of the *liurai* who initiated the war, Dom Boaventura. It is said that in 1911, Dom Boaventura managed to convince all the *liurais* that they would be stronger and more successful in their endeavour if they fought the colonial powers together. As a result, they entered a blood oath to fight against all the Europeans in Timor Leste and began "attacking Portuguese posts, burning houses and killing Portuguese" (Ospina and Hohe, 2002; p.39). The war lasted one year, but eventually led, counter-productively, to the strengthening of the divide and conquer rule of the Portuguese who, one by one, won over the kingdoms of Timor Leste so that, eventually, all *liurais* surrendered and the new system of administration was established where *sucos* were given more power so as to reduce that of the *liurais* (CAVR, 2005; p.9).

The second most significant rebellion against Portuguese rule was inspired, in 1959, by the independence movement taking place at the time in neighbouring Indonesia. It is said that a small group of anti-colonial activists had already been forming in the outskirts of Dili since 1958 and, inspired by a group of Indonesian activists that had fled to Baucau, in Timor Leste, had begun planning an uprising against colonial rule: "a group including nine of the Permesta Indonesians would march Baucau to Dili and begin the uprising, seizing installations; a concurrent uprising would be taking place in Aileu [south of Dili, in the mountains]" (Chamberlain, 2010; p.175). The rebellion, however, never took the proportions that it aimed for as the Portuguese forces, tipped by someone in Dili, repressed the rebellion in the capital without much violence, arresting the rebels; Viqueque fell shortly afterwards (ibid).

5.1.4. Territory

What the analysis of citizenship, legitimacy and sovereignty in Portuguese ruled Timor Leste demonstrates is that, although the geographical boundaries of the country, as it stands today, emerged out of Portuguese decision-making, the manner in which the colonisers administered the population within those boundaries failed to create a territory. Instead, the deliberate implementation of a system aimed at creating divisions amongst the *liurais* in order to divide and conquer more easily resulted in practice in the perpetration of the status quo in relation to local authority: as people continued to relate to their *liurais* and saw very little development that could be attributed to the Portuguese, colonial rule did not

engender any type of legitimacy. Furthermore, the lack of a system that could potentially open room for participation from the population, combined with the lack of a project that aimed at developing a wider social identity that would encompass all the various existing ones, resulted in a situation where people could not express their concerns but at the same time did not have the knowledge or communication tools to build a widespread resistance. Sovereignty of the Portuguese, thus, failed to emerge.

As such, Portuguese colonial rule by no means was recognised across the whole territory other than through a few specific policies such as taxation and forced labour; however, as those were implemented within a system that did not guarantee – nor did it seek to build – any legitimacy across the population, the authority of the colonisers meant little to the population. In this context, as of the mid-1970s Timor Leste did not present any of the characteristics of a territory as it is understood in the context of this research.

5.1.5. Portuguese withdrawal – Timor Leste's first independence

On 25 April 1974 a military coup took place in Lisbon, Portugal, to overthrow the authoritarian regime that had been ruling the country since 1933, thus starting a turbulent period of change in Portugal's history also known as the Carnation Revolution. While the coup was originally organised by the Armed Forces Movement to overthrow the authoritarian regime, it soon turned into a peaceful civil revolution to free Portuguese colonies, where the state was seen to spend significant amounts of human and financial resources to fight independence wars thus severely affecting Portugal's economy (Le Monde Diplomatique, 2004).

As with all other Portuguese colonies, the outcome of the Carnation revolution in Timor Leste was decolonisation with, however, one important distinction: no independence struggle had been taking place in the country, thus the absence of a unified struggle against the outsider meant that there was no strong unity in the territory amongst the population, and no one – or more – leaders to follow. Nonetheless, Timor Leste's first attempt to independence between 1974 and 1975, although brief, is a crucial point in understanding the process of the country's "political awakening" (Rod Nixon in Carapic and Jütersonke, 2012; p.24) and the divides this period has created within its ruling elite. Indeed, as independence was handed to a Timorese population that was neither prepared nor organised for it, thus throwing Timor Leste "into a pit of independence" (Gusmão, 2000 in Hughes,

2009; p.35), very different ideas for the future of the country emerged. These are reflected in the three main parties that emerged as a result of Portuguese efforts to encourage educated Timorese to form political parties: Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN), União Democratica Timorense (UDT) and Associação Democratica de Timor (Apodeti). Table 6 below presents a brief overview of their main positions regarding independence and their political stances.

Table 6 – Differences between three main political parties in 1975

Party	Position on independence	Political stance in 1975
FRETILIN	Strong position on independence from Indonesia	▪ Radical social, political and economic change ▪ Undertook literacy and other development projects ▪ Strong grassroots following in rural communities
UDT	Self-determination in support of independent federation with Portugal	▪ Accelerated social, economic, cultural and political development ▪ National use of Portuguese ▪ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and democracy ▪ Just distribution of income ▪ Good neighbour policies ▪ Cooperation with other political parties ▪ Primary support from Timorese with strong links to the Portuguese
Apodeti	In favour of becoming part of Indonesia	▪ Introduce compulsory Indonesian in schools ▪ Uphold essential human rights, ▪ Just distribution of wealth, ▪ Minimum salary, ▪ Right to strike, ▪ Free education and health, ▪ Freedom of expression, of religion and opposed racial discrimination but had a declared bias towards the Catholic Church

Source: adapted from Walsh (2001), Kiernan (2003) and Carapic and Jütersonke (2012)

What the table highlights is that the three parties that emerged were not only characterised by their very different positions in terms of independence – fully independent, strong ties with Portugal or strong ties with Indonesia – but that these differences accordingly led to strong divergences, on issues of language and relations with the grassroots and their needs, that would have a significant impact on the social identity of the Timorese in very different ways. Furthermore, the political awakening triggered by the Portuguese withdrawal was managed in much the same way in which the Portuguese had dealt with the Timorese population, that is, focused on the Portuguese speaking elite. Therefore, the parties and their political stances reflected the aspirations of an elite few, with little concern as to the desires of the Timorese population.

However, these differences amongst emerging leaders were only the tip of the iceberg looming on Timor Leste's path to peaceful independence, for the political turmoil that followed the Portuguese organised elections of March 1975 led to a three-weeks civil war, which contributed to creating divisions amongst Timorese leaders that still bear significant divisive potential today. In fact, shortly after winning the local elections in 1975, FRETILIN agreed to rule with UDT in order to form a unified front against Apodeti; however, when the then President of Indonesia, Suharto, returned from a trip in the United States where he had managed to convince then U.S President Gerald Ford that FRETILIN presented a communist threat – thus justifying Indonesia's invasion – UDT leaders perceived a threat for the future of Timor and organised a coup against FRETILIN. The coup took place in Dili in the night of 11 August 1975, resulting in the arrest of more than 80 FRETILIN members (Kiernan, 2003; p.205) and UDT regaining control of the port, the airport, the radio and the telephone facilities (University of New South Wales, 2014). But UDT's overthrow was short-lived, as remaining FRETILIN members fled to the mountains and appealed successfully "to the Portuguese trained East Timorese military units" (Kiernan, 2003; p.205) for their help, leading to a three-weeks civil war that eventually saw UDT defeated and many of its members fleeing to West Timor. On 28 November 1975 FRETILIN declared Timor Leste's independence and started taking the first steps towards building a state[49].

[49] It is not the aim of this section, or of this thesis, to go in-depth into the description of FRETILIN's initial attempt at building state institutions in 1975. Nonetheless, parts of this process will be explored throughout the analysis of the case study as a comparison with the state building exercise undertaken by the United Nations.

5.2. Indonesian military rule

Unfortunately for Timor Leste, the timing of its political awakening coincided with a wider geopolitical context that quickly cut short the country's aspirations for independence. Set during the Cold War, in a geographical area where U.S forces had been waging a fight against communist forces for over two decades, FRETILIN leaders' belief that "they could draw on Marxism and adapt it to nationalist ends" (Joliffe, 1978 in Kiernan, 2003; p.206) rose significant concerns amongst anti-communist neighbours. General Suharto in particular, a fierce anti-communist who had successfully crushed Indonesia's left in a violent repression in 1965-1966 and become Indonesia's first president in 1967, was concerned with FRETILIN's policies; "the socio-economic transformations including land reform, the establishment of cooperatives and an end to elite rule" (Jones, 2010; p.554), advocated by the party, sat rather uneasily against his plans, financially and politically backed by the US, to implement a "capitalist social order" (ibid) in the region.

Consequently, upon FRETILIN's victory of the 1975 elections, General Suharto began lobbying then U.S President Gerald Ford, and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for their approval to intervene in order to avert another communist threat. The US eventually gave their green light, and on December 7th, 1975, Indonesian forces landed in Dili and launched a full-scale invasion of Timor Leste.

5.2.1. Citizenship

Indonesia's plan to integrate Timor Leste originally rested on two important pillars that would have allowed it to maintain control over the population across the whole territory of Timor Leste: infrastructure as well as economic development, and education. Indeed, in order to facilitate movement of military troops across a territory that had originally seen very little development during Portuguese times, the Indonesians constructed a wide network of roads. Furthermore, the role of education in a country that was primarily illiterate was seen by the Indonesians as a major factor in integrating East Timorese in Indonesia: through the establishment of schools throughout the whole territory, and by making education in Bahasa mandatory for everyone, the Indonesians thought they could achieve a "comprehensive resocialisation of the territory" (Aditjondro, 1994 in Jones, 2010; p.555). Finally, as Timor Leste was part of the territory, the Indonesian government also took control over most of Timorese's main businesses and plantations,

integrating them together under the PT Denok holding company, which eventually also became the monopoly exporter of coffee (Jones, 2012; p.99).

But these extensive efforts to resocialise East Timorese, however, backfired significantly against Indonesia as the resistance, instead, used them to organise its fight more efficiently. Firstly, the far-reaching road network built for the purpose of facilitating Indonesian military's movement across the territory also "entailed new types of mobility for locals, which paralleled the pyramid of subdistrict, district, and provincial/national hierarchies" (Hughes, 2009; p.38) developed by the Indonesians to govern the territory. Therefore, where previously it had proven difficult for Timorese to travel, they were now able to move around and communicate more easily amongst each other, facilitating the establishment of a clandestine resistance network between towns and villages across Timor Leste. Secondly, the compulsory education, complemented toward the end of the 1980s by new opportunities for youth to access universities in Indonesia, led to a new East Timorese youth that was "imbued with Indonesian ideas concerning the importance of independent nationhood" (ibid; p.41), and which returned to the country with new ideas for independence and statehood for Timor Leste. Thirdly, the economic monopoly exercised by PT Denok not only forced Timorese farmers to sell their coffee harvests at much lower prices (Jones, 2012; p.99), but the extensive plundering of economic resources by the Indonesians to fund their military activity on the territory brought about unemployment and economic stagnation throughout most of the territory, thus contributing to a growing "popular resentment at being colonised by government-backed monopolies", especially amongst the youth (ibid; p.101).

In addition to these issues, Indonesia's rhetoric and attitude toward Timor Leste and its population produced, in the long run, a counter-citizenship that eventually reinforced anti-Indonesian sentiments amongst the Timorese. As Anderson (2001; p.236) points out, "the Indonesian government has been unable to incorporate [Timor Leste] imaginatively, in the boarder, popular sense": what should have been Indonesian territory was never referred to in any other way than as 'Timor Leste' by Suharto and his military, and the population within was persistently called 'East Timorese'. Moreover, Indonesia's deployment of violence on a vast scale, including "the use of aerial bombardments, the napalming of villages, the systematic herding of people into resettlement centres leading to the terrible starvation famines of 1977-1980" (Anderson, 2001; p.235), differed significantly

from Indonesia's policies in the rest of the archipelago. The consequences of these policies, that appeared to be more "for enemies than for national siblings" (ibid), were crucial for shaping representations of belonging in the minds of both Indonesians and Timorese; people on either side of the original border continued to feel as though that border strongly defined their identity, both amongst themselves and in the eyes of the Indonesian government.

In contrast with these extremely isolating Indonesian policies, the strong leadership of the resistance movement and the Church within Timor Leste contributed to the emergence and reinforcement of a new nationalist sentiment. Indeed, the "new equality that transcended any pre-existing social cleavage" (Hughes, 2009; p.38), resulting from Indonesian policies in Timor Leste, provided an opportunity for FRETILIN to develop programmes that aimed at raising an East Timorese consciousness amongst the population (Hughes, 2009; p.39). For example, in the early years of the invasion, as mass displacement of population arrived in the zones still under FRETILIN's control, "mountainous liberated zones" (ibid) were created where FRETILIN organised food production, education services, health care, and political education programmes (ibid) "designed to encourage the spirit of nationalism and support the national liberation struggle" (CAVR, 2005 in ibid). According to some testimonies received by CAVR, these liberated zones marked an important step forward toward the development of East Timorese nationalism, starkly in contrast with Indonesian resocialisation policies within the territory.

Furthermore, as Indonesia required that everyone in its territory choose one of five registered religions – which included Catholicism but excluded animism, Timor Leste's main religion – the vast majority of East Timorese joined the Catholic Church, since relations with the Church during Portuguese times had remained good. The role of the Church took on special meaning when, at the beginning of the 1980s, it became particularly indigenised through two main events: the appointment of East Timorese Bishop Belo, which contributed to increasing the number of East Timorese priests in the territory; and, the authorisation from the Vatican to use Tetun – the indigenous *lingua franca* – during mass, since Portuguese had been banned by the Indonesians. Thus, churches became "the only places in which Timorese could congregate as a community without arousing the suspicion of the Indonesians" (Hughes, 2009; p.43), a sentiment that played a key role in the development of a Timorese sense of belonging to a polity that transcended the local to form new representations of a wider society. As new safe-

heavens, churches became the primary site where people belonging to the resistance movements felt they could discuss strategic matters, share information and build a strong network. Finally, the use of Tetun across all the churches in the territory contributed significantly to the spread of the language, which soon became the language of the resistance and, as such, an identifier of Timorese polity.

Consequently, whilst Indonesia initially organised its administration of Timor Leste in a way that aimed at transforming the variety of local kingdoms into a unified extension of Indonesia's territory, its rhetoric and attitudes toward the population of the territory eventually achieved the opposite. Indeed, despite attempting, much like the Portuguese did although on a wider and more consistent scale, to promote formal citizenship for those who allied themselves with the regime, many of its tactics served instead to facilitate the development and strengthening of a resistance movement that came to define Timorese polity. The notion that the vast majority of Timorese were suffering from the same brutal and unfair rule across a contained geographic space served to build representations of a wider political community. Additionally, the development of a common language that came to define the resistance movement contributed to the development of a substantive citizenship that ran counter to the formal one extended only to a few.

5.2.2. Legitimacy

Suharto's policies towards Timor Leste were mirrored in the way in which military administration of the territory was organised: in order to ensure control of the population over the whole territory of Timor Leste, the previous administrative structures were maintained, safeguarding the many layers running from district to hamlets; however, since Timor Leste was now Indonesia's 27th province (Ospina and Hohe, 2002; p.47) a combination of both Indonesian and Timorese powers were now responsible for these different administrative layers, as shown in Table 7 below.

Table 7 – Indonesian administration structure

Unit	Indonesian term	Head
District	*Kabupaten*	*Bupati*
Subdistrict	*Kecamatan*	*Camat*
Village	*Desa*	*Kepala desa*
Hamlet	*Dusun*	*Kepala desun*
Neighbourhood	*Rukun tetangga (RT)*	*Kepala RT*

Source: Ospina and Hohe (2002) p.47

Informants in the study carried out by Ospina and Hohe (2002) pointed out that the Indonesians understood the importance of the local level within Timorese traditional power structures. They had realised that if they wished to maintain control over the population at those levels it was necessary to implement a system that could, on one hand, give the Timorese the impression that they could still choose who would have power, whilst on the other hand leaving room for Indonesians to ensure that power holders would work with them rather than against.

As such, the village chief – which had become the new title of many *liurais* under Portuguese administration – was no longer to be appointed according to royal family ties but, rather, would be elected by the population. The candidates' appointment process maintained a semblance of traditional system in that "the power holders of the village, who decided still in accordance with the traditional power structure, chose the candidates" (ibid; p.48), and did so in traditional Timorese ways, respecting the importance of descent in the selection of the candidates – an important feature in Timorese culture, as noted in the previous sections. Village inhabitants were then called on to vote for their village chiefs and it is at this level, informants of the study indicate, that Indonesians sometimes interfered to adjust elections results in favour of the candidates that showed most allegiance to them. Views vary at this stage with regard to whether the Indonesians interfered often with elections results or not, and whether they respected traditional systems and elders' choices; nonetheless, general consensus remains on the fact that Timorese generally felt that their leaders were still traditionally chosen,

although now elected, and their authority consequently remained intact to a significant extent.

This mode of administration by the Indonesians appeared, initially, as the only way to penetrate Timorese society and control it. The system relied heavily on an anti-FRETILIN elite to join the administration and form alliances in order to maintain existing businesses or form new ones, thus leading to the creation of a "web of patron-client relationships [which] comprised of members of the local government, distinguished military [officers], technocrats in charge of firms, influential families, political and traditional leaders and business elites" (Pedersen and Arneberg, 1999 in Jones, 2010; p.556). However, whilst this division between elites working with the Indonesians and FRETILIN and its social base worked at the beginning, the penetration of Timorese society with its ideological or historical divisions into the new system of administration eventually translated into a loss of control by the Indonesians. Furthermore, the aforementioned election system, which the Indonesians thought they could continue to control, also eventually undermined Indonesian control as some local chiefs pretended to work for the Indonesians while in reality working for the resistance. Consequently, despite Indonesia's best efforts to use the local system to maintain control and penetrate Timorese society, "Indonesia's state project was modified by the newcomers' need to compromise with pre-existing powerful social groups to constitute local power" (Jones, 2010; p.557), a system which in the end worked against Indonesia.

Therefore, it appears that by building a governance system based on pre-existing Timorese customary authority relationships, Indonesia initially sought to guarantee the legitimacy of its presence in the territory. However, much like what has been highlighted previously in relation to citizenship, the actual way in which the Indonesian military governed the population and exercised their authority eventually turned against Indonesian rule in the long run. Indeed, cognisant that the institutions, originally meant to provide them with the opportunity to participate and keep checks and balances on the governance system, were in reality a façade aimed at maintaining closer control over their daily activities, the Timorese population began using them to its own advantage; as such, the legitimacy these structures contributed to building was not that of the Indonesian ruler but rather that of FRETILIN-led's resistance.

5.2.3. Sovereignty

The politicisation of Timorese society upon Portuguese withdrawal, compounded with Indonesia's violent repression tactics, contributed to the development of a strong resistance movement which lasted 25 years and eventually succeeded with the referendum for independence in 1999. Resistance to Indonesian military rule can be divided into three main phases (Hughes, 2009; p.35), which roughly correspond to the three main fronts that had developed: the military front organised by FRETILIN's armed wing, the Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste (FALINTIL), a clandestine structure involving civilians also organised by FALINTIL, and a political and diplomatic front headed internally and abroad by FRETILIN's Portuguese educated elite (Ospina and Hohe, 2002; p.50).

In the first years of resistance, between **1975 and 1979**, FALINTIL was successful on the **military front** in its fight against the Indonesian military and in 1976, as much as 80% of Timor Leste's territory was still under FRETILIN's control (Kiernan, 2003; p.210), thus perpetrating the image of "FRETILIN as a legitimate government under attack, rather than a resistance force" (Hughes, 2009; p.35). However, closer to the end of the 1970s, Indonesia's retaliation against FALINTIL's military efforts became even more violent, including both assaults on FALINTIL's bases and air attacks on the civilians in the areas under its control; in 1978 the death of FALINTIL's commander Nicolao Lobato marked the end of a relatively successful phase and the beginning of the most difficult period of the resistance movement.

Between **1979 and 1987**, "FRETILIN relinquished control of the territory and FALINTIL retreated to secret hideouts in the mountains, from where its members mounted sporadic guerrilla raids on the Indonesian army" (ibid). But the raids continued to decrease as Indonesia's violent repression brought the number of FALINTIL fighters from approximately 5,000 in 1979 to about a 100 in 1987 (ibid). Furthermore, ideological disagreements between FRETILIN leaders contributed to further weakening the resistance movement, a split which became particularly clear at a FRETILIN Central Committee's conference convened in 1981, where FALINTIL's commander in chief Xanana Gusmao's push for the adoption of a Leninist-Marxist ideology within the resistance created significant differences between FRETILIN's leaders who did not want the fight to become political and those who did, insisting that a peasant militia be trained (Kiernan, 2003; p.208).

The creation, during that same conference, of an umbrella organisation encouraging a more united resistance front – the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (CRRN) – did little to reconcile those differences, and for a few years the resistance movement was forced to remain disaggregated into small cells that moved around the territory and relied more heavily on the participation of a **clandestine resistance movement** amongst the population.

The period between **1987 and 1999** marked a new impetus for Timorese resistance, characterised by the combination of an **urban clandestine resistance** and the support of a **political and diplomatic front,** both at home and abroad. In 1989, Suharto began opening up Timor Leste to the rest of the world, increasing the number of opportunities for Timorese youth to go and study in Indonesian universities (Hughes, 2009; p.41). This, however, also opened up the Indonesian regime to renewed, stronger criticism as a growing number of unemployed Timorese youth became increasingly frustrated with the significant gap between Indonesia's promises of "development and enhanced job prospects" (Jones, 2012; p.101) and the reality of mass unemployment; as a result, many youth organised themselves into an urban clandestine movement.

On the political front, by the mid-1980s it had become evident that, due to a decreasing number of guerrilla fighters, a military victory would not be possible. Thus, FAILINTIL, still under Xanana's command, changed tactics. First, the Marxist-Leninist ideology that had proved so divisive was dropped and replaced by a more nationalist discourse of independence (Philpott, 2006; p.141) at the centre of which "FALINTIL operated as a symbol of Timorese resistance, and a reminder to the outside world of the illegality and brutality of the Indonesian regime" (Hughes, 2009; p.40). Second, toward the end of the 1980s Xanana had become convinced that, in order to win the struggle against Indonesian rule, it was necessary to create a more united front including other key actors such as UDT, the Church and the student urban clandestine movement (Philpott, 2006; Hughes, 2009). Consequently, despite persisting differences between leaders' political tactics – which culminated into FALINTIL and FRETILIN separating in 1987, creating animosities between Xanana and other leaders that continue to characterise Timor Leste's politics today – the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) was formed in 1988, and took the lead "in promoting the struggle for independence on the international stage, under the auspices of Jose Ramos Horta from 1989" (Hughes, 2009; p.40).

It is, however, a student demonstration organised in Dili's Santa Cruz cemetery on 12 November 1991, that revealed Indonesia's violently repressive military rule to the international community; that day the massacre of over 200 people by Indonesian police, who attempted to suppress the rebellion, was filmed by British journalist Max Stahl who happened to be visiting Timor Leste at the time and was present in Santa Cruz, filming the protest. The film was subsequently successfully released internationally to raise awareness of the Timorese plight, a release which coincided, to Timor Leste's advantage, with the end of the Cold War and, as such, a reversal of the situation for the country within the geopolitical arena. No longer concerned with the possibility of a communist threat, the international community was suddenly shaken by the evidence brought forward that the military regime implemented by Indonesia in Timor Leste in all these years had turned into "a highly repressive, deeply corrupt and fairly ramshackle entity, which systematically failed to develop the local economy and thereby cultivate popular legitimacy" (ibid). Consequently, Timor Leste found itself at the forefront of the international stage, which significantly facilitated the task of the diplomatic front led by Jose Ramos Horta and Bishop Belo.

The financial crisis of 1997-1998 eventually gave the final blow to Suharto's government in Indonesia, as international actors used Indonesia's increased reliance on IMF and World Bank assistance to pressure Suharto into retreating from Timor Leste. Simultaneously, in Timor Leste in 1998, the CNRT (National Council of Timorese Resistance) replaced the CNRM, encompassing the five political parties that had been created in 1975, in order to present Timor Leste as a united front to the international community and presenting the basis for a future government of national reconciliation (Philpott, 2006; p.142). In May 1998 Suharto stepped down and his successor, President Habibie, offered East Timorese the opportunity to vote in a referendum for independence from Indonesia.

The development of a well-organised, widespread resistance throughout Timor Leste during the 25 years of military rule clearly demonstrates that the legitimacy and sovereignty originally conferred to the Indonesian regime by the U.S did not match the situation within the country's boundaries. Rather, Indonesian's extensive and brutal repression of any form of dissent only contributed to reinforcing, in contrast, the sovereignty of FRETILIN across Timor Leste's society.

5.2.4. Territory

The case of Indonesia's military rule in Timor Leste is particularly interesting for the purpose of this research because it brings to the fore clear evidence of how an extremely repressive military regime can masquerade as a state building exercise and gather the international legitimacy and sovereignty it needs to maintain control within internationally defined geographical boundaries. This example also contributes to show, however, that such international legitimacy and sovereignty do not necessarily result in the creation of a territory as defined for the purposes of this research.

Indeed, whilst Suharto's claim that it was better for Timor Leste – and the international community as a whole – if the country became part of Indonesia may have won him US approval for a full-scale invasion, the border between the two territories remained a reality in the hearts and minds of both Indonesian and Timorese population throughout the 25 years of military rule. As such, the fierce resistance struggle led, over those 25 years, by FRETILIN and the population's clandestine movements, shows very clearly that despite some initial level of support from a small share of the population, Indonesia's attempt to annex Timor Leste not only failed, but managed to foster a new sense of national unity that was "still quite thin on the ground" (Anderson, 2001; p.237) in 1975. Fascinatingly, therefore, Suharto did manage to create a territory, yet what emerged was not a bigger Indonesia but the 21st century newest nation, Timor Leste.

5.2.5. Timor Leste's independence from Indonesia

Keen to show the international community his intentions for a much more democratic rule, B.J. Habibie, Suharto's successor in 1998, immediately agreed to open negotiations with Timor Leste regarding its independence from Indonesia. Thus, backed by the UN, which had refused from the very beginning to recognise Indonesia's annexation of Timor Leste's territory (Smith, 2004; p.147), and by Portugal, which had maintained legal ties with Timor Leste in the eyes of the UN and had regularly argued for its self-determination (Ingram, 2012; p.3), Indonesia signed on 5 May 1999 an agreement that set the legal grounds for a popular consultation that would give the people of Timor Leste the opportunity to decide

the future of their country – that is, special autonomy within Indonesia or independence (ibid)[50]. The CNRT, however, was left outside of the negotiations.

Preparations for the popular consultation started as soon as the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established in June 1999, but security issues marred the process from the beginning. Indeed, security in the run up to, and during, the popular consultation was entrusted to Indonesian military troops – a decision resulting from Jakarta's refusal, at the time of the agreement, to allow a UN blue beret force (Smith, 2004; p.148) – and was characterised, as early as July, by regular pro-Indonesian Timorese militias attacks and intimidation, which Indonesian military troops did little to stop. Despite these warning signs, however, Xanana Gusmão insisted that the people of Timor Leste were ready (Chopra, 2002; p.983), and the consultation was held on 30 August 1999.

Whilst the consultation was a success, with 98.6% of registered voters turning out to cast their ballot (Philpott, 2006; p.144) of which 78.5% were in favour of Timor Leste's independence from Indonesia (Ingram, 2012; p.1), the feeling of happiness was short-lived. Between September 1 and 3, "terror started even before the votes were counted" (Cristalis, 2009; p.206), with militiamen attacking UNAMET district offices in an attempt to drive UN staff – mostly volunteers – away from their bases and, eventually, the country. On September 4, upon announcement of the results, pro-Indonesia militiamen started a campaign of violence against the East Timorese population – "Operation Clean Sweep" (Chopra, 2002; p.983) – which lasted three weeks, the time it took for the international community to build a response. Indeed, ill prepared for the violence that followed the ballot (Dinnen, N.D.; p.2), UNAMET evacuated most of its staff; simultaneously, UN response was delayed by concerns from Malaysia, U.S, China and Russia over negatively affecting their relationship with Indonesia by intervening in what could be conceived as sovereign territory (Suhrke, 2001; p.5). The International Force East Timor (INTERFET) was finally authorised and deployed on 15 September, as Indonesia publicly acknowledged the involvement of its military and police personnel in allowing militiamen's violence in Timor Leste (UN, 1999 in Ingram, 2012; p.1); INTERFET was tasked to "take all necessary measures to restore peace and security in East Timor" (Gorjão, 2002; p.315) and peace was restored shortly after.

[50] The agreement stipulated that should East Timorese people vote for independence from Indonesia, "the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations" (UN, 1999; p.7)

Fifteen days for the authorisation and deployment of an international force may appear a "swift reply" (Philpott, 2006; Ingram, 2012) by international standards, but to the East Timorese the destruction that took place between September 4 and 15 left a gaping hole in the country's physical and human resources: close to 2,000 East Timorese were killed while over 250,000 refugees fled to West Timor (Gorjão, 2002; Ingram, 2012); and, around 70% of the country's physical infrastructure - public buildings, and therefore government records, communications, water supply and electricity infrastructure – was destroyed as villages, towns and cities were burnt to the ground (Chopra 2002; Ingram, 2012). Consequently, the physical, human and political devastation that occurred in September 1999 laid the foundation for the international community to consider Timor Leste a *tabula rasa* (Chopra, 2002; Jones, 2010) or *terra nullius* (Suhrke, 2001; Lemay-Hebert, 2011).

5.3. United Nations Transitional Administration – post-conflict state building

Six weeks after INTERFET's intervention to restore peace in Timor Leste, on 25 October 1999, UN Resolution 1272 established UNAMET's successor and, as such, set the foundations for the first ever most comprehensive exercise of transitional administration to be undertaken by the UN: UNTAET. The Resolution stipulated that it "will be endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice" (UN Security Council, 1999; p.2). In these terms, Resolution 1272 turned UNTAET into Timor Leste's effective formal government and the individual responsible for the mission, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator Sergio Vieira de Mello, into Timor Leste's sovereign. But UNTAET's task was not solely that of administrating the country whilst the foundations for state building were being laid; it was also responsible for laying those foundations, and was therefore in charge of "establishing an effective administration, assisting in the development of civil and social services, […] supporting capacity-building for self-government, and assisting in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development" (Gorjão, 2002; p.314). In this light, UNTAET's mandate was without any precedent both in breadth and content (ibid).

As such, UNTAET's position during Timor Leste's transitional administration is both highly complex and also crucial to analyse for the purpose of understanding how the international state building process has affected – and indeed continues to

affect today – the emergence of a national citizenship and the development of a sense of political community amongst the Timorese population. Because the mission acted, for two years, almost like a state, this sub-section will analyse its main actions through the lenses of citizenship, legitimacy, sovereignty and territory; however, its ambiguous position between having full authority over the territory for two years whilst building national institutions, had subsequent significant consequences on the sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship – as section 5.3.1 will illustrate. As such, the order of analysis has been inverted.

5.3.1. Territory

Section 5.2.5 demonstrated that the networks and practices inherent to the resistance movements against Indonesia, as well as the knowledge that other people within the same bounded space were suffering in the same conditions without distinction for ethnicity, class or political orientation (Hughes, 2009; p.38), fostered representations of a wider social Timorese polity, creating a link between society and space (Soja, 1971 in Storey, 2012; p.27). The overwhelming majority in favour for Timor Leste's independence from Indonesia in 1999 marked the culmination of this new "mapped imagination" (Anderson, 2001; p.237) within the now internationally recognised boundaries of the country's territory.

In this context, UNTAET's mission included all the classical powers of a state, as indicated in the aforementioned Resolution, but they were to be "exercised as a trustee rather than a sovereign" (Stahn, 2001 in Ingram, 2012; p.3). In other words, UNTAET was left with a very delicate balance to strike within the new territory: it needed to display enough authority to be able to manage the country whilst the new institutions were being built, simultaneously ensuring that its authority did not undermine the relationship between the Timorese population and its emerging political elite. As a consequence, with the intent to leave the creation of a territory to the Timorese society, UNTAET purposefully chose to abstain from engaging "with the deeper political history of Timor and the corrosive relationship between prominent elite personalities and their supporters" (Ingram, 2012; p.2). This decision, however, had devastating consequences for the institutional design that took place over the next two years of transitional administration and, as a result, on the extension of state's power across the whole territory.

5.3.2. Sovereignty

In order to have the fastest and most effective reach at the local level, UNTAET made a decision early on to maintain the Indonesian system of governance – that is, district, sub-district, village and hamlet; maintaining a strong central authority at national level, it created the position of international District Field Officer (DFO), which was meant to become a link between these local levels of governance and central authority. At the same time as the DFOs were being set-up, however, a parallel structure based on existing clandestine structures re-emerged under the leadership of the CNRT (Hohe, 2002; p.579). Also using the same levels of governance established by the Indonesians, it established a system where sub-district and village chiefs were appointed following a procedure that combined customary and resistance related authority: village elders made initial appointments according to customary practices, then FALINTIL consulted with the CNRT to validate the final choice (ibid). As such, the parallel structure set-up by the CNRT held much more authority than the DFOs, whom many people felt "did not have sufficient cultural knowledge" (ibid) to gain such authority.

Faced with the evidence of CNRT's authority on the ground, the international community entered a very divisive debate about the way in which to handle the CNRT; whilst some organisations, such as the World Bank, argued against dealing with a single interlocutor, others were in favour of capitalising on the sense of unity that the umbrella organisation appeared to bring to Timor Leste's political realm. The UN, with whom the decision ultimately rested as the transitional administrator, remained however stuck within a binary approach to the problem: "either there is a sovereign government for the UN to relate to as a national institution, or else there is an illegitimate faction fighting on the ground" (Chopra, 2002; p.997), two categories within which the CNRT did not fit; thus, in the absence of a formal decision and faced with the fact that the CNRT was the only coherent and pervasive entity on the ground (ibid), INTERFET and DFOs dealt with the CNRT as the most effective way to manage day-to-day activities.

Whilst this approach proved useful in ensuring a certain level of interaction between internationals and locals on the ground, as well as in preserving relationships with authoritative figures the Timorese population could understand, it mistakenly assumed that within the political elite there was a broad consensus about the new state's institutions design (Ingram, 2012; p.4). Instead, deeply

rooted in a “diplomatic habit to remain removed from local politics and not to participate in the social process behind it” (ibid), UNTAET left many of the divisions that characterised CNRT unaddressed. This proved to be a significant issue when, early 2001, old rivalries re-emerged as UNTAET started preparing the ground for the elections of the constituent assembly – the body subsequently responsible for drafting the constitution – leading, in June 2001, to the disintegration of the CNRT: on the one hand, the irreconcilable differences between Mari Alkatiri – secretary general of FRETILIN, the main component of the CNRT – and Xanana Gusmão – President of the CNRT – led to the departure of FRETILIN from the CNRT; on the other hand, historical differences between Xanana Gusmão and UDT leaders – who were, in 1975, pro-integration with Indonesia – resulted in the UDT also leaving the CNRT to become its own political party.

Consequently, UNTAET’s refusal, upon establishment of its mission, to officially accept the CNRT “as the primary legitimate Timorese body” (Roland and Cliffe, 2002 in Ingram, 2012; p.5), compounded with international staff’s actual engagement with it on the ground to run local administrative structures, initially allowed the CNRT “to capitalise on the extent of their own support and create the space to develop their own parallel structures” (Richmond and Franks, 2007b; p.10). From the start, therefore, UNTAET held *de jure* sovereignty over the territory of Timor Leste but the CNRT was indeed the *de facto* sovereign. However, as the CNRT split during a crucial electoral process – the first ever to be held in Timor Leste – failure to have engaged officially with the CNRT led to UNTAET’s inability to predict that most of the CNRT support base was in reality mostly made up of FRETILIN supporters, since it was the only party the majority of the population had ever heard of (Hohe, 2002; p.581). Furthermore, as Xanana Gusmao remained UNTAET’s primary interlocutor throughout the whole process, and since Gusmao continued to benefit from its charismatic leadership of the resistance struggle, the split within the CNRT only contributed to creating additional tensions in relation to authority within the territory, therefore creating the framework for a struggle over contested authority, and ambiguous sovereignty, that continues to characterise the Timorese political community today.

5.3.3. Legitimacy

Strikingly, although UNTAET's mandate revolved around transitional administration whilst preparing the country to administrate itself, a reading of Resolution 1272 reveals that the Timorese – both political elite and population – were mostly absent from the process (Ingram, 2012; p.3). Indeed, despite provisions that stipulated the need to regularly "consult and cooperate with the East Timorese people" (UN Security Council, 1999; p.3), the rest of the Regulation clearly entrusts all the powers to the Transitional Administrator. This is also clearly reflected in the way in which the process of 'Timorisation' of the mission took place.

a) Timorisation of the state building process

From December 1999 to July 2000, UNTAET took a series of steps toward the Timorisation of the state building process – outlined in Table 8 below – that proved unsuccessful in establishing the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of the population. Indeed, both the NCC and the NC, its replacement, merely allowed Timorese political elites to "participate in the decision-making process" (UNTAET Regulation No. 1999/2 in Ingram, 2012; p.5) or contribute to a "forum for all legislative matters" (UNTAET Regulation No.24/2000 in Gorjão, 2002; p.319); both were equally regarded by the Timorese – the political elite as much as the population – as not representative enough of Timorese society and affording it only a consultative role, rather than active participation in shaping the policies that would come to define the future country's political landscape. Even the establishment of ETTA, which initially appeared to meet East Timorese demands – both political elite and population – to actively contribute to the process of building state institutions, was quickly criticised as it became increasingly clear that international staff continued to maintain, whether overtly or covertly, the essential decision-making power in the Cabinet.

Table 8 – Timorisation of state building through consultative bodies

Date	Name of the consultative body	Composition
December 1999	National Consultative Council (NCC) – all members to be appointed by the Transitional Administrator UNTAET Regulation No. 1999/2	7 representatives of the CNRT 3 representatives of pro-integrationist groups A representative of the catholic church 3 members of UNTAET staff Transitional Administrator
July 2000	National Council (NC) – all members to be appointed by the Transitional Administrator UNTAET Regulation No. 24/2000	10 representatives from civil society[51] 1 representative from each of the 13 districts 7 CNRT representatives 3 representatives from other political parties A representative of the catholic church
July 2000	East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) – to replace UNTAET pillar of governance and to be administered by the Transitional Cabinet UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/23	Transitional Cabinet comprised eight portfolios, four of which assigned to East Timorese

Source: adapted from Ingram (2012) and Gorjão (2002)

In addition to these frustrations with the Timorisation process, the increasing contrast in Dili between the lifestyle upheld by international staff – who lived in the nicest houses, dined in the nicest restaurants, and drove around in their big cars – and the high unemployment still experienced by the Timorese population, contributed to a mounting discontent with the way in which the state building exercise was being carried out and impacting the population (ibid). Finally, the ultimate blow to UNTAET's legitimacy in the country came as East Timorese discovered that the UN planned to leave the country as soon as the first elections

[51] One representative for each of the following groups: women, youth, Protestant churches, Muslim community, NGO forum, professional associations, farming community, business community, labour organisations

were held; in the words of Lucas da Costa – Rector of the Higher Institute for Economics and Management – in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, withdrawal of the UN upon the first country elections would leave a considerable "gap between UNTAET's original mandate and the persisting debris of a nation unbuilt, the ruins of which the Timorese would inherit while the UN presented itself externally as successful" (Chopra, 2002; p.994).

Thus, in light of the mounting discontent toward the way in which UNTAET's state building operations were being carried out, pressure to speed up the process of full Timorisation – that is, to become fully independent – resulted in the decision by the NC, on 22 February 2001, to organise a **Constituent Assembly**, comprising 88 members that were to be voted in on 30 August 2001 by the East Timorese, responsible for drafting the Timor Leste's constitution (Gorjão, 2002; p.321). The way in which the Constituent Assembly was to be voted, however, would eventually have significant consequences on the way in which the Constitution was to be drafted – that is, how the different powers were to be divided.

Indeed, for 75 of the 88 seats the system required voters to cast their ballot for a party, rather than a single candidate, and seats where thereafter allocated in proportion to each party's share of the total vote (Ingram, 2012; p.11); as such, those chosen to seat in the Assembly owed their allegiance more to the party that placed them there than to the people, to whom they were not directly accountable. Furthermore, in a concession to members of the NC in favour of local representation, the 13 additional seats were to be filled by one representative of each of the 13 districts, voted on a first-past-the-post basis (ibid). This voting structure, however, turned out to be problematic in light of the CNRT split described previously; indeed, "utilising networks neglected by other CNRT parties [after the division], FRETILIN won the territory's first post-occupation elections […] taking 57.4 per cent of the vote and 55 of the 88 seats in the constituent assembly" (Jones, 2010; p.560). Furthermore, by creating a coalition with a smaller party with similar political inclinations – the Social Democratic Timorese Association (ASDT) – achieved majority in the Assembly with the required 60 seats (ibid). Therefore, with so little significant opposition, and consequently so little incentive for compromise, it should have been clear that the Constitution would be drafted essentially with regard to FRETILIN's interests.

b) Resistance heroes or armed civilians? The politicisation of the armed forces

UNTAET's failure to address power dynamics also had a significant impact on the security sector in Timor Leste. Much like it did with the CNRT, UNTAET and INTERFET did not recognise FALINTIL as an indigenous partner in the reconstruction of the country – in this case the security sector; rather, upon arrival in September 1999 FALINTIL personnel "were treated as armed civilians in need of being disarmed and disbanded" (Carapic and Jütersonke 2012; p.35). FALINTIL members initially refused demilitarisation and considered it "deeply insulting" (Hughes, 2009; p.114) to be regarded as a mere armed group when in fact they had been the core of the resistance forces fighting on the ground for the majority of the resistance years. This was also Xanana Gusmão's position as he strongly opposed UNTAET's decision-makers arguing that FALINTIL was not to be considered "a group of bandits" (ibid) and argued for the integration of ex-FALINTIL combatants into Timor Leste's military force – a decision that had been originally excluded on the ground that Timor Leste did not want any more wars, but was quickly put back on the negotiation table as Indonesian militias continued to attack the border.

Whilst UNTAET and the Timorese political elite sought to find an agreement on how to best deal with FALINTIL soldiers, the soldiers themselves had been cantoned out of sight in Aileu (Ingram, 2012; p.7). The cantonment last eighteen months, during which not only did soldiers had to live in poor conditions – food was in short supply whilst malaria and tuberculosis pandemics started spreading in the camp (Hughes, 2009; p.116) – but it forced FALINTIL commanders, who had worked directly together during the resistance years, to live together in confinement. As a result, an escalating sense of grievance (Ingram, 2012; p.7) seeped through all levels of FALINTIL and spread across the camp, leading to declining discipline and increasing divisions amongst soldiers and commanders, mostly along political lines. Finally, under pressure from Xanana Gusmão, in June 2000, UNTAET hired a team of consultants from King's College in London to advise them on the best course of action to follow in the creation of the military (Carapic and Jütersonke 2012; p.35). The report produced by the team proposed three options to the matter at hand, and the solution eventually selected by UNTAET "provided for the demobilisation of more than half the FALINTIL forces and the retention of 650 soldiers to form Battalion 1 of the new Forças de Defesa

de Timor Leste (FDTL)" (Hughes, 2009; p.116) – later renamed F-FDTL, controversially highlighting the strong FALINTIL component of the force and politicising it – while a second battalion, to be recruited subsequently, would be open to all applicants (Ingram, 2012; p.8).

That only 650 soldiers out of 1500 were to be chosen, was controversial enough for ex-resistance fighters who perceived themselves – and in fact were perceived by most of the population – as the heroes who had freed Timor Leste from Indonesia; but the way in which the selection of the 650 soldiers was undertaken further contributed to aggravating resentment. Indeed, FALINTIL High Command only agreed upon the demobilisation of the rest of the soldiers on condition that it be allowed – without any kind of consultation with the veterans or the wider community – to select the soldiers to be included in the new army (Hughes, 2009; p.116); consequently, Battallion 1 comprised only soldiers loyal to Xanana Gusmão (ibid), which incidentally were also mostly from the Eastern districts (Ingram, 2012; p.8). The rest of the veterans, already aggrieved by having been excluded from consultation and from the force, only received a sum of money to reintegrate into civilian life; no further action was taken by either UNTAET, INTERFET or even FALINTIL's High Command to create processes through which these disgruntled veterans could voice their concerns, therefore leaving them vulnerable to recruitment from dissident groups or other politicians (Hughes, 2009; p.118). Which is, in fact, precisely what happened when former FALINTIL commander Rogerio Lobato rallied ex-FALINTIL soldiers to participate in a demonstration in Dili in May 2002, thus calling FRETILIN's attention on his ability to be a powerful leader and successfully earning him the position of Minister of Interior a few days later (ibid) – where he would subsequently form the police force (PNTL) as a "rival power-base to the F-FDTL" (Jones, 2010; p.561).

Consequently, by wishing to remain a-political and, therefore, refusing to deal with FALINTIL as a legitimate military force, UNTAET stripped FALINTIL of its identity as a National Liberation force enjoying popular legitimacy; instead it contributed to the development of an army with a more elitist orientation (Lao Hamutuk, 2005 in Huhges, 2009; p.117), opposed to the police force and within which the Timorese were no longer capable of recognising themselves. Consequently, the design of Timor Leste's new state reflected much more political interests and quarrels than it did Timorese needs and hopes for the future.

5.3.4. Citizenship

Citizenship in the context of UNTAET is treated in this section in relation to the way in which the decision-making processes allowed, or failed to allow, room for the Timorese population to build its representations of what it expected Timorese political community to be into the institutional framework that emerged from the state building process.

a) Timor Leste's constitution – a rushed milestone towards independence

The drafting of the **Constitution** was initially scheduled by UNTAET to be done within 90 days, but was subsequently extended by a further three months to allow time for an additional round of consultation at the Constituent Assembly. With a total of six months – between the election of the Constituent Assembly in August 2001 and the signing of the Constitution in March 2002 – to draft a constitution that would determine the way in which the country would be run, the church, minor political parties and Timorese civil society were particularly concerned that the final document would hardly reflect the needs and wishes of the Timorese people (Ingram, 2012; p.12). In this light, they wrote a letter to the head of UNTAET's Political Affair Unit to ask that the Constitution to be adopted at the end of the six months be only a temporary one, a first draft to be amended later, following additional rounds of consultation; the request, however, remained unheard.

Furthermore, the fact that "of the five constitutional drafts brought forward by political parties in the initial weeks of the Constituent Assembly, the FRETILIN draft prevailed as the primary text" (Garrison, 2005 in ibid; p.13) raised significant concerns in relation to the content of the final document. These were confirmed when it became evident, to all non-FRETILIN members both within the political elite and amongst the population, that "the Constitution that passed was based on it" (Ingram, 2012; p.12).

Finally, in view of avoiding further delays to independence with additional elections, UNTAET had included in its Regulation 2001/254 an article stipulating that the Constituent Assembly "shall become the legislature of an independent East Timor, if so provided by the Constitution" (ibid; p.12). It should, however, have been obvious that, having managed to secure a majority during the Constituent Assembly elections, FRETILIN would have chosen to become Timor Leste's first government in order to remain in power. Even more predictable should have been

the negative outcome of a request, by Xanana Gusmão, Bishop Belo and civil society organisations, to hold parliamentary elections, as it was redirected from UNTAET to the Constituent Assembly as "the legitimate representative body for the Timorese people" (ibid) – that is, mainly FRETILIN. As a result, Timor Leste's first government was an essentially hardly legitimate FRETILIN government.

b) Official and working languages

The choice of Timor Leste's *lingua franca* and working languages also reflects a decision-making process where the view of the Timorese political elite significantly prevailed over that of the population. Indeed, while the Constitution (Part I, Section 13) recognises that "Tetum and Portuguese shall be official languages in the Democratic Republic of East Timor", it also stipulates that "Indonesian and English shall be the working languages within civil service side-by-side with official languages as long as deemed necessary" (Part VII, Section 159).

Because of the important role it played during the independence struggle, as mentioned in section 5.2.1, as well as its widespread use throughout the island, it was crucial to maintain Tetun as one of the *lingua franca* of the country. However, because it had remained an oral language throughout the centuries, the simplicity of its grammar and vocabulary made it inappropriate for administrative use; a period of transition of five to ten years was therefore allowed for the development of Tetun (CNRT congress, August 2000 in Ingram, 2012; p.7), during which time Portuguese was to be used as the other *lingua franca*. This choice was motivated by the mostly Portuguese educated Timorese political elite – such as Xanana Gusmão, Jose Ramos Horta and Mari Alkatiri – but failed to account for the fact that for the majority of the population had been educated in Bahasa by the Indonesians (Richmond and Frank, 2007b; p.6) and spoke little to no Portuguese. Finally, the use of English was introduced in the Constitution as a reference to the many international advisors that would be working alongside the Timorese to rebuild their state institutions, as well as to Australia's significant involvement in state building and development aid in the country. Much like Portuguese, however, English was mostly spoken by the political elite.

On the ground, however, the language choices made in the Constitutions became controversial; it created deep cleavages between the state and its population, as most people saw in those choices the desire of a small but powerful Lusophone

elite minority of leaders to impose Portuguese without any regard for the population's familiarity with the language (Schulz and de Freitas, 2002 in Borgerhoff, 2006; p.113). Indeed, Bahasa and Tetun were the languages "of the street, the village and the marketplace" (ibid; p.114), themselves reflecting many language differences amongst the population, as illustrated in Table 9 below.

Table 9 – Mapping the use of Timor Leste's official and working languages in everyday life

Use	EN	PT	BA	TE
Everyday interactions			√	√
Administrative papers		√		
Parliament		√		√
Timorese political elite	√	√	√	√
Elderly		(few)	(few)	√
Youth			√	√

Note: EN= English, PT=Portuguese, BA=Bahasa, TE=Tetun

Source: elaborated by the author

Consequently, the choice of an official language in Timor Leste was never going to be an easy matter to resolve. Caught between indigenous multilingualism – Timor Leste counts 32 endogenous language varieties in use (Taylor-Leech, 2008; p.155) –, a heavy colonial past and the necessity to use English to deal with the international community's heavy presence on the ground, the question of the official language was always going to require decision-makers "to find a path through the wider political ideologies represented by three dominant exogenous languages" (ibid; p.174). This was a path "that no external actor could impose, irrespective of mandate" (Harland, 2005 in Ingram, 2012; p.7), but which outcome eventually created deep cleavages that continue to characterise Timorese society, and political community, today – as chapter six will explain.

In relation to UNTAET, however, the decisions described above had two important effects. Firstly, the use of English and Portuguese that pervaded the decision-making mechanisms of UNTAET automatically excluded the vast majority of the population from the processes of institutional and constitutional design. Secondly,

the choices made, with little to no consultation of the population, with regard to the national languages, have contributed to creating deep cleavages between the older and younger generations – as shown in Table 9 above: whilst "the old generation of the resistance struggle and the diaspora favoured Portuguese as the expression of their patrimony and symbol of the resistance; the younger generation, who had carried the resistance struggle forward through the 1990s, were educated in Bahasa Indonesia" (Ingram, 2012; p.7).

In this sense, citizenship during the transitional administration was not developed neither formally – as people could not contribute to the state building process – or substantively – as the inability of the vast majority of the population to speak the two languages in which decisions were made contributed to creating different representations of Timorese political community between population and elite.

5.3.5. UNTAET's legacies for the 21st century newest nation

The decision-making processes detailed in this section clearly highlight two important issues with the way in which UNTAET's *tabula rasa* approach to Timor Leste impacted the state building process in post-independence Timor Leste.

Firstly, caught in a dilemma characterised by its imperative to carry out a successful short-term mandate to govern Timor Leste and its longer-term strategic objective of preparing the country for democratic self-government (Beauvais, 2001 in Gorjão, 2002; p.316), UNTAET made a number of decisions that facilitated its task while simultaneously severely undermining the outcomes of both objectives. Putting a blind faith in the united front the CNRT had demonstrated during the last years of the resistance, the mission overlooked the importance of analysing in depth the political dynamics that had developed during Timor Leste's political awakening in 1975 and during the first twenty years of resistance, mistaking "the absence of government as a political vacuum" (Ingram, 2012; p.4). As a consequence, it assumed that by dealing essentially with certain political elites who showed leadership – in particular Xanana Gusmão – it was taking into account the essential needs and requests of the population at large, therefore enjoying automatic legitimacy to enforce top-down policies (Lemay-Hebert, 2011; p.199). In this context, Timorese participation in the process of state building remained "mainly cosmetic" (Gorjão, 2002; p.320), resulting in a process that significantly lacked political legitimacy in the eyes of a population sidelined from

the start, and left wide open the door for an institutional design that strongly reflected political divergences between the political elite of the country.

Secondly, the decision-making process that accompanied the election of the Constituent Assembly, the drafting of the constitution and the selection of the official languages of the country were characterised by a significant lack of concern, by UNTAET, as to their effect on both formal and substantive citizenship during and after the transitional administration period. Dictated by the principle of impartiality (Suhrke, 2001; p.14) pervading UN missions, UNTAET's decision not to engage in the politics of Timor Leste – and, by extension, not to delve into in depth historical research – had a profound effect on the drafting of the constitution; indeed, political rivalries amongst Timor Leste's political elite seeped through the electoral process for the Constituent Assembly, resulting in a constitution drafted essentially following the interests of the main party, FRETILIN, and representing very little of the population imagination for the country's future. As such, the institutional design embedded in the document as well as, incidentally, the language of the document itself, set up a system where "the political life of the population becomes cut off from the 'state' and a gulf is created between the new, technical version of state institutions and the forms and language of political community that make sense to people" (Brown, 2009; p.148).

Thirdly, the choice of Portuguese and Tetun as official languages, complemented however by very little support for the establishment of institutions that could ensure the development of Tetun, laid the basis for a political community characterised by a strong language division: on the one hand, the decision-making process would essentially be carried out in Portuguese by the political elite; on the other hand, the inability of the population to participate in the decision-making due to their lack of knowledge of the political community's language. As a result, "the continued use of Portuguese, Indonesian and English on the grounds that Tetun is not ready for use in the modern world undermines its status, impedes effective corpus planning and obstructs its use in education and in other high status domains such as the legal system" (Taylor-Leech, 2008; p.174).

Therefore, throughout the process, UNTAET failed to take into account the extent to which the Timorese population consented to or even supported the framework rules within which political institutions are designed and function (Kaldor, 2000 in Lemay-Hebert, 2011; p.193); the state building process reflected little of the ideas

or values widely held by a population that been united by a struggle for independence (ibid).

5.4. Conclusion – "East Timor is between three giants. We need to manage the giants"[52]

Using the analytical lenses of territory, sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship developed in chapter two, this chapter has demonstrated how Timor Leste's state building process, implemented by UNTAET during the transitional administration, has failed to lay the basis for the emergence of state institutions that could capitalise on the sense of unity pervading post-independence Timorese society and, consequently, build a system of governance with which the population at large could identify.

Table 10 below presents an overview and comparison of the main impacts of the three exogenous interventions that have contributed to shaping the citizenship, legitimacy, sovereignty and territory throughout Timor Leste's history. It highlights a crucial fact: by approaching Timor Leste's state building exercise as though it was intervening in a *terra nullis*, UNTAET inadvertently reproduced the same mistakes made by the Portuguese and the Indonesians; as a result, the impact of those previous mistakes were carried through into the post-independence state building exercise, with significant consequences for the institutional design of the new state.

[52] Participant in the study "Language identity in East Timor – The discourses of nation building", Taylor-Leech, K. (2008), p.174

Table 10 – Comparing the three administrations

	Portuguese	**Indonesian**	**UNTAET**
Citizenship	Division *firaku/kaladi* Division *assimilado* (taught Portuguese & worked with Portuguese)/*maubere* (no Portuguese education & did not work with Portuguese) **=> Divide and conquer**	Widespread education in Bahasa University education in Indonesia Building infrastructure Importance of Tetun and church **=>All used against Indonesian rule**	Language of UNTAET decision-making excluded population Language choice in Constitution reflect socio-economic and generational differences Little popular consultation **=> Institutional framework does not reflect popular aspirations**
Legitimacy	Used existing organisation of society (although attempted to use *liurai* for their interests)	Adapted existing system, maintaining appearance of traditional legitimacy through elections (tried to use chides for their interests)	Centralised decision-making Institutionalised political differences
Sovereignty	Resistance is fragmented & occasional Portuguese authority imposed by violence, but not respected	Resistance created differences amongst leadership But also created unity against ruler throughout the country	Used CNRT local networks without however giving authority to CNRT = CNRT *de facto* sovereign, UNTAET *de jure* sovereign
Territory	Representation remained local in population's mind	Emergence of representations of Timor Leste territory	Took for granted political and popular unity created for resistance Assumed territorial representation without understanding importance of local networks
Legacy	Political awakening, with divisions along pro-independence, pro-Indonesians, pro-federation with Portugal	Imagining of a nation Political divisions	Fragmented political elite Institutional design disconnected from popular expectations Identity divisions through language choices

Source: elaborated by the author

Regarding citizenship, UNTAET's choice, not to interfere into what were inherently polity defining decision-making processes, was however offset by the legacies of the two previous administrations' policies. Indeed, failing to understand the complex language dynamics of the country, and consulting essentially with a

limited political elite, UNTAET facilitated the resurfacing of Portuguese language divisions. Compounded with Indonesia's language policies, these divisions contributed to redefining Timorese political community along socio-economic and generational differences, thus creating new societal cleavages.

Similarly to its predecessors, UNTAET's administration sought to use the existing societal organisation mechanisms in order to facilitate the implementation of its mandate. Unfortunately, and similarly to what happened during Portuguese and Indonesian rule, the use of these networks worked against the initial objectives; in fact, through the use of these networks, and blind to the power dynamics that characterised the leadership UNTAET regularly consulted with, the state building process successfully institutionalised the political differences that had emerged after the Portuguese withdrawal and during the resistance against Indonesia. As a result, both legitimacy and sovereignty of UNTAET's institutional design were severely questioned by the population.

Finally, as it took for granted popular representations of sovereignty and territory, UNTAET's administration underestimated the importance of local networks of relationships and social organisation pervasive throughout Timor Leste's history. By assuming popular and political unity, and therefore taking for granted popular imaginings of belonging to Timor Leste's territory, UNTAET failed to engender a widespread societal project that could reflect popular aspirations and trigger the process of nation state building.

CHAPTER 6 – THE IMPACT OF POST-CONFLICT STATE BUILDING ON STATE INSTITUTIONS

"Yet the gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials".

(Robert Kennedy, 1968)

6. The impact of post-conflict state building on Timor Leste's state institutions

This chapter builds on the argument developed in the previous chapter that the decision-making processes adopted by UNTAET, for the purpose of building Timor Leste's state system, have significantly contributed to shaping the institutional design of the new country. It argues that not only did the state building process have profound consequences on the decision-making processes of the newly established institutions, but also that these processes themselves affect state policies implemented to fulfil its core functions – that is, research question number two.

To this end, based on the literature review and the interviews carried out at national level during the fieldwork for this research, this chapter focuses individually on four core functions – as outlined in section 2.3.3 (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005; p.6) – that have been affected the most by the issues highlighted in chapter five. It begins by exploring how the decisions made during UNTAET's state building have affected state's administrative control and legitimate monopoly on the means of violence. Subsequently, it reviews the way in which Timor Leste's first two governments – FRETILIN and the *Aliança Maioria Parlamentar* (AMP) – have managed public finances between 2002 and 2012, highlighting also the role of continued international assistance in the country – see APPENDIX VI for a list of the main multilateral and bilateral organisations active in the country. Finally, it investigates how a combination of institutional design and spending policies has been significantly affecting investments in human capital.

6.1. Administrative control

Administrative control, as defined by Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan (2005; p.7), refers both to the "breadth and depth of the reach of a state's authority over its territory". The ability of a state to retain control over its territory is as much dependent upon the development of a coherent set of rules used to define governance responsibilities at horizontal and vertical levels, as it is upon citizens' acceptance of those rules and the way in which they are enforced (ibid). Consequently, a state capable of promulgating and enforcing rules that are understood by its citizens as serving the interests of the majority (ibid) is a state capable of building a relationship of trust with its citizens and fostering a sense of belonging amongst them; conversely, a state that is perceived as unfair and unjust is likely to lose control over large sections of the population.

6.1.1. The organisation of Timor Leste's governance structures

This sub-section articulates the way in which UNTAET's apolitical approach to institutional design has had a significant impact on the organisation of Timor Leste's governance structures at both national and local level.

a) At national level

One of the main impacts of UNTAET's failure to understand and address the power struggles within the CNRT is undoubtedly the way in which Timor Leste's constitution was drafted. Left in the hands of a constituent assembly predominantly made up of FRETILIN members who knew that they would subsequently become Timor Leste's first government, it was clear from the start that the decisions made in the process of drafting the document would have reflected FRETILIN's power ambitions. Predominantly based on the Portuguese Constitution, as a result of the largely Portuguese educated FRETILIN elite, the new Constitution of Timor Leste established a semi-Presidential system composed of (Leach and Kingsbury, 2012; p.14): a President, to be elected by national vote; a National Parliament, to be elected by legislative elections based on party-list; and, a Prime Minister, to be designated by the National Parliament and subsequently appointed and sworn in by the President – as illustrated in Figure 9 below.

Figure 9 – Distribution of powers within Timor Leste's Constitution



Source: elaborated by the author

Since FRETILIN was to become the first National Parliament, it was obvious that the first Prime Minister to be appointed would be FRETILIN's Secretary General Mari Alkatiri. On the other hand, Xanana Gusmão, whose charismatic leadership during the resistance years and after independence made him "the ordained leader of the nation" (Ingram, 2012; p.13) in the eyes of the population, was sure to be elected Timor Leste's first President. Thus, cognisant of the differences that would oppose the two leaders of the nation, the distribution of government powers in the Constitution reflects very clearly FRETILIN's will to make most of the decisions without too much interference from Xanana Gusmão: the semi-presidential system concentrates legislative and executive powers in the Prime Minister's office (ibid), granting the President a veto power (Leach and Kingsbury, 2012; p.14).

The implications of this distribution of powers are clear: whilst it aims at rendering the President "effectively totally subordinate to the Prime Minister" (International Commission of Jurists, 2002 in Ingram, 2012; p.14), the ability of the President to veto the legislative decisions made by the Prime Minister has paved the way for a power struggle between the two positions (Richmond and Franks, 2007b; p.10), which has often resulted in cumbersome and protracted decision-making procedures stalled by disagreements between leaders, with significant implications for the sovereignty and legitimacy of the government.

b) At local level

From its arrival in 1999, through to independence in 2002, the UN approached Timor Leste as a *tabula rasa* or *terra nullius*, considering that "one of the consequences of the violence [of 1999] was that practically overnight [Timor Leste was] stripped of its entire administrative and executive super-structures" (Strohmeyer, 2001 in Lemay-Hebert, 2011; p.195). This approach to post-conflict reconstruction in Timor Leste reveals two important facts about the way in which the UN carried out state building in the country. First, by assuming that the extent of the destruction on the ground – e.g. infrastructure – was a reflection of a complete disintegration of the social and political tissues of Timorese society, the UN justified its intervention as a transitional administration with the goal of rebuilding a Timorese state following liberal peace democratic standards and checklists – e.g. political parties, multiparty elections, market economy. Secondly, this assumption is firmly grounded in UN's state centric approach to state building, which essentially focuses on the importance of rebuilding state institutions to the detriment of any pre-existing local institutions, social organisation or networks on which the population was used to rely. Therefore, this approach "altogether missed the fact that the population continues to exist […] and that the social structures of indigenous communities invariably generate sources of political legitimacy according to their own paradigms" (Chopra, 2002; p.980).

As a result, the systems of governance emerging from the state building process reflect a profound paradox. Basing itself on the evolution of the structure of local governance during Portuguese and Indonesian times, UNTAET recreated a system that reflected the different layers of administration – that is, district, sub-district, *suku* and *aldeia* – with their respective administrative positions – district and sub-district administrators, *xefi suku* and *xefi aldeia*. However, in the process of establishing this organisational framework, UNTAET failed to carefully analyse both the meaning of these structures for the colonisers – that is, how they related to central power – and their relation with Timorese customary social organisation – that is, how the leaders come to acquire their position and what these positions mean for the Timorese. As a result, "the superficial uniformity of *suku* structures, by which the state seeks to render national socio-political order 'legible' from the centre, covers an extraordinary variety of accommodations and experiences" (Brown, 2012; p.57).

The organisation of local leadership is set out in the law on "Community leaderships and their election" (Law 3/2009 of 8 July 2009) and clearly stipulates the rights and duties of the local leaders as well as their elections. As such, community leadership comprises:

- A *Xefi Suku* who is elected by the population residing in the *suku* on the basis of his leadership skills and his list for the *Suku* Council; and,
- A *Suku* Council, comprising two women, two youth leaders – one man and one woman – one elder, the lian nain and the Xefi Aldeia.

The role of the *Xefi Suku* is primarily that of implementing the decisions made by the government as well as any decision regarding the suku more specifically made by the *Suku* Council; its role also includes providing support to any initiatives undertaken in the *suku* as well as promoting peace – the latter two being often linked. The *Suku* Council has an advisory role only, with the aim of supporting the *Xefi Suku* in his/her activities in particular in relation to health, education, environment, employment and food safety. Finally, the *Xefi Aldeia*, is responsible for representing the interests and needs of his/her own *aldeia* within the *suku* – both on an ad hoc basis and on the basis of regular *aldeia* meetings with the population – as well as facilitating conflict resolution – including domestic violence, family feuds, minor disputes. Figure 10 below provides an overview of the functioning of local governance institutions.

Figure 10 – Organisation of local governance



Source: elaborated by the author

A closer reading of the law on "Community leaderships and their election" and the Constitution of Timor Leste, reveals, however, that there is no formal link between the local government and the national government. Rather, the functioning of the government appears to be top-down, whereby *Xefi Sukus* are responsible for implementing government decisions at the *suku* level, but there is no formal channel for citizens to voice their concerns to any layer of the government higher than the *suku*. Similarly, in order to maintain the structure of Districts and Sub-districts that had been established during Portuguese and Indonesian times, the state building project of Timor Leste included a District Administrator and a Sub-District administrator; however, their role appears to remain, much like the *Xefi Suku*'s, that of administering funds distributed by the national government and implementing government policies, whilst there is no structure or place for citizens to dialogue in the government framework[53]. A simplified illustration, in Figure 11 below, of the government structure – that is, not including all the sub-levels of national government such as ministries and secretaries of state – clearly shows the disconnection between the local level and the national level.

Figure 11 – Overview of government structure with all the administrative layers



Source: elaborated by the author

[53] The role of the District and Sub-District administrators is not clearly defined by law. It is worth noting that interviewee 34 indicated they play an important role in the districts as a link between the *xefis* and the national administration; in Dili, however, they appear to have very little power.

The current set-up therefore fails to fully engage citizens not only in voicing their concerns about their own aldeia's needs, but also in participating and engaging in discussions regarding the future of their country, as pointed out by interviewee number 43: "*we are never asked our opinion, we are only told what decisions have been made, and we don't know how to share our problems with the* government". In a country where centuries of colonial rule and decades of violent military occupation have shaped a culture with very little space for discussion and dissent, these national interventions at local level cannot take for granted the existence of a dialogue between the two parties; rather, "the potential for effective exchange […] has to be made" (Brown, 2012; p.59), putting the onus – at least at the start – essentially on government officials to set up communication models that provide such room for public debate.

Furthermore, this system also reflects UNTAET's inability to fully grasp the importance of the village level – that is, aldeia – in Timorese culture and history. Indeed, throughout the history of Timor Leste the village has been a "point of systemic articulation between locally established governance practices and successive waves of occupation by, or interpenetration with, powerful other forces – a key site of resistance, accommodation and re-interpretation" (ibid; p.61) that has permitted the Timorese population to continue functioning under Portuguese colonial rule and to fight against Indonesian military occupation.

The result of this failure to fully engage the village level has been that the population, instead of attempting to engage with institutions that they do not fully understand and that are far removed from their everyday life, has created a hybrid situation whereby local leaders work with both formal and customary forms of governance in order to respond to the needs of their population as efficiently as possible. "In this context, the balance found in meeting the requirements of state-based and customary governance is created through local leaders' interactions with their community and with each other" (Cummins, 2013; p.143), thus engaging into a form of local polity characteristically disengaged from the political community.

6.1.2. FRETILIN and the Crisis of 2006

Since its independence in 2002, Timor Leste has seen a number of episodes of violence that have given cause for concerns in relation to the state's administrative control over its population. The violence that erupted in 2006 following a petition filed by 159 members of the F-FDTL (ICG, 2006 in Hicks, 2009; p.85), which resulted in a communal conflict that nearly brought the country to a halt, is often analysed in hindsight as the inevitable conclusion of a long period of discontent amongst Timor Leste's population. Indeed, prior to those events – hereafter referred to as the '2006 crisis' – Dili had already been the stage for the expression of such discontent: December 2002, a riot broke out in Dili in response to the killing of two students who had been demonstrating against the government (World Bank, 2011; p.13); in April/May 2005, Catholic Church leaders organised a three weeks-long demonstration to protest against the government's decision to make religious education optional (dos Santos Monteiro, 2010; p.40). Although neither of these events escalated into violence to the extent that the Crisis of 2006 did – approximately 150,000 people were forcibly displaced from their homes (IOM, 2012; p.16) – national and international experts recognise that most donor partners failed to read into them the signs of an "evolving political situation, the divisiveness within society, and the latent discontent and disaffection among sections of the population (including youth)" (World Bank, 2010; p.13).

One of the main faults in the FRETILIN government's administrative control came as a result of the mishandled demilitarisation of ex-FALINTIL fighters during UNTAET's transition period. Indeed, as detailed in section 5.3.3, only 650 ex-FALINTIL fighters – out of over 1500 – were selected by Xanana Gusmão to be part of F-FDTL's first battalion, most of them from the Eastern part of the country with well-known allegiance to him; soldiers in other battalions, on the other hand, were recruited through a process open to all applicants, more mixed in terms of districts of origin (Ingram, 2012; p.7) and many of them aggravated by their exclusion from Batallion 1[54]. By contrast, the recruitment of PNTL personnel, carried out by disgruntled ex-FALINTIL fighter Rogerio Lobato, included between 350 and 400 officers from the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) as well as FALINTIL veterans who had been excluded from the F-FDTL selection process (Carapic and Jütersonke, 2012; p.34), resulting in a police force coming mainly

[54] According to a UNMISET issue paper quoted in ICG (2006; p.6), Easterners in the F-FDTL represented 56% of the force but, perhaps most importantly, 85% of the officers

from Western districts and historically as well as politically prone to be pitted against the military. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that a demonstration held on 24 April 2006, outside the Parliament, by a group of soldiers dismissed from F-FDTL for desertion – after having complained of living conditions in their camp – quickly escalated, within the space of a month, into a confrontation between the F-FDTL and PNTL – as illustrated in APPENDIX VII. Much more surprising was the way in which the government proved unable – in fact, even unwilling – to regain control of the situation and restrain the violence, allowing riots to unfold into a full-blown crisis shaped along alleged ethnic identities.

In this context, the "ethnic-territorial dimensions of the *Lorosae* [easterner] and *Loromonu*[55] [westerner] division in the military" (Grenfell, 2008; p.181) were quickly re-appropriated and adapted by the wide variety of social and political groupings that soon joined into the widespread violence that was to last – albeit intermittently – until December 2007; this led many international observers to mistakenly conclude that the crisis was of ethnic character and was threatening to turn Timor Leste's success story in that of a failed state. The reality on the ground, later studies and researches would demonstrate (Scambary, 2009; Carapic and Jütersonke, 2012), was much more complex and depicted not a failing state, but rather a government which administrative control was pervaded by historical power struggles that found their expression in the instrumentalisation of ethnicity "at different times and in different forms" (Scambary, 2009; p.266). To be sure, the division between *lorosae* and *loromonu*, originally used by the Portuguese to distinguish between 'law-abiding' and more rebellious Timorese – respectively *kaladi*/Westerners and *firaku*/Easterners –, has become integral part of the variety of ways in which Timorese may refer to their origins, as indicated by respected Timorese consultant Alex Tilman (in Hicks, 2009; p.84); but until 2006 it was never used as a divisive feature within the Timorese population – nor has it been used since – for it merely refers to a geographical indication – as illustrated in Map 5 below – and does not reflect any inherently ethnic differences, such as language – as illustrated in Map 4 below. The reality, therefore, is that the two opposing powers within the government – President Gusmão and Prime Minister Alkatiri – used this rhetoric to foster allegiances creating "a conflict triggered from within the state, fuelled by rivalries about how and by whom the country was run" (Grenfell,

[55] Lorosae is the tetum word for 'easterner' and literally means 'rising sun' (loro=sun; sae=rise); Loromonu is the word for 'westerner' and literally means 'sunset' (loro=sun; monu=to fall)

2008; p.85). Consequently, whilst "changing the territorial domain of Timor Leste never surfaced as a question through the crisis" (ibid), the government failed to maintain administrative control over it.

Map 4 – Principal ethno-linguistic groups on the island of Timor



Figure 2.The Principal Ethnolinguistic Groups on the Island of Timor.

Source: Hicks, 2009; p.83

Map 5 – Generally understood distinction between eastern and western districts



Figure 1. The Districts and Principal Towns of Timor-Leste and One Possible Line of Disjunction for the Alleged '*Ema Lorosa'e*'/ '*Ema Loromonu*' Contrast.

Source: Hicks, 2009; p.83

At the level of the population, the wildfire-like propagation of the 2006 crisis, to a wide variety of social and political groups acting along dividing ethnic lines, revealed much deeper issues relating to a "weak and fractured sense of national unity" (Leach, 2008 in Scambary, 2009; p.266). Ethnicity, Eriksen (1993 in ibid) argues, "is not an absolute category, it is constructed and relational, […] contingent on the situation" much like the concept of national unity, thus the ease with which ethnic rhetoric was used to fracture unity in Timor Leste in the Crisis can be read as a reaction by Timorese citizens to the structures that framed the country's first steps into independence. Indeed, Scambary's (2009) analysis of the evolution of the crisis throughout 2006/2007 shows the fluidity of a wide variety of groups in assembling and disassembling, forming different allegiances at different times, seemingly following different claims. As such, whilst institutional issues within the security sector sparked the first phase of the crisis, the collapse of the police force following the events of April/May marked a second phase whereby a general sense of lawlessness allowed ample room for the involvement of political groups, veterans groups, martial arts groups, small street corner gangs and youth groups (Scambary, 2009; p.267) each holding different claims, ranging from their role in the resistance – e.g. veterans, youth – to socio economic problems – e.g. youth with high level of unemployment – to land property issues – as a result of the superimposition of Portuguese and Indonesian land titles. Many of these claims continued to be made following the *lorosae/loromonu* divide. A respite in the violence came as Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri stepped down from his position in June 2006 to be replaced by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Jose Ramos Horta for an interim period, and as the Presidential Office initiated dialogue between antagonistic groups. The dialogue, however, quickly turned into an effort from President Gusmão to reinforce or build new allegiances by offering construction and catering contracts to the leaders of some of those groups (ibid; p.278), a tactic which soon reignited the violence, leading it into a third phase that ostensibly rejected national authority by resorting to practical kinship alliances that reflected "the most basic unit of East Timorese society: genealogically related, village-based family units" (ibid; p.283).

6.2. Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence

The legitimate monopoly on the means of violence relates to "the legitimacy of the state's monopoly on violence as perceived by the citizens of the state" (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005; p.6). That is, a state that retains legitimate control on the means of violence maintains social order and social control by building trust, between its citizens and the institutions responsible for their security, through the implementation of visible and transparent checks and balances (ibid) on those institutions. Conversely, a state that develops a security apparatus perceived as unfair by a large section of the population – as a result of corruption and/or heavily repressive measures – can leave room for other informal security providers to step in, thus leading to a whole new set of security issues at all levels – national, regional, urban and local.

6.2.1. Overlapping and contradictory mandates between PNTL and F-FDTL

The issues undermining the legitimacy of the police – PNTL – and military – F-FDTL – forces in Timor Leste are not only political. They also fall within the realm of policy design and implementation in relation to the mandate and authority of these forces as outlined in the Constitution: the police is "essentially responsible for internal security" (Wilson, 2008) whilst the military is in charge "for external security" (ibid). The competencies of each force are further detailed in, respectively, Decree Law 8/2004 – repealed by Decree Law 9/2009 following the events of 2006 – and 15/2006. However, the events of the crisis of 2006 revealed a deep flaw in the definition of the competencies and responsibilities between the two forces, in particular with regard to their cooperation in a time of crisis - that is, "state of siege and state of emergency"[56] (Section 25 of the Constitution of the RDTL).

Indeed, while F-FDTL forces are mandated to be involved in all matters relating to the protection of Timor Leste's borders, and PNTL's guiding principle is community policing – "where proximity patrolling is given preference" (Decree Law 9/2009) –, the definition of their interaction in a time of crisis was, as of 2006, still rather vague. On the one hand, Decree Law 15/2006 (Art.2(4))stipulates that "the use of F-FDTL in situations of State of Siege or State of Emergency shall be regulated by a specific nature", without however specifying what that nature might be or how it

[56] Section 25(2) of the Constitution: "A state of siege or a state of emergency shall only be declared in case of effective or impending aggression by a foreign force, of serious disturbance or threat of serious disturbance to the democratic constitutional order, or of public disaster"

ought to involve the PNTL; on the other hand, Decree Law 8/2004 (Art.2(1)) only goes so far as to provide that in the event of a State of Siege or Emergency, the competencies of the PNTL "are those that arise from legislation on national defence", that is to say the same that regiment the F-FDTL. Interestingly, the Constitution itself remains vague on how the State of Siege or Emergency is to be dealt with and by whom, as it merely indicates that, "authorities shall restore constitutional normality as soon as possible" (Section 25(6) of the Constitution of the RDTL) – without any further specification as to what is meant by 'authorities'. Finally, and perhaps most importantly in the view of the crisis of 2006, whilst the PNTL is subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, and therefore the Prime Minister, the President is "the Supreme Commander of F-FDTL by right of office" (Art.5 of Decree Law 15-2006); thus, at a time of crisis where the offices of the President and that of the Prime Minister were interlocked in a battle of power, these distinctions paved the way for the crisis that unfolded.

In the aftermath of the crisis of 2006, cognisant of the uncertainties highlighted above and worried that new power battles may lead to other episodes of violence, international and national leaders alike put particular emphasis on the clarification and strengthening of the relationship between the two forces. As such, the "Joint Command" was created in order to facilitate the execution of security operations conducted jointly by the PNTL and the F-FDTL during a State of Siege or Emergency (Wilson, 2008), providing at least "the appearance of a 'unified front' to the population in times of crisis" (Carapic and Jütersonke, 2012; p.44) although not dealing directly with the more profound cleavages between the two forces. Furthermore, the new Decree Law 9/2009 removed the PNTL from the subordination to the Ministry of Interior, and put it under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence and Security, equally responsible for the F-FDTL.

Despite these efforts, however, the involvement of the two security forces – not just as security forces but as catalysts – in the events that led to the crisis of 2006 produced profound doubts amongst citizens as to the trust that could be put in those institutions. The fact that "individuals and groups coming from the same district […] organised and sought to protect themselves during the breakdown of social order that characterised the Crisis" (ibid; p.43) by resorting to more local security providers – at times identified also as violence experts – is revealing not only of a crisis of legitimacy for the security forces, but also of a fragmentation of the sense of national unity. The following points will highlight how the development

of the PNTL and the oversight of informal security groups by international and national leaders during the reconfiguration of the security sector have contributed to this fragmentation.

6.2.2. The PNTL and customary forms of dispute resolution

As already seen in section 5.3.3, the international community has heavily influenced the establishment of the security forces – both F-FDTL and PNTL – in Timor Leste; but to a large extent it also had a significant impact, post UNTAET, on the policy developments in relation to the functioning of the PNTL. This had a significant impact on the way in which citizens engage with their security forces.

a) Varied approaches to PNTL training

From its establishment in August 2001 through UNTAET Regulation 2001/22, the PNTL has worked alongside, and been trained, by a wide variety of international actors with diverging approaches to the principle of community policing – PNTL's guiding principle as indicated in the previous sub-section. International influences included (Wassel, 2014; p.5):

- UN civilian police forces deployed after independence (CIVPOL) and after the crisis of 2006 to provide support in maintaining order (UNPOL);
- Japanese development agency (JICA) in 2001 to establish a Koban system – Asian-type community policing through the deployment of community based police officers;
- Australian-led Timor-Leste Police Development Programme (TLPDP) in 2004;
- UNMIT in 2006 to establish International Community Police officers in all districts;
- New Zealand police in reinforcing community policing practices; and,
- UNMIT again in the development of the Decree Law 15/2009 where community policing has become fully integrated in the legislation.

As a consequence of these disparate and varied approaches to engaging with, and training, the PNTL, it has become "a service whose units engage with the community in different ways" (ibid; p.9). The absence of a national level coordination of the units, complemented by a lack of nationwide agreement on the

nature of the relationship between PNTL community units and local leaders as well as the population, often results in very different perceptions of the police force from one community to the next – for instance, while in some areas PNTL units engage actively and build relationships with the community, in others people have reported having problems with the police in relation to corruption, violence and intimidation (ibid). Thus, a survey of community police perception carried out by The Asia Foundation (TAF) in 2008 found that although the population in 2008 generally felt that the performance of the PNTL had improved since the Crisis, people are nevertheless "four times more likely to identify community leaders, rather than the PNTL, as the individual/institution which has primary responsibility for maintaining security in their locality" (Chinn and Everett, 2008; p.8).

b) PNTL and local security and conflict resolution mechanisms

As highlighted repeatedly across this chapter, "local communities' ongoing efforts, under diverse and difficult circumstances, to shape their governance in ways that work for them – while certainly not always successful – underscore East Timorese as generators of political community rather than passive recipients of the state building project" (Brown, 2012; p.57). As a result, whilst Timorese society appears to have fully, and relatively peacefully, embraced the institutionalisation of democratic governance, a closer look at governance at the local level reveals that the norms, values and leadership that constitute the framework within which people interact is a complex combination of customary and state-based governance complemented by a wide variety of relationships that have evolved through time, and within social groups, to respond to community needs (Cummins, 2012; p.111). Operating across three layers, local security in Timor Leste is no exception.

The first layer relates to the customary practice of dealing with conflict resolution in Timor Leste, known as *lisan* – system of law and rituals. The *lisan* refers to "social structures that guide relationships between members of a community and between the natural, social and ancestral worlds" (Tilman, 2012; p.192); it has traditionally ruled the social, political and economic life of the *suku* in Timor Leste and authority within a *suku* to maintain peace and stability as well as taking an informal role resolving problems or conflicts rests within the elder leader, the *lia-nain* – literally translated 'owner of the words' (ibid; p.193). As seen in section 5.3.4, the structure of the Suku Council was organised so as to maintain the presence of the *lia-nain*

as well as the *xefi suku* within local governance structures in order to bridge state structures and customary systems (Wassel, 2014; p.10); however, in view of the institutional challenges facing the PNTL to organise a cohesive and coherent community policing policy, as well as the limited resources available to the police[57] that have "prevented the police from developing a more clearly defined and understood role in society"(ibid; p.12), the *lia-nain* and other community leaders remain a crucial first point of reference for maintaining social order within communities[58]. As a result, whilst the PNTL may become increasingly involved in the resolution of conflict within communities, it is usually in guise of support to traditional conflict resolution ceremonies rather than to play an active role. Finally, the important role of the community leaders also plays a significant role in determining the quality of the relationship between the police and the community itself, depending on whether they wish to cooperate with PNTL units or not – and depending also on the will of the PNTL unit itself.

The second layer relates to the importance of relationships amongst social groups in ensuring security within their area. In a survey carried out by TAF in 2013, a telling 51% of the respondents indicated that they consider citizens to have primary responsibility for security in their area compared to 19% indicating this responsibility to lie within the PNTL (Wassel and Rajalingam, 2014 in ibid; p.9). This corresponds to the security advice the author was given when moving to the country: it is crucial to build very good relationships with all the members of the local area in order to ensure not only peaceful cohabitation with them – and avoid potential issues relating to social jealousy or resentment toward the *malae* – but also become part of a powerful mechanism of neighbourhood watch. Indeed, whether within urban or rural environments, streets and roads in Timor Leste are constantly filled with life as children play in gardens and on the streets, youth 'hang out' on front porches and women sit on porches and in public spaces to play bingo; therefore ensuring a good relationship with everyone is one of the best guarantees that one's home will be under constant surveillance. Similarly, even "the ubiquitous kiosk [is] at one level answering to a security dimension of daily life with [its] close proximity to homes" (Grenfell and Winch, 2013; p.142), and maintaining good

[57] "The vast majority of police (91%) say the resources allocated to them to help ensure security in the area in which they work are inadequate in a wide-range of areas, including staff levels, communications equipment, vehicles, and weapons, among others" (Chinn and Everett, 2008; p.8)

[58] Participants for this research have all indicated that if there is a problem in their community they first refer to their xefi aldeia, xefi suku or lia-nain, depending on the nature of the problem and how successful the closer layers of authority have been. The police has usually been referred to as a last resort.

relations with the owner of the kiosk – through, for instance, regularly buying small groceries from them – is crucial to security in the neighbourhood.

Finally, in addition to neighbourhood relations, informal security groups constitute the third layer of security provision in Timor Leste. Although often reductively portrayed as "products of poverty, social disintegration, or a weak state" (Scambary, 2012; p.198), informal security groups have actually been part of Timorese society long before independence in 1999 and include "rural-based millenarian groups; protest movements and veterans groups; mass-scale, national martial art groups; political-front groups; and street corner gangs" (ibid; p.197). Each of these groups has the particularity of having emerged at different times throughout Timor Leste's history[59] in response to specific policies or social needs; similarly, many of them have, through time, evolved and changed to become protest vehicles or political parties "as the only way to influence a centralised development and political process [most people] feel they have little participation in or control over" (ibid; p.214). At community level, they play a key role not only as social movements to voice demands, but also as security providers where the communities do not trust authorities or where the police are simply absent.

6.3. Sound management of public finance

According to Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan (2005; p.7), the sound management of public finances refers to the state's ability to find a careful balance between generating its own revenue, as opposed to depending on international aid, and developing an economy that generates growth as well as wealth and ensures the distribution of resources. Therefore, a state proficiently manages its public finances when it is capable of generating revenue from tax collection and, if relevant, the extractive industry, whilst simultaneously demonstrating its ability to spend this revenue in a transparent manner on development priorities aimed at increasing citizen's access to opportunities. Conversely, "no state can be sovereign while it relies on an external source to fund its ongoing operations" (ibid), nor can it be legitimate if its revenue is not duly and transparently accounted for in its public budgets and/or if it is being spent on matters that are not considered national priorities by its political community.

[59] E.g. originally martial art groups are the product of a social control tool by the Indonesians, whereas veterans groups emerged in response to the unfair treatment many feel they have received in return for their involvement, and losses, during the resistance years.

The following points analyse the drafting of the National Development Plan (NDP) during the UNTAET period as well as the main spending policies upheld by Timor Leste's first two governments (FRETILIN and the ANP). The discussion that follows is by no means a comprehensive assessment of the policies developed by these two governments; rather, it merely aims at understanding the general line of thinking that characterised their decision-making procedures.

6.3.1. Timor Leste's National Development Plan – setting priorities for the country's future

Much of the literature on Timor Leste's state building process (Barbara, 2008; Hughes, 2009; Jones, 2012, 2010 and 2013; Moxham, 2008) argues that the economic system that was set up followed closely the neoliberal inclinations of the international organisations that provided their funding and inputs to the process. Indeed, as of 2007, that is to say prior to the establishment of Timor Leste's oil fund, the government remained quite dependent on international aid: approximately 82% of external financial assistance was bilateral; on the other hand, multilateral assistance represented 16% of the international assistance received by Timor Leste, not directly channelled to the government but instead delivered through three Multi-Donor Trust Fund modalities[60] under the trusteeship of the World Bank (Myrttinen, 2009; p.238). Therefore, the National Development Plan (NDP), adopted in 2002, was drafted during a period where Timor Leste "did not quite have its full sovereign voice" (Anderson, 2012; p.223).

Aimed at "at formulating a twenty-year vision, identifying key development challenges, and evolving strategies and programs of action for the next five years (2002 – 2007) to take the nation forward economically, socially, and politically" (NDP, 2002; p.14), some of its priorities do reflect to some extent the wide-ranging consultation that involved "representatives of the Church and members of Civil Society, national and international NGOs, the private sector and public interests groups" (NDP, 2002; p.XVII). This is particularly evident in its emphasis on education and health in order to facilitate "access to economic and social goods and services as well as to remunerative jobs, in participation in social and political processes, and in other life choices" (ibid; p.32). Similarly, its focus on the importance of the agriculture, fisheries and forestry in the first years of the country

[60] TFET- Trust Fund for East Timor; TSP-Transitional Support Programme; and CSP- Consolidated Support Programme

reflects the reality of Timor Leste's economic sector in 2002, where 76% of the population lived in rural areas and the majority of households were engaged in subsistence agriculture (UNDP, 2002; p.15). The role of the state, in this context, was to remain a key feature of the management of public finances for development.

However, the strong economic liberal component focused on a market-led economy, in relation to investments in infrastructure and human development, reveals the strong influence of World Bank in the management of public finance in Timor Leste since 1999[61] (Anderson, 2012; p.223). This is particularly evident in the consistent reference, throughout the whole document, to the role of the government in assisting the development of a market-based economy (NDP, 2002; p.43) through in particular: transforming subsistence production into a market-based economy; emphasising the importance of the private sector in "the development effort" (ibid; p.5) and the role of the Government in "creating an enabling environment […] for the private sector to gain confidence and strength, and to become the engine of economic growth" (ibid; p.28); and, in order to achieve the latter, stress the need – especially in the early years – to have "an open approach to foreign investment and foreign trade that will help build [Timor Leste]'s international competitiveness" (ibid; p.11).

The following sections will analyse how these international influences impacted the management of public finance for Timor Leste's first two governments.

[61] Through the management of Multi-Donor Trust Funds (World Bank 2010; p.102)

6.3.2. The FRETILIN government – caught between a rock and a hard place

The description of FRETILIN's development policies detailed below begins by highlighting the government's desire to achieve the priorities set out in the NDP. It then moves on, however, to reveal how budgetary concerns led to a significant change in decision-making priorities that eventually strayed from the NDP.

a) Making good on NDP promises – the rock

Mari Alkatiri's policy for Timor Leste's first government was firmly grounded in the conviction that the country should avoid the loans and debt that were being advocated by organisations such as the WB and the IMF at all costs – even for the Timorese population. In his view, not only would debts have contributed to adding another burden on a new country with so many other issues to struggle with, but also the conditionality that would inevitably be tied to those loans would eventually become an obstacle to the government's independence and sovereignty. Instead, while the government aimed to develop a market economy, it sought to do so by maintaining a strong role in regulating the market and planning resource allocations – including creating "the networks and mean by which to guarantee social security during the most difficult times" (Alkatiri, 2006 in Anderson, 2012; p.225).

The first step toward these ambitious goals was to develop, against WB and Asian Development Bank (ADB) advice[62], a food security policy quite separate from the market economy and which focused on rehabilitating irrigated rice fields and supporting small-scale farming[63]. In a country where the vast majority of the population's livelihood revolves around farming, this policy went a long way in securing the population's support. Furthermore, the government remained particularly conscious of avoiding private takeovers of key services such as water and electricity. Finally, the establishment of Sector Investment Programmes (SIPs), elaborated by each ministry, in consultation with the population, to identify the key areas in which to channel donor money (Hughes, 2009; p.151), represented the government's commitment in practice to include the population in

[62] Who had already rejected such proposal, put forward by UNTAET and Timorese leaders, on the basis that it would involve state ownership of revenue generating enterprises and would, therefore, inhibit private entrepreneurship (Hughes, 2009; p.225).

[63] This included "land use policy, support for community organisations and cooperatives, and roads to [facilitate mobility for isolated villages]" (Anderson, 2012; p.226) as well as early warning systems that required strong involvement from the villages in the management of grain storage (ibid).

the process of reconstructing the country; “unsurprisingly, the public was most interested in education, health and agriculture” (ibid; p.152).

In the first two years, the state managed to show some progress on agriculture, education and health, thus initially making good on NDP promises. In relation to agriculture, rice production – mostly irrigated fields – had increased strongly from 36,000 in 1998-99 – a very low level – to 65,000 in 2004 (UNDP, 2006 in Anderson, 2012; p.226). In schools, enrolment rates increased from 59% in 1999 to 66% in 2004 (ibid; p.228) and a school-feeding programme was implemented to encourage school attendance and combat malnutrition (MAAF, 2005 in ibid). In relation to health, children mortality rate – under-five years-old – fell from 159 to 136 death for thousands between 1999 and 2004 (UNDP, 2006 in ibid; p.228), while a health-cooperation programme to send young doctors to train in Cuba with scholarships had successfully awarded 900 scholarships by 2008 and by 2006 the first 300 – approximately – Cuban-trained health doctors were back to practice in Timor Leste (Anderson, 2012; p.228).

However, whilst laudable at first, the government’s determination to remain independent of external policy influence proved unsustainable and subsequently came at a very high price for the Timorese population. Indeed, unable yet to access the revenue from Timor Leste’s oil and gas resources – as will be discussed in the next sub-section – the FRETILIN government found itself with very few financial resources, forcing it into a combination of tight fiscal policy and strong dependence on Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). In practice, the fiscal policy translated into the implementation of drastic austerity measures that severely hampered the development of infrastructure and services so crucial not only for the improvement of Timorese wellbeing, but also to attract FDIs.

Thus, in order to gather revenue, Mari Alkatiri adopted a series of policies with a strong focus on maximising revenue through the collection of user fees for the services provided by the government, such as electricity, and on imposing fees and taxes on foreign investors and agencies (ibid; p.145). Whilst the former was poorly received by a Timorese population already struggling to make ends meet, the latter was the source of equally significant discontent amidst foreign investors. Furthermore, cognisant of the imperative to avoid corruptions scandals – for the benefit of its legitimacy internally but also, perhaps most importantly, abroad in order to attract FDIs – the governance and spending style of the government

became extremely centralised and bureaucratised, carried out by "very inexperienced staff members" (ibid; p.149). This resulted in prolonged and convoluted administrative procedures that led to Timor Leste ranking second from the bottom in the WB's perception-based "Doing Business" survey (ibid), thus failing to attract the investments it badly needed in order to keep its economy growing.

Consequently, as the funds available to the government remained limited due to national and international constraints, education and agriculture budgets became increasingly limited, falling short of initial targets: in the 2004-5 budget, from the 11% that had been promised through SIPs for agriculture, only 8% spent; whereas from the 35% the government had committed to spend on education, only 27% was actually allocated (RDTL State budget 2004-5 in ibid; pp.226-227).

b) Negotiating oil revenue – the hard place

As state revenue continued to represent a significant issue for the development of the country, it became imperative for the government to make successful and swift progress on the negotiation for the exploitation of oil and gas, as well as perception of the revenue they would yield; however, as these negotiations proved increasingly complex and protracted, the government "found itself trapped in an economic context in which [its] efforts to achieve greater independence simply entangled [it] deeper in the dilemmas associated with dependent governance" (Hughes, 2009; p.144).

Timor Leste sits in proximity of a large oil field – also known as the 'Timor Gap' – the maritime boundaries of which have been in question between Australia and, successively, Indonesia, Portugal and Timor Leste since 1972. In 1989, Australia signed the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia, which "divided the Timor Gap region into three sections: petroleum production in the largest area, Area A, was to be equally shared by the two countries; in Area C, closest to East Timor, 90% of the production would go to Indonesia and 10% to Australia; [and] in Area B, Indonesia received 10% and Australia 90%" (Lao Hamutuk, 2002) – as shown in Map 6. Exploitation began in 1992, but the Treaty was soon contested by Portugal[64], which brought Australia in front of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) claiming

[64] It is important to remember that Portugal never recognized Indonesian's occupation of the territory and still, by virtue of international law, held Timor Leste as a non-self-governing territory (Ingram, 2012; p.3).

that "the Treaty violated the rights of both Portugal and the people of [Timor Leste]" (ibid)[65]. After independence, the Treaty came under renewed scrutiny by Timor Leste's leaders as it transpired that Australia had successfully managed to claim shared exploitation of the largest production area on the basis of the continental shelf argument[66]; an argument that, however, did not appear to hold against the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which stipulates that "for countries with less than 400 nautical miles of sea between them, the international boundary [is] the mid-point" (ibid) – that is, the median line originally drawn by the Portuguese – thus effectively excluding Australia from Area A – as shown in Map 7.

Map 6 – Existing boundary arrangements between Australia and Indonesia

(Map removed for copyright purposes)

Source: Kaye (N.D.), presentation for the Faculty of Law, University of Western Australia

[65] A case which the ICJ was unable to rule as Indonesia did not recognize its jurisdiction

[66] Which argues that a seabed boundary should follow the deepest point on the ocean floor between the countries (La'o Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002)

Map 7 – Area of dispute

(Map removed for copyright purposes)

Source: Kaye (N.D.), presentation for the Faculty of Law, University of Western Australia

Post-independence negotiations about the Timor Gap, between Timor Leste and Australia, were kick started by the Memorandum of understanding between UNTAET and Australia[67], "formally proposing that on independence a new agreement, the 'Timor Sea Agreement', be considered for ratification" (ibid); but the process proved to be difficult and prolonged. Indeed, Australia repeatedly undermined the process by refusing to discuss maritime boundaries, concerned as it was that changes in those boundaries would decrease its access to the oil fields and, consequently, to its revenues. As such, it became crucial for Timor Leste to garner "international support for its position on the question of sovereignty [over the oil fields] and revenue sharing" (Hughes, 2009; p.147). This support, however, met with strong international concerns in relation to the possibility that access to its oil revenues would plague Timor Leste with the natural resource curse[68]; in order to demonstrate that this would not be the case, Alkatiri would have to show a willingness to conform to international demands on its public finance management.

[67] "Under this Arrangement, which replaces the February 2000 MOU, East Timor will receive 90% and Australia 10% of oil and gas revenues from the JPDA. The JPDA inherits the ZOC from the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty, altering only the division of revenues. The largest gas field, Greater Sunrise, is deemed to lie 20% in the JPDA and 80% in Australian territory. Although the Arrangement is "without prejudice" to a future seabed boundary delimitation, it does not question Australia's claim to fields outside the JPDA" (The La'o Hamutuk Bulletin Vol. 3, No. 8: December 2002 (2/3) - http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2002/Dec/bulletinv3n8b.html#Chronology).

[68] A thesis that holds "that the exploitation of large amounts of valuable natural resources can undermine economic and political institutions, owing to the distorting effect on the rest of the economy; the potential for large fluctuation in revenue; and the likelihood that political constituencies at home will engage in aggressive contention in an attempt to capture the profits" (Hughes, 2009; p.146).

Consequently, the final Treaty signed by Alkatiri in 2006, under increasing pressure both at home – as elections were looming – and abroad – regarding public finance management – came at a very high price for the country's independence from aid and its sovereignty over the Timor Gap.

Firstly, the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS), signed in Sydney on 12 January 2006, whilst apportioning equal revenue shares between Australia and Timor Leste from extraction of the resources, required Timor signing away sovereign rights (ibid; p.149) whilst deferring "the more intractable issue of a permanent maritime boundary for half a century or more, until all petroleum resources in the Timor Sea are likely to be exhausted" (APSN, 2006). Secondly, in order to garner international support in the negotiations, Timor Leste had to agree to place oil revenues in a Petroleum fund – maintained outside the country – from whence it would withdraw 3% of the revenues each year (Hughes, 2009; p.149), therefore ensuring sustainability of the fund and avoiding disproportionately large sums of money fuelling a potential natural resource curse. Finally, international support also signified that international agencies could weight in more on public finance management decisions; as such, the ADB and some individuals at the WB, encouraged the government "to focus on facilitation of the private sector, as a solution to unemployment, rather than attempting much active intervention in the economy" (ibid).

Aware that the limited development, engendered by the strict austerity measures and (neo)liberal policies encouraged by donors, contrasted strongly with "publicity surrounding gains in the Timor Sea negotiations and reports of donations apparently flowing in from bilateral or multilateral agencies" (ibid; p.150), Alkatiri sought to implement the SIPs; however, the fact that this impetus came four years after the initial consultation proved that progress on the ground was slow whilst often projects "bore prominent signs attributing them to the generosity of one donor or another" (ibid; p.152), much to the detriment of the government's visibility at the local level. As a result, by early 2006 the disastrous economic situation of the country and the apparent lack of attention by the government to its population's needs led to a significant crisis of legitimacy, which culminated in the Crisis and the resignation of Mari Alkatiri in June 2006.

6.3.3. The AMP coalition

Following the resignation of Mari Alkatiri, Timor Leste prepared for its first ever parliamentary elections and its second presidential elections; and although these took place in the midst of the crisis of 2006, violence seemed to subside around election time, likely as the population overwhelmingly welcomed an upcoming change in government and policies. The outcome of these elections saw the *Aliança Maioria Parlamentar* (AMP – Parliamentary Majority Alliance) come into power, with Xanana Gusmão as Prime Minister, and Jose Ramos Horta as the second President of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste. This shift in the country's political history brought about two major, interrelated, changes in the governance of the country in relation to management of public finances.

Firstly, with the Timor Sea Treaty finally in force Timor Leste gained access to its oil revenue, with a significant impact on its budget: "the state budget almost tripled, from US$120 million in 2005 to $348 million in 2008; by 2010, the budget had risen to US$660 million" (RDTL state budgets in Anderson, 2012; p.229). As a consequence of such increase, and very much in line with IMF policy for the country, the government sought to establish a much more liberal economic approach focused on "ramp[ing] up public spending in […] pursuit of economic growth" (IMF, 2007; p.5). Said economic growth was seen primarily as stemming from FDIs and the development of private businesses, an approach that led the AMP government to make a very strong commitment to spending on infrastructure. Consequently, as Table 11 below illustrates, government spending on key sectors – originally identified as such by the previous government and the population at large during the NDP consultation – decreased significantly between 2006 and 2010, whilst infrastructure spending rose steadily, representing over a quarter of the government budget in 2010.

Table 11 – Public spending in key sectors in Timor Leste from 2004 to 2010

Spending as % of combined sources (CS)[69] and state budget (SB)	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2008	2010
Education (% of CS)	14.9	13.4	10.7	11.7	11.3
Education (% of SB)	15.3	15.1	11.1	13	10.2
Health (% of CS)	12.2	11.3	9.2	8.2	6.9
Health (% of SB)	9	11.9	8.1	6.9	5.4
Agriculture (% of CS)	8.8	4.6	5.8	5.9	3.7
Agriculture (% of SB)	1.5	3.7	4.4	4.8	2.5
Infrastructure (% of CS)	n.a.	n.a.	8.8	13.2	26.6
Infrastructure (% of SB)	n.a.	n.a.	15.8	12.8	28.5

Source: RDTL state budgets combined in Anderson, 2012; p.228

Furthermore, cognisant of the fact that it might take a few years to develop the infrastructure at the level it needs to be in order to attract FDIs, Jose Ramos Horta introduced a drastic tax reform in July 2008 aimed at cutting the profit tax rate from 30% to 10% (PWC, 2010; p.12) making the country "almost tax free" (ABC in Anderson, 2012; p.231). Whilst this move was praised by the World Bank, which qualified Timor Leste of 'top reformer' (PWC, 2010; p.12), its effect on the country's economy remains highly debated to date: in a country where nearly 80% of the population works in subsistence agriculture, nearly half of the population lives below the national poverty line – 49% in 2007 and 41% in 2009 (UNDP, 2011; p.111) – and 'natural persons' only start paying taxes above $6000 of annual income (PWC, 2009; p.19), it is safe to say that the tax reform has significantly narrowed down the tax base whilst there is little purchase power available to keep the economy at large growing.

In the mean time, however, the decrease in agriculture spending has marked a "shift away from agricultural and food security policy based on domestic crops as the core of food security" (Anderson, 2012; p.232), leading to a food shortage that has been compensated with an increase in food import – as seen in figure below,

[69] "Combined sources" is the state budget plus contributions from outside agencies; autonomous agencies are included in combined sources, but not in state budgets (Anderson, 2012; p.228)

in 2009 rice was one of the country's main imports, representing 27.28% of imports – thus creating a dependency on imported products. Similarly, the significant increase in infrastructure spending has meant that more materials have been imported in Timor Leste in order to accommodate the demand – as shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13 below, in 2009 construction vehicles, cement and raw iron bars were also amongst the highest imports with respectively 1.21%, 2.82% and 2.31%. The figures for 2011 show that, whilst rice imports no longer represent the highest share, food imports – marked in orange and beige and headed by rice and poultry/meat – continue to represent a significant proportion of the country's import – nearly 10%; similarly, iron structures, metal and cement also make up a large share of imports.

Figure 12 – Timor Leste's imports in 2009

(Figure removed for copyright purposes)

Source: Observatory of economic complexity (OEC)

Figure 13 - Timor Leste's imports in 2011

(Figure removed for copyright purposes)

Source: OEC

Secondly, the crisis of 2006 brought to the fore severe societal problems related to poverty, economic exclusion and social cohesion. Thus, "in an effort to rapidly resettle the displaced [of the crisis], lower tensions and promote social cohesion, the government [established the] post-crisis National Recovery Strategy [which] focused on five areas: transitional shelter and housing, social protection, security and stability, local socio-economic development and confidence-building/reconciliation activities" (Dale, Lepuschuetz and Umapathi, 2014; p.2). Whilst initially the focus remained on the first objective in order to return people to their homes as soon as possible, as the situation improved in 2008 and the Petroleum Fund began yielding higher returns – in response to increasing global fuel prices – the government shifted its focus on social protection through the delivery of cash transfers (World Bank, 2013; p.26). The cash transfers targeted the vulnerable population of Timor Leste, namely the elderly, people with disabilities, children in vulnerable households – through the *Bolsa da Mãe* or Mother's Purse programme – and the veterans and survivors families – although the latter is considered more as a recognition of their fight for independence – APPENDIX VIII presents an overview of the main characteristics of such programmes.

Both approaches, however, have come under heavy criticism in relation to a sound management of public finances. Indeed, the narrowing of the tax base has translated into a large dependence of the Timorese state on oil revenues, with

"98% of state revenues and 83% of Gross National Income coming from converting non-renewable oil and gas resources into cash revenues" (IDPS, 2010; p.14). Furthermore, the high levels of imports to satisfy food and infrastructure needs has resulted in a balance of trade consistently in significant deficit as shown in Figure 14 – in 2014, Timor Leste's trade deficit reached approximately $41million (Trading Economics) – and the country's dependence on food imports, such as rice, makes it highly vulnerable to food prices on the global market, a vulnerability that consistently needs to be palliated through government spending[70].

Figure 14 – Timor Leste balance of trade



Source: Trading economics

Furthermore, the focus on the rebuilding of infrastructure led, in 2009, to the creation of the "Referendum Package" so as to "bolster local infrastructure in rural communities, increase employment opportunities and empower the private sector with small to medium size projects" (IDPS, 2010; p.18). The Package, however, came under severe national and international scrutiny when it became clear that a large number of projects were being allocated outside the government tender process (Tempo Semanal, 28 March 2010) to private companies that either had "good family and political connections" or had "proven potential to use violence against the state" in 2006[71] (ICG, 2013; p.6). The situation was further aggravated when it became clear that "about 60% of the Referendum Package Projects [were]

[70] For example, when rice prices rose dramatically in 2008, the state subsidized the import of rice in order to respond as soon as possible to the otherwise inevitable food shortage crisis (IDPS, 2010; p.18)

[71] Some of the contractors have been known to be directly linked to the 2006 violence such as Lito Rambo, an influential gang leader in the suku of Becora – where violence was quite high during the Crisis – and Rai Los, who had been convicted and subsequently released for leading a hit squad during the Crisis (ICG, 2013; p.6)

of bad quality" as then Secretary of State of public works, Domingos Caero, noted (in Anderson, 2012; p.230), and that they did not appear to respond to any of the pressing infrastructural needs of the population.

Finally, there are considerable doubts as to the real impact of cash transfer programmes on reducing poverty. The haste with which they were designed and deployed in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis "contributed to a lack of an overarching programme strategy, and insufficient attention to operational processes and guidelines to ensure appropriate targeting, programme management, and accountability" (World Bank, 2013; p.30). As such, one interviewee at national level – number 30 – indicated that "*there is no real strategy for determining priority groups, such as young people, and the government tied itself with large and expensive programmes targeted at groups that are not priority, therefore reducing the impact*". It is therefore no surprising that a research carried out by Dale, Lepuschuetz and Umapathi (2014) revealed that the Bolsa da Mãe and disability pension have barely impacted national poverty – as shown in Figure 15 below.

Figure 15 – National poverty averted due to social assistance programmes (percentage points)



Note: These calculations use a 40 per cent poverty threshold and show by how many percentage points poverty would increase were these programs to be discontinued.
Source: Authors' calculations using Timor-Leste Social Protection Survey 2011 and HIES 2011.

Source: Dale, Lepuschuetz and Umapathi, 2014; p.5

In light of the key points highlighted above, the management of public finances under the AMP government has not only moved away from the strong push from financial independence, originally advocated under the FRETILIN government, into a much more IMF-style of liberal economic approach dependent on imports and vulnerable to global markets; it has also been characterised by a 'big money'

approach aimed at attracting private businesses and FDIs whilst buying off the most potentially troublesome groups amongst the population through, cash transfers – also called peace dividends by numbers of national level staff interviewed for the purpose of this research. The result of this style of public finance management has been the creation of "a dependent population with high expectations of government handouts and of easy contracts to build second-rate infrastructure" (ICG, 2013; p.6), which reflects to the international investor a climate of fragile stability resting mostly on oil revenues that are forecasted to be sustainable only if managed with care. As a result, FDIs have not been flowing and Timor Leste's economy remains reliant on a source of revenue that is only projected to last for another 10 years.

6.4. Investments in human capital

Investment in human capital refers to the state's ability to invest in policies for the development of skills that will enable its population to become citizens, that is, "actors in the economy, polity and society" (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005; p.7). Thus, in order to achieve this goal, the state needs to invest consistently in education and training policies that will provide citizens with the skills required to participate in the economy – as producers of goods and services, as consumers who can afford these goods and services with their wages and as tax payers. Furthermore, education need not be limited to merely fulfilling the basic human right to education; the education system "should be devoted to compensating, as far as possible, for environmental disadvantages" (Barry, 2005; p.58) by ensuring that all schools in the country provide the same level of education regardless of their location – e.g. remote rural villages, conflict affected urban areas – and by ensuring that children evolving in more difficult environments are adequately attended to in schools. Finally, education needs to provide all citizens with the ability to critically and actively contribute to the political community, not only through active participation but also by affording them the means to remain informed about policies that impact their everyday lives. A state failing to provide these opportunities cannot produce responsible citizens with marketable skills, thus rendering administrative reform and competitiveness unrealistic goals (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005; p.7).

This section argues that despite the progress registered in Timor Leste since independence in relation to the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of education,

the decisions made by the Timorese elite in relation to the national languages – as explained in section 5.3.4 – are significantly impacting the education system in Timor Leste, leading to important differences in equality of opportunity. Furthermore, the section goes on to understanding how training is being organised, delivered and promoted in Timor Leste, arguing that the government's efforts have so far fallen short of creating a skilled labour force capable of contributing to the economy.

6.4.1. Language of education policies from 1999 to 2012

Section 5.3.4 highlighted the main issues related to the language choices made by Timorese political elites upon drafting the constitution. It emphasised the fact that in a country boasting 32 endogenous language varieties, any choice regarding the *lingua franca* would already inevitably imply a set of significant challenges in relation to the development of an education curriculum; the choice of Portuguese as one of those *lingua franca*, in a country where only 5% of the population spoke the language at the time of decision-making (Nicolai, 2004; p.120) represented an additional challenge.

But upon independence, language issues were not the only matter of concern for the Timorese Ministry of Education. Indeed, in the aftermath of the violence that erupted in 1999, a ten days Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), organised to assess the damage that had been done to the country's infrastructure[72], brought to the fore crucial findings in relation to the education sector: "approximately 95 per cent of schools and other education institutions were destroyed in the post-ballot period" incurring the loss of furniture and teaching materials as well (World Bank 1999 in ibid; p.73), and "at least 75% of primary school teachers remain in the country, whilst less than 20% of secondary and vocational training teachers are available" (Annex 1, World Bank, 1999; p.12). As such, as early as 2005, the Ministry of Education began expressing concerns about "how the process of embedding the new curriculum in the system and ensuring that it is adequately supported in the classroom will be financed or managed" (MEC, 2005 in ibid; p.33).

These uncertainties, clearly present from the start, have had devastating results on the development of the education system in Timor Leste. First and foremost, the

[72] Coordinated by the World Bank, including representatives from major donors, UN agencies, multilateral institutions as well as East Timorese experts (Nicolai, 2004; p.72) and focusing on eight key sectors: economic management, civil service, community empowerment, justice system, agriculture, infrastructure, health and education (World Bank, 1999)

emphasis during the transitional period on phasing out completely Bahasa as a language of education and imposing Portuguese in its stead has meant that in addition to the burden of gathering and training a teaching force as soon as possible, the problem of training it in a language that less than 5% of the population spoke encumbered. As such, of the 3000 teachers recruited for primary and secondary education in August 2000, only 158 individuals achieved a pass mark in Portuguese proficiency tests (ibid; p.116); training was therefore crucial if Portuguese was to become the language of instruction. Nevertheless, despite early efforts from UNICEF and some Australian groups, as well as training offered since 2000 by Portuguese Instituto Camões and the Federation of Portuguese universities, to date training of the teaching workforce has remained highly inadequate – the former were blocked by the CNRT due to curriculum uncertainties whilst the latter has been characterised by high teacher drop out rates. Furthermore, the absence of curriculum at the beginning also meant that, although teaching was supposed to happen in Portuguese, no education books could be prepared to facilitate this task, thus "Indonesian textbooks were the only teaching resource available for quite some time" (Taylor-Leech, 2013; p.115), leading to further confusion for both teachers and students.

Since 2004, at which point "fewer than 6% of teachers reported fluency in Portuguese" (World Bank, 2004 in Shah, 2012; p.35), education curricula have been a very sensitive point of debate between political decision-makers, and the very delicate balance between Portuguese and Tetun – based on a more transitional approach focused on slowly phasing out Tetun throughout grades for the benefit of Portuguese – has remained highly dependent on the political climate, continuing to create confusion both for the teachers and the students. APPENDIX IX provides an overview of the main policy decisions made in relation to the language of instruction between 1999 and 2012 and draws a very complex picture characterised by a clean shift in 2004, underpinned by the idea of acclimatising children to Portuguese through the use of Tetun in the early grades so as to prepare them to Portuguese-only education in later grades.

A further key development in the country's education policy has come with the introduction of the Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE) programme in February 2011– currently being piloted in the districts of Lautem, Manatuto and Oecussi. The MTB-MLE comes as the result of unabated debate amongst Timorese political elite, policy makers and experts on the difficulties of

introducing children to primary education in a language they understand, and falls within the National Strategic Plan's (NSP) priority recommendations for education. It proposes to take into consideration the multilingual nature of Timor Leste by introducing a school system whereby "a student's mother tongue should be used as a medium of instruction in pre-primary education and in the first four years of primary schooling, thus enabling children to acquire the fundamental skills of reading and writing in the language they know best" (UNESCO, 2012; p.1).

Whilst these developments show that there is intense and productive debate at policy level to improve the education system and solve the issue of language, two additional crucial challenges remain unaddressed. Firstly, secondary schools, already suffering from a lack of staff after 1999, continue to be characterised by poor quality of education as Bahasa textbooks as still being used in secondary school classes, all the while introducing Portuguese (World Bank, 2004; p.31) in order to accommodate the majority of young students who have thus far been taught in a mix of Portuguese, Tetun and Bahasa in their primary education. Secondly, according to national level interviewee – number 36 – "*currently teachers self-select where they wish to be teaching; from a language point of view this most likely means that teachers choose to teach where they speak the language*". As a result, the quality of education across the country remains highly unequal as well performing teachers might select to go in schools with better infrastructure whilst others might choose to teach in their area or district of origin, in a language they master better.

6.4.2. Vocational training and skills development

The issues highlighted above in relation to education are particularly worrying, looking at Timor Leste's investment in human capital, when compounded to the stark lack of training opportunities existing in the country.

Indeed, vocational education and training, much like secondary education, "had little early success [after independence], with few instructor remaining and little equipment left that was of use" (Sanderson, 2001 in Nicolai, 2004; p.83). Whilst it has slowly gained in importance as a result of the large share of unemployed and underemployed population in the country, most of the activities continue to be financed by employers – on-the-job training – or through bilateral aid – for example Brazil and Australian Aid (AusAid) were the main donors involved in vocational training in 2002 (Nicolai, 2004; p.102). Furthermore, as Table 12 below illustrates

the majority of the vocational training offered is generally targeted to managers, professionals, technicians and clerical workers[73] - which, however, make up for only 20% of the workforce in SEFOPE's sample analysis of the Timor Leste's labour force (2010; p.34); conversely, "the skills required for agricultural work, craft and related trades, machine operation, and elementary occupations, were most likely to be self-taught or acquired from family or friends" (ibid; p.22) – that is, 72% of the sample labour force.

Table 12 – Percentage distribution of type of training received by those in employment

Work trained for	Formal schooling	Vocational training programme	Training programme provided by NGO	On-the-job training	Learning from relative, friend	Self-taught	Total
Managers	25	43	7	8	-	17	100
Professionals	33	47	5	8	5	2	100
Technicians	6	13	3	6	26	46	100
Clerical	10	49	6	15	20	-	100
Service and sales	1	11	2	23	23	39	100
Skilled agric worker	-	1	4	2	15	78	100
Craft and related trades	2	4	2	11	45	36	100
Machine operators	1	-	-	10	72	18	100
Elementary occupations	0	4	1	3	21	70	100
All occupations	7	13	3	8	22	47	100

Source: SEFOPE, 2010; p.21

[73] These are usually found in the following sectors: information and communication, professional and scientific, public administration, education, health and social work, arts and entertainment, service industry (SEFOPE, 2010; p.34)

In line with these findings, the interviews carried out during the fieldwork for the purpose of this research revealed that the vast majority of training undergone by people at local area level was promoted and organised by national – e.g. *Ba Futuru*[74] – and international – Plan International, Caritas – organisations. By contrast, as highlighted by national level interviewee – number 31 – "*there is very little promotion of training opportunities for youth by the government, and the budget currently being allocated to SEFOPE – approximately $2.5million for 2012 – remains insufficient to implement any significant promotion campaign in the country*".

Furthermore, employment policies at national level continue to be plagued by a significant statistical information gap in relation to the data necessary to identify the sectors where skilled labour is most in demand. Consequently, as pointed out by interviewee number 32, "*with such lack of information, due in part to coordination issues between relevant ministries, the development of relevant training opportunities is rendered particularly difficult"*. Number of interviewees within the two case study *aldeias* were also particularly concerned by such lack of information.

As a result, the number of young people who have undergone vocational training since independence is close to non-existent, with only 0.1% of the male population 5 years and older attending the academic year 2006/7 having registered for such programme (Ministry of Finance, 2008; pp.101).

6.4.3. Education and training as investments in Timor Leste's human capital

In Timor Leste, however, the reduced share of education and training in the state's budget, as highlighted in section 6.3, compounded with significant curriculum issues linked to policies on language of education, appear inadequate to achieve equal educational attainments (World Bank, 2013; p.6). Indeed, the lack of qualified teaching force and the constant changes in the curriculum – heavily dependent on the language policies determined by the state – have resulted in poor quality of education evidenced by poor literacy rates, especially in Portuguese and in rural areas – as shown in Table 13 below.

[74] http://www.bafuturu.org/

Table 13 – Adult literacy rate (15 and over) in 2010

Total	Urban	Rural
Speak, read and write in Tetum		
51.6	80.9	44.6
Speak, read and write in Portuguese		
25.2	40.1	18.3
Speak, read and write in Bahasa		
45.3	74.1	31.8
Speak, read and write in English		
14.6	24.7	7.6

Source: Ministry of Finance statistics, 2011; p.XVII

Furthermore, "skills learnt in educational institutions appear to map poorly into what is required in the workplace" whilst the few formal training courses currently available "in both post-school and technical high school settings are poorly valued by employers" (ibid; p.8); as a result, the largest share of the population that young people represent – as shown in Figure 16 below – continues to arrive on the job market unskilled and unprepared. The consequence of this lack of adequate education and training is that a large number of the population 15 and over goes on to work in sectors where education and training are not crucial for accessing employment – 50.8% of the people surveyed by SEFOPE worked in agriculture, 5.2% worked in construction and 17.6% worked in wholesale and retail trade (SEFOPE, 2010; p.39) – which incidentally also represent the sectors where the highest share of persons in vulnerable employment[75] can be found – 97.8% in agriculture and 87.8% in wholesale and trade (ibid; p.41). Finally, although official statistics boast low unemployment rates throughout Timor Leste, a closer look at the share of people working in informal, vulnerable employment or that are inactive

[75] People unlikely to have formal work arrangements or access to benefits or social protection programmes, and they are more at risk to the effects of the economic cycles (SEFOPE, 2013; p.41)

reveals much deeper socio-economic issues linked to inequality – as shown in Table 14 below.

Figure 16 – Age distribution of household population of Timor Leste in 2010



Source: World Bank, 2013; p.VII

Table 14 – Distribution of the labour force SEFOPE survey by employment status

	Labour force participation rate	Employment to population ratio	Information employment rate	Vulnerable employment rate	Unemployment rate	Inactivity rate
Timor Leste	41.7	40.2	17.8	69.9	3.6	57.4
Urban	42.3	39.3	20	42.1	6.9	57.7
Rural	41.5	40.6	16.9	80.3	2.2	58.5

Source: SEFOPE, 2010; p.VIII

The shortcomings highlighted above in relation to Timor Leste's government's investment in human capital have significant consequences for the country's growth and the development of its political community. Concerning the country's growth, the fact that the majority of the population continues to work in the informal sector and/or agriculture – a sector that should have been developed in order to ensure food security but has so far remained, as seen previously, mostly subsistence-based – means that a large share of the population is not contributing to the country's economy. Furthermore, the lack of marketable skills, resulting from both the absence of information concerning what skills would be necessary to improve the country's competitiveness and the lack of training opportunities, also

means that Timor Leste's population is currently not attractive to foreign investors. As such, three of the main motivators for investors in a country – size of local market, growth of local market and skilled labour (UNCTAD in Beck, 2013) – are currently lacking in Timor Leste and fail to attract the much needed FDIs. Finally, the issues of literacy highlighted above also impact on the ability of the citizens to actively participate in the country's political community. Indeed, inability to master Portuguese means that although Timor Leste's state has made significant progress in terms of transparency in the past few years – for instance with the transparency portal for public budget, online consultation for laws and policies – a large share of the population remains unable to consult – if they lack access to internet, often as a result of socio-economic issues – and read these documents; as such, they are unable to critically assess them and contribute to debates.

6.5. Conclusion – "Diligent and obedient boys"[76]

This chapter aimed to understand how the decisions made during the transitional administration, in relation to state building, affected the institutional design of Timor Leste and, as a consequence, the way in which the policies emanating from the new state institutions affect its ability to exercise its core functions. Based on the analysis, carried out in chapter five, of the dynamics and interests pervading the state building decision-making processes, this chapter has highlighted how these have affected "the distribution of resources and power among societal groups, which quickly began to affect the state's development" (Jones, 2010; p.560).

The analysis of the state's ability to maintain administrative control between 2002 and 2012 revealed that UNTAET's choice not to engage, or indeed even recognise, the power dynamics amongst Timor Leste's political elite in the process of institutional design, had profound consequences for the future state's legitimacy and sovereignty. Firstly, the political divisions that seeped through the electoral process for the Constituent Assembly played out in such a way that the subsequent drafting of the Constitution reflected essentially the interests and aspirations of one political party – FRETILIN. In fact, through a process that saw little consultation and opposition, the Constitution of Timor Leste shaped a political system "failed by design" (Richmond, 2014; p.17), institutionalising the main leaders' political divisions that triggered a national crisis in 2006, nearly bringing the country to its knees. Secondly, the system of governance established through

[76] Mari Alkatiri, May 18, 2004 in Hughes (2009), p.135

the Constitution, whilst modelled on previous societal organisation, did not, however, reflect any of its meanings for the population. This resulted in a decision-making process that is essentially top-down, and leaves little room for voice. Consequently, unable to recognise themselves into, or even act within, a system marred by "basic problems with respect to political competition, the control of institutions such as the army or police, unemployment and poverty" (ibid; p.5), the population used the crisis of 2006 as a way to boycott institutions they perceived as illegitimate. Had UNTAET allowed more time to analyse the political dynamics at play, it could have avoided establishing a voting system for the Constituent Assembly that led to a majority of FRETILIN members and, therefore, essentially reflected FRETILIN's interests. More consultation with the civil society, as the experience with the NDP demonstrated, could have resulted in the establishment of institutions that included local authorities more successfully – for instance, giving them more power[77].

The state's ability to maintain a legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, especially in the first six years of Timor Leste's state building – both before and after independence in 2002 – was therefore severely undermined by the crisis of 2006. The widespread violence that overtook the country, triggered by the politicisation of the security sector along deep political divisions and that spread in result of popular discontent with the state of the nation in general, highlighted to the population "the dangers for society when top leaders […] present themselves to the public solely as historic figures but are unable to perform their functions and assume their responsibilities as leaders" (CEPAD, 2009; p.38). In addition to being politicised, Timor Leste's initial attempts at building a security sectors were also undermined by the lack of coherence and coordination that characterised successive international approaches to training the PNTL. As such, its inconsistent mandate with regard to community policing failed to penetrate the local level, resulting in Timorese relying essentially on customary and informal practices for conflict resolution and security, rather than trusting the state. A more coherent approach, where the PNTL works closely with the community, would have resulted in more trust toward state institutions, as already is the case in the areas where PNTL community units and local leaders have developed a positive relationship.

[77] This is currently being undertaken through a process of decentralization.

Timor Leste's first two governments' attempts at the management of public finance, whilst not directly affected by the decision-making processes made during the transitional administration, have nonetheless been significantly stirred by international state building practices post-independence in 2002. FRETILIN, under Mari Alkatiri, made initial attempts at avoiding aid dependence in order to maintain independence in its decision-making. However, the lack of resources that plagued its government, compounded with the necessity to garner international support in the negotiations with Australia over the Timor Gap, led to a series of decisions that took the management of public finance away from its initial focus – on education, health and livelihoods – and redirected it towards the more (neo)liberal administration style encouraged by donors. The subsequent government, AMP, continued in the same direction, focusing on investing to attract FDIs rather than redirecting newly accessible state oil revenues "towards strategic infrastructural investments and local-private sector development" (Barbara, 2008; p.309) to generate national development and growth.

Investments in human capital, during the first twelve years of independence, suffered considerably from all the dynamics described above. Pressed with the necessity to "relinquish its recent colonial past and the baggage it included" (Shah, 2012; p.34), Timorese leadership pushed for the establishment of Portuguese as a *lingua franca*, despite a widespread lack of knowledge of the language amongst the country's population. This choice, already problematic for its colonial symbolism and lack of reach, proved even more challenging in a post-conflict context where the teaching force was not only lacking but also lacked, much like the population, the language skills. As such, whilst debates over the education curriculum slowed down and complicated the process of implementing such choice, the lack of investments in education characteristic of the (neo)liberal approaches adopted by the state only contributed to worsening the quality of education throughout the country. Compounded with a lack of investment in skills training, the resulting educational and training inequalities that came to characterise the population have led to severe social, political and economic disparities in the country.

Hughes (2009; p.197) affirms that "the task of elites is to create not only a narrative that can elicit allegiance, but a web of practical connections that links the state to society, in a manner that can give form to claims of central representations, authority, and legitimacy, in the eyes of at least a section of the population". It

transpires, from the analysis carried out in this chapter, that the process of state building has not only deeply affected the new state's ability to carry out its core functions, but has also, as a result, led to the emergence of alternative, more local, "shared and deeply held, but historically contingent, desire[s] for community" (Jennings, 2011; p.43) amongst the population. The next chapter will explore, through the narratives emerging from the two case study *aldeias*, how the impact of the core functions on social cohesion contributed to this process.

CHAPTER 7 – THE IMPACT OF STATE BUILDING ON URBAN SOCIAL COHESION IN DILI

"We wanted Western tastes without having Western skills,

We undertook urbanization without industrialisation"

(Joao Boavida, 2013)

7. The impact of state building on urban social cohesion in Dili

This chapter aims to explore how the dynamics highlighted in chapters five and six affect citizens' narratives of their everyday life, so as to understand how the decisions-making processes that characterise Timor Leste's state building have contributed to shaping the construction of social cohesion in Dili, its capital. Through the use of social cohesion as an analytical tool that facilitates the exploration of Timorese citizens' "major preoccupations, history, and how they are managing and responding to social, political, economic, environmental or cultural changes" (Grenfell et al, 2009; p.25), this chapter seeks to explore the disjunctions that can emerge between state building and the construction of a political community (Devant, 2009; p.170) when the institutions and politics are established within a framework of action strongly focused on top-down relations between the state and its citizens (ibid; p.159).

In this light, this chapter begins by first introducing Dili's urban space in its social, economic and political context, and subsequently offers a brief re-introduction of the elements of the analytical framework that will be used for the analysis of the two *aldeias*. The second part of this chapter provides the analysis of the two *aldeias* in order to understand how the urban fabric affects social cohesion and, therefore, how the spaces emerging from this interaction contribute to shaping the scales and spaces of people's representation of citizenship in these *aldeias* – that is, research question number three.

7.1. Introducing Dili and urban social cohesion

7.1.1. Dili in its social, economic and political context

Dili gained its importance in 1769, when the Portuguese were forced to leave Oecussi – which had remained a Portuguese enclave despite the significant Dutch presence on the Western part – due to ongoing struggles and wars with the local leaders (Ospina and Hohe, 2002; Cristalis, 2009). Initially of equal importance to Baucau, situated 122km East of Dili and preferred by the Portuguese for its cooler climate, its fishing and its beautiful sea, Dili was soon declared the capital of the Portuguese colony as a result of its much more accessible port and wider urbanisation potential – indeed, Dili is located at sea level whilst Baucau was built on a hill. Nonetheless, as shown in Map 8 below, Dili's territorial expansion was minimal during Portuguese times: between 1951 and 1972 the maps show that the

main urbanised area around the harbour – delimited by the thick dark line in 1972 – has remained unchanged and there has only been small additional construction around the main area – delimited by the thinner line in 1972.

Map 8 – Dili Portuguese urbanisation plans 1951 and 1972



Source: Interviewee at the Ministry of Education, Timor Leste

Dili really began developing during Indonesian military rule as a result of two factors: the higher number of Indonesian staff that lived in the country, and Dili more specifically, compared to Portuguese; and, the construction, as part of Indonesian population control policies, of small villages across the urban space where they relocated Timorese population they had captured in the mountains. But, as mentioned in section 4.3.1, it is essentially after independence from the Indonesian in 1999 that Dili became the main recipient of migration in Timor Leste, contributing to levels and speed of urbanisation that have had considerable impacts on the infrastructure as well as economic and social relations of the urban area. Indeed, between 2004 and 2010, the number of national migrants in Dili

increased by 37% (GDS, 2010; p.vii) and the average annual growth rate has been 4.6%, that is double the national average annual growth rate of 2.4 % during the same period (ibid).

As a result, the patterns of migration in the different *sukus* of the city have also contributed to creating both very mixed as well as very homogenised areas: where homogeneity is often due to certain areas being conveniently located on roads that lead to certain districts – e.g. eastern or southern – heterogeneity is often times the result of important historical changes and displacements in some areas – e.g. freed houses by the Portuguese and Indonesian staff, massive displacements during violent episodes in 1999 and 2006.

Furthermore, its position as the capital of the country – and main urban area – has made Dili the centre of economic development in the country – since Portuguese and Indonesian times already, but more specifically since independence with the arrival of a large number of international organisations and NGOs. As such, it has attracted a significant number of people in search of better socio-economic prospects as well as better education opportunities, resulting in 21.3% of the country's economically active population residing in the capital (GDS, 2014). However, the lack of skills of the active population combined with the lack of economic opportunities – which is only likely to increase as international organisations, Dili's main employers, leave the country – have also resulted in Dili presenting the highest percentage of economically inactive – not employed or seeking employment[78] – population in the country with 24%, as well as the highest share of unemployed population in the country with 40.7% (MoF, 2011). Nevertheless, despite these stark socio-economic contrasts, to date there is still no urban planning policy at any level of the state in order to manage these disparities (Reis Pequinho, 2010; p.55).

Finally, as a consequence of both its historical political importance and its unregulated population growth (Jütersonke et al, 2010; p.17), Dili has from the very beginning of its existence as an urban space, "frequently served as a site of violence and resistance, both real and symbolic" (ibid; p.21). These episodes of violence started as far back as during Portuguese times, with the rebellion of Dom Boaventura, and remained the focus of much of the violence during the 1975 civil war, Indonesia's 1999 scorched earth campaign, and the 2002, 2005 and 2006

[78] E.g. homemakers, retirees, incapacitated people and full-time students (MoF, 2012; p.6)

contestations against the newly independent state's government – as mentioned in section 6.1.2. However, even the history of violence of the different neighbourhoods in Dili is diverse, as some areas were more severely hit than others during 1999 – e.g. areas known to be part of the resistance – whilst other suffered particularly during the Crisis of 2006 – e.g. areas with more diversity in relation to their population's districts of origin.

The aim of this chapter is therefore to take into account these diversities within Dili's urban space and understand how, in combination with the state policy issues highlighted in the previous chapter, they affect people's relations with each other and their state.

7.1.2. Social cohesion as a tool to explore social identities in Dili's urban spaces

The remainder of this chapther presents the findings of the investigation of social cohesion, in the two selected *aldeias* of Dili, following the two important steps highlighted in chapter three: the objective and the subjective readings of the urban fabric.

As such, each section will provide an insight into the objective reading of the urban fabric of the *aldeia*. This will include an introduction to the geographical position of the area within Dili's urban space, as well as an analysis of the main socio-economic characteristics of the area through statistical evidence and personal observations supported by visual evidence – that is, photographs of the *aldeias* taken by the author. It will also present the historical development of the *aldeias* based on people's narratives – since there is no other evidence available on such matters in Timor Leste – as well as an outline of the *aldeias*' history of violence.

Subsequently, for each *aldeia* the subjective reading will be presented through an investigation of each of the four domains of social cohesion. This investigation will be organised so as to intertwine the findings highlighted in Chapter six with the narratives emerging from people's voices and opinions in relation to their daily lives within and between *aldeias*. More specifically, the subjective reading of urban social cohesion in each *aldeia* will organised as follows:

- Common values and civic culture – this sub-section analyses how people relate to different layers of administrative control – both at local and national level –, the level of understanding they have concerning their ability to voice

their opinions, and the representations of their belonging to the political community these relations create in their minds;

- Social order and social control – this sub-section explores social order in each *aldeia* through people's narratives of the violence that occurred in 2006/7 and their understanding of the state's actions to both end the violence and promote reconciliation. It also looks at social control through people's relationships with each other and authority, attempting to understand people's levels of trust in the state's ability to maintain the monopoly over the means of violence and, as such, ensure justice;

- Social solidarity and reduction in wealth disparities – this sub-section investigates people's understanding of the state's management of public finance in relation to infrastructure and services as well as concerning investment in human capital. It offers an insight into the representations of the state that these narratives create at *aldeia* level; and,

- Social networks and social capital – this sub-section looks more in depth into people's representations of the state's administrative control through their engagement into matters of public concern both at local and national level. It explores the type of information, trust and norms on which people rely to act within their *aldeias* so as to gather a sense of whether social capital is being bonded or bridged.

Finally, this chapter's conclusion analyses what social cohesion means for the spaces and scales at which people interact in the two *aldeias*, in order to then understand how these feed people's representations of their attachment to place and construction of political identity in political, historical, cultural, territorial and psychological terms – that is, the elements that constitute the political community in the context of this research, as described in section 2.2.4.

7.2. Urban social cohesion in Liriu

7.2.1. Objective reading of Liriu's urban fabric

a) Geographic position

Liriu is situated in what can be considered the heart of Dili, in the *suku* of Motael and part of the sub-district of Vera Cruz – as shown in Map 9 below.

Map 9 – Geographical location of Liriu (delineated in blue) within Dili's urban area

(Map removed for copyright purposes)

Source: Google map

The *aldeia* of Liriu – located in Map 10 below – began developing during Portuguese times, thus boasting a long history of urbanisation. It is located right by Dili port and between two of Dili's main roads, that is, Avenida de Portugal – known to Dili residents as Beach Road because it runs along the sea – and Avenida Almirante Americo Tomas - known to Dili residents as Comoro road because it connects the city centre with the Comoro river bridge – both of which have high visibility by internationals, run across the urban space and are therefore regularly maintained – as illustrated in Picture 1 below.

Map 10 – Aerial view of Liriu

(Map removed for copyright purposes)

Source: Google satellite view

Picture 1 – Beach road runs beside embassies and is regularly maintained

Source: photograph taken by the author

b) Accessibility

Liriu's central location within Dili's urban space means that it is also very well connected. As the mikrolet map below indicates, seven mikrolet routes pass by Liriu, providing easy transportation to its inhabitants at either end of the *aldeia*; furthermore, the *aldeia* is at the centre of routes 9 and 10 – respectively routes in white and blue in Map 11 below – which run from the West of Dili – past the airport – to the North – Lahane Hospital – and far East – Lecidere, where the main vegetable market is – through the centre – Katedral – thus considerably facilitating Liriu's residents access to the majority of the key areas within Dili's urban space. Finally, the high density of international and national organisations' offices in the area, in addition to the high number of embassies being located in and around Liriu, mean that it is a generally safe area to walk around during day and night.

Map 11 – Location of Liriu within the mikrolet route system



Source: Fritz, S. (2014)

As one of the oldest and most urbanised *aldeias* in Dili, Liriu is also characterised by a number of aspects that can be found in other urban areas around the world, such as paved roads, pedestrian crossings and pavements – all features that are not, however, a foregone conclusion in many other areas within Dili – as evidenced in Picture 2 below. To be sure, the roads within Liriu are not all as well maintained as Beach Road or Comoro Road, as the presence of big potholes can attest; however, these potholes are generally few and far between and whilst they could be considered a safety concern for cars, they remain easy to circumvent on motorbike – the means of transportation used by the majority of Timor Leste's population.

Picture 2 – Liriu's main roads are easily accessible to most means of transport

Source: photograph taken by the author

c) Socio-economic characteristics

Motael is one of the sukus, within the sub-district of Vera Cruz, with the highest school attendance – 43.3% of people in age of going to school – and the lowest share of people who have never attended school – 6.4% (MoF, 2011; p.166) – and discussions with participants both in Liriu and other aldeias revealed that the school in Liriu is known to be one of the best ones in Dili. Furthermore, Motael is one of the sukus with the best levels of education in Vera Cruz, as 35% of the population have completed secondary education, 18.1% have a university degree – 6% higher than the other sukus in the sub-distrcit – and 2.3% have a diploma – a small share but the highest in the sub-district (MoF, 2011; p.228). Interestingly, when talking to the participants it appeared that the opportunity to go to university was not restricted to people living in good or high socio-economic status, but rather that the opportunity was available and taken up by many across the socio-economic spectrum of the area. Moreover, the MoF statistics indicating that there is only 2% unemployment in Motael – the lowest level of unemployment in the sub-

district – is confirmed by the fact that none of the participants to the study were unemployed – despite the author having searched for them during the week; rather, whilst some indicated that they were unemployed, in reality one owned a small *kios* and the other one a shop.

The urban fabric that unfolds as one takes a walk through Liriu very much reflects that of an urban space in more developed countries; that is, the vast majority of the houses face onto the road, have a front porch as well as a front garden – big or small depending on the socio-economic status of the household – and there is a wall separating the property from the road. The presence of these walls is mainly due historically to the architecture inherited from the Portuguese colonisers. The type of walls, however, reflects immediately the socio-economic status of the household, as the photos and captions below illustrate:

Picture 3 - High protective walls or fences are home to *malae* population or wealthy Timorese

Source: photograph taken by the author

Picture 4 - Smaller walls or fences reflect a good socio-economic status

Source: photograph taken by the author

Picture 5 - Properties with makeshift fences host low socio-economic households

Source: photograph taken by the author

In addition to these differences, there are also a number of pockets of poverty within the *aldeia*, generally clustered together, built in simple grey brick, without porches or gardens. In Picture 6 below, behind the sports grounds on the right hand side of the picture one can notice a grouping of low-income households and notice the absence of walls and the simplicity of the constructions.

Picture 6 – Low-income households in Liriu

Source: photograph taken by Jenny Asman

Finally, when walking around Liriu one notices a high number of little *kios* that sell food and convenience products – some of those *kios* within formal buildings others within makeshift little huts, all of them along the road – and a hotel, therefore signifying the presence of business opportunities; moreover, aside for one house that boasted a big garden where corn is cultivated and chicken raised, in Liriu there appears to be no agriculture taking place, confirming once more the prevalent urban character of the *aldeia*.

d) Development of the area

Liriu's population comes from many different districts of origins in different parts of Timor Leste, and has arrived at different times, although it does appear that a large number of people have moved into Liriu post-1999, as a consequence of their houses burning down in other areas and attracted by the peaceful reputation of this *aldeia*.

As illustrated in the maps below, Liriu is part of the original core of Dili's urban area and started developing during the Portuguese times, although it appears that until the 1950s/60s most of the development took place along the seashore whereas by the 1970s it had been developed following the street layout that can still be observed nowadays.

Map 12 – Portuguese urbanisation plans for 1951 (top) and 1972 (bottom)



Source: Ministry of Education

According to interviewee 71, who grew up in Liriu, during Portuguese times "Liriu was home to both Portuguese administrative staff as well as Timorese who worked with the Portuguese, often as part of the teaching force or as part of the military[79]". This description confirmed the memories other participants, who had grown up in the area or had moved there prior to Portuguese withdrawal from Timor Leste, also shared with the author.

Upon Indonesia's invasion, shortly after Portuguese withdrawal, the majority of the Timorese who had lived in Liriu fled to the mountains because they were afraid of the Indonesians; interviewee 42 that her father, who was Portuguese, "*was killed by Indonesian militias*". Instead, as indicated by interviewee 47, Indonesian military personnel and administrative staff "*moved into the empty houses and, as such, Liriu remained a centre of administrative control*". Most participants, however, indicated that unlike in other areas Indonesians made very little infrastructure upgrading in Liriu.

e) History of violence since independence

In 1999, as the Indonesians withdrew from Timor Leste, Liriu did not suffer from the scorched earth campaign as much as other areas of Dili, probably because the majority of the houses were actually occupied by Indonesians themselves; as such, most of the infrastructure built by the Portuguese is still being used today. Rather, as the situation improved and Timorese started coming back from the mountains into Dili, Liriu became one of the main areas of resettlement for the population; indeed, many of the participants in this research indicated that they have been living in the *aldeia* **since 1999** because their house in other *aldeias* had been burnt down and they had nowhere to go.

The result of this spontaneous resettlement movement in Liriu, however, is that many people now live on land that is being claimed by the state. Interviewee 45 explained that the Motael is now also known as "*the 'red line' of land disputes: many people here live on state land and are aware of it, but they have been living here for many years, sometimes decades, and if they have to vacate the land they expect to be compensated and/or relocated*". But the process of applying for compensation, relocation or land purchase is complex and protracted, therefore a

[79] *Colegio Militar*, the military academy which used to stand in the street that now bears its name and where Liriu's *sede suku* is now located

large number of people are in the same situation as interviewee 46, who said "*I have been participating to all the meetings in the suku discussing this issue, I am aware of the process to apply for ownership or compensation and I have taken all the steps I was supposed to take, but so far I have not heard anything from the government*".

Nevertheless, despite being referred to as the 'red line' of land disputes, the fact that in Liriu most of those disputes are taking place between the state and its citizens means that there are few issues between previous and current owners, none of which able to produce land titles[80]; this goes a long way in explaining why Liriu has mostly remained a peaceful area since independence.

This does not mean that there haven't been fights between youth or episodes of violence, but that these episodes have thus far been few and far between and not significant enough to cause a disruption in the life of the *aldeia*'s inhabitants. As a result of this peaceful reputation, Motael hosted one of the main IDP camps during the **2006 crisis** and its church became a main destination for many other people fleeing the violence at the time. Many participants who lived in the area at the time remember seeing many people coming to Liriu's church to seek refuge, although it is interesting to note that there is no animosity in relation to the situation, potentially because the IDPs did not resettle in the area. To date, Liriu's inhabitants consider their *aldeia* to be a safe and peaceful environment to live in.

7.2.2. Common values and civic culture

Discussions with participants in Liriu in relation to their understanding of, and relationship with, state institutions revealed that there is a significant amount of interaction between Liriu's residents and their state, resulting in a much deeper understanding of its functioning.

Participants demonstrated a tendency to keep checks and balances on their state on the basis of the level of development and change their *aldeia* is subject to. The vast majority of participants indicated that the infrastructure being used in the *aldeia* has not been properly updated – or even changed – since Indonesian and, in some instances, Portuguese times. As a result, as noted interviewee 41,

[80] Land titles in Timor Leste are a source of much conflict: whilst the Portuguese had proceeded to properly conferring those titles to owners, as the owner of the Vasco deGama restaurant in Liriu showed the author, the repeated violence and destruction during Indonesian rule – which contributed to much population movement – and the burning of the Portuguese archives as the Indonesians left, have resulted in many parcels of land being contested.

"*although there has always been running water here – since it was installed by the Portuguese – the system has never been upgraded and the whole area sometimes goes for two or three weeks without any water*". When the water goes missing, Liriu's inhabitants either go to Jardin[81] like interviewee 41, or take their cars to go fetch water elsewhere like interviewee 45. The issue has been signalled repeatedly to the *xefi suku* and other government representatives, but interviewee 42 indicated that "*so far nothing has happened*".

Nevertheless, participants in Liriu do not limit their judgement of the state solely on tangible infrastructure improvements; rather, a large number of participants demonstrated to have a good knowledge of the way in which state institutions operate, the political situation at national level and the main issues with the current functioning of the state system. For instance, a number of participants commented on the presence of corruption at state level, expressing their concerns in relation to how tender contracts, scholarships and other resources are allocated, and indicating that often it appears those with the connections to the government are the ones who manage to receive money from the state. Others, such as interviewee 51, criticised the multiparty system: "*There are twenty-three political parties within the state, which can easily turn into a problem because they disagree with most of the actions undertaken by the party in power*."

This ability to look at the state, as well as assess its functioning, from different points of views results in Liriu's participants' judgement of state actions and developments being more critical and yet less severe. Indeed, many participants, regardless of their socio-economic and employment status, indicated that whilst it was clear that there was still much progress to be done in relation to improving people's everyday life, "*the last government [AMP] did a good job, it managed to build some infrastructure despite the fact that we were a new nation and there was very little budget*" – interviewee 51; many, such as interviewee 46, also indicated that "*as a new nation it is normal to see slow progress*", but they can see things improving.

Two important elements, which emerged through discussion with participants, appear to contribute to facilitating people's interaction and understanding of the state system in Liriu. The first one is the important role of local leaders in actively

[81] 'Jardin' refers here to the 'Jardin 5 de Maio', which is also part of Motael and is located just opposite the entrance to Dili's port

involving the population in all matters pertaining to the development and living standards of their *aldeia*; from making readily available all communication about community meetings – in which the majority of participants indicated they participated actively – to involving the residents in the development of proposals for initiatives to improve life in the *aldeia*, it became clear that the local leaders in Liriu play a significant role in portraying an image of local governance that reflects more positively on at least one layer of the state system. As such, youth, middle aged, elderly, as much as women and men, all indicated that they have been part in the development of proposals, whether "*to be able to use the field along the beach, in Lecidere, as a football field to train and organise games*" – interviewee 39 – or as monthly proposals "*to the government to improve the infrastructure of the area*" – interviewee 43.

The second element that appeared to contribute significantly to shaping people's images of their state at different levels, was the active attitude of many participants, beyond that encouraged and initiated by the local leaders, in dealing with different state institutions and authorities. Whether participants were small business owners – e.g. the owner of a private shop selling air conditioning – or private contractors – e.g. the owner of a private company working in agribusiness, the owner of a private construction company – or whether they lived on state land and were trying to legalise their situation or apply for relocation compensations, a large number of Liriu participants had already interacted with different levels of state authorities more than once, therefore facilitating a certain level of understanding of state institutions. Similarly, interviewee 44 pointed out that "*young people in this area participate actively in the development of a good governance and in creating a better environment for our community*" and they do not depend on the state: "*if they need something done they will apply for funding and if they do not succeed, often they will do it voluntarily*".

Consequently, an investigation into participants' understanding and judgment of their state revealed that their regular interaction with its institutions, at different levels, gives them a sense of belonging to both the *aldeia* polity and the wider Timorese political community. A number of participants shared insightful comments about what they think is problematic with the way in which their state is currently managing the country, and how this can significantly impact the construction of a Timorese political community needed to ensure the development of a strong state. For instance, interviewee 39 pointed out that there is currently a

significant gap between international and national consultants' salaries, and "*this should change in order to provide an incentive for Timorese to improve as well, because at the moment many people don't look like they want to contribute*". Similarly, interviewee 40 argued that the state should empower the private sector in order to boost the country's economy, but instead "*at the moment the government is just using oil money to carry out the developments, and works very little on creating a Timorese identity*". These comments show that there is a sense of the importance of common aims, objectives and values at all levels, and that the state, through its policies, is seen as currently failing to promote those.

7.2.3. Social order and social control

According to participants in the research, social order in Liriu has been characterised, since independence, by a general lack of violence or threats to peaceful relations amongst its population. Even throughout the Crisis of 2006/7, all participants indicated that the *aldeia* managed to remain generally free from riots and violence, transforming it instead in a safe area where IDP camps were set up – one of the main IDP camps was set up in Jardim, just East of Liriu, by the port – to accommodate many people fleeing the violence in their *aldeias*, whilst no participants from Liriu indicated fleeing their house. This may partly be do to the fact that there are no known martial art groups active in the area; that is, there may be some martial art group members amongst the inhabitants of the *aldeia* but they are not causing problems or fighting amongst each other in Liriu.

Today, social order in Liriu continues to be maintained, even if disrupted at times by issues related to young people provoking each other or some domestic violence, making the *aldeia* one of the safest ones in Dili. All the residents who participated in the research, agreed with interviewee 48 that since 1999 there have not been any significant episodes of violence in the *aldeia* "*because most of the families are well educated and they educate their children, not only by sending them to school but also by teaching them respect for their community*".

The vast majority of the participants agreed that the maintenance of social control is successful thanks to local leaders' ability to "*manage and organise the community*" – interviewee 49. Furthermore, as indicated by interviewee 44, participants in Liriu believe that "*the activities organised by the leadership, especially the xefi suku but also the youth leader, have a very good impact on the relationships and the behaviour of young people*". The relationship with the police

force, although generally omitted from discussions about social control, was described in relatively positive terms. Indeed, interviewee 43 mentioned the close relationship with the authorities, called upon "*depending on the type of offence or issue that is being reported*", generally in order to "*avoid problems escalating and going to court".*

The more positive relationship of Liriu's residents with the police force may be attributed, in no small part, to the fact that since much of the violence during the Crisis happened outside of the *aldeia*, little repression took place in Liriu, thus preventing a negative representation of the state monopoly over the means of violence. In combination with the fact, highlighted in the previous sub-section, that people in Liriu have regular interaction with state institutions and a relatively comprehensive vision of the state system, it is also likely that participants have a more critical approach to the state in relation to social control and the monopoly of the means of violence. For instance, a number of participants pointed out, like interviewee 49, that in 2006 "*it should have been obvious that laying off 600 policemen who had families to feed would have provoked an outcry not only amongst those policemen, but would also have been a trigger to protest against much larger socio-economic issues"*. Since the crisis in 2006, interviewee 43 indicated, "*there has been a professionalization of the police, which means that they are now much better at responding to episodes of violence*".

Finally, there are still a number of people in Liriu who have either worked with the Portuguese or Indonesian authorities, or whose parents did, resulting in a long-standing relationship with security forces and state power.

7.2.4. Social solidarity and reduction in wealth disparities

Despite visible wealth disparities in Liriu's urban fabric, discussions with participants on economic and social development, as well as common standards, reveal that access to opportunities and services is relatively equal across all socio-economic backgrounds within the *aldeia*. This was also confirmed by the socio-economic statistics on the *suku* of Motael presented in section 7.2.1.

Indeed, Motael is one of the very few sub-districts in Dili where only seven households out of the whole sub-district do not have access to electricity for lighting (MoF, 2011; p.434). Furthermore, while most households appear to have access to running water – whether in their houses or from a tap just outside their

house – access to drinking water appears to be much more of an issue for the majority of the participants, regardless of their socio-economic status: although statistics show that 61% of households can access drinking water from a public tap (ibid; p.454) – partly as a result of the water and sanitation projects for IDP camps in Motael[82] during the Crisis – most participants, regardless of their socio-economic status, lamented like interviewee 46 that "*"there have been no changes in our area in relation to clean water, we still have no access to it"*.

Access to transportation in the area also proved to transcend socio-economic boundaries within Liriu, as the position of the *aldeia* on a large number of *mikrolet* routes facilitates most participants' movements across Dili's urban space. The fact that most of these routes directly reach the main areas of the urban space, therefore keeping the costs low, also ensure more movement across Dili. Similarly, the proximity to Colmera – one of Dili's areas with the highest density of shops – and Comoro – another area with many shops – facilitate many participants' easy access to economic activity, thus contributing to an additional incentive for movement around the urban space.

In relation to social solidarity, interviewees 48 and 49, who had both worked as civil servants with the Portuguese government, explained that they were receiving state pensions from both the Portuguese and the Timorese governments. Because he also worked as a civil servant for the Indonesian government, interviewee 49 indicated also receiving an Indonesian pension.

The findings highlighted in this sub-section reveal that whilst there are wealth disparities in Liriu, these do not lead to unequal access to opportunities. Indeed, the wide variety of different economic – e.g. construction company, farmer, selling food in government offices, security guards, civil servants from Portuguese, Indonesian and independence times, etc – and social activities in the area – organising events, applying for grants to improve infrastructure – showed that there are generally common standards across the *aldeia*, as well as good levels of social and economic development across the population. Furthermore, references to receiving pensions from the state demonstrated that there is a certain level of redistribution of public finances taking place in Liriu.

[82] These were located in the Motael camps of Jardim, Farol EP, Belun's office and Fundacao Haburas.

7.2.5. Social networks and social capital

Fieldwork visits revealed that the nature of social interaction in Liriu is much more akin to that of an urban area in Western countries, rather than more traditionally taking place in the streets like in rural areas. During the weekend, people with high socio-economic status living in houses built during Portuguese times generally stay in their garden and invite family, friends and neighbours in their private sphere rather than meeting outside. A similar attitude was observed in relation to people with good socio-economic status living either in Portuguese or Indonesian houses. On the other hand, people from lower socio-economic backgrounds, living in small compounds of simple brick houses, appeared to interact a little more in or around public spaces – as illustrated in Picture 7 below showing people interacting around the *sede suku*. Interestingly, however, there are few children playing outside and rarely do so on the street, again reflecting a lifestyle much more akin to an urban space, rather than a rural area.

Picture 7 – Youth chatting on the side of the road on a Saturday

Source: photograph taken by the author

Picture 8 – Women interacting in public spaces around low-income housing

Source: photograph taken by the author

During the week the level of social interaction in the streets reflects the socio-economic background of the area; as indicated by interviewee 42, people in Liriu "*are busy with their jobs and with their lives, there are minimum relationships between neighbours*", and even though there is interactions amongst neighbours, interviewee 37 noted that "*people who work generally like to go home to stay with their families*".

Despite these varied approaches to social interaction discussions with participants, regarding the level of attendance and nature of the community meetings, revealed a high degree of civic engagement and associational activity in Liriu, confirming the findings regarding civic culture highlighted in sub-section 7.2.2 that emphasised Liriu's residents engagement with their local authorities. Indeed, not only does the majority of people attend community meetings regularly, but they also appear to spark productive discussions on the improvement of living standards in the area. Perhaps even more interesting is the fact that civic engagement goes beyond local leaders leadership and can also be found at individual level, as many participants

indicated that they often sit with "*friends to talk about politics*", like interviewee 39, or with their family such as interviewee 52 who is new to the area but indicated "*I do discuss at length with my uncle here, because the decisions the government takes affect us every day and it is important to talk about it*". Finally, many interviewees pointed out like interviewee 41 that "*there are no real issues in the aldeia so I don't really discuss those, but I do like to discuss what happens at national level"*. This was particularly striking amongst youth who, much like interviewee 40, indicated "*we all have an interest in building our future nation: as youth, we reap what we sow*".

Similarly, associational activity, under the leadership of local leaders, is vibrant in Liriu, and many of the activities taking place are generally targeted at youth. Interestingly, these activities are not limited to typical football games and other sports, but also include a number of "*activities to build the capacity of our youth to ensure that even those who cannot go to university are capable of finding a job to make a living*" – interviewee 39. Furthermore, confirming the findings of section 7.2.2 highlighting the importance of making young people responsible, interviewee 44 indicated that these activities "*help them change their mentalities and create a better environment in which they can grow up*."

Finally, the high degree of civic engagement within Liriu also translates into a well-developed sense of responsibility toward each other; the levels of trust fostered amongst the community, as well as the networks developed between people through their regular civic engagement, significantly contribute to facilitating the resolution of collective action problems both under the leadership of the local leaders as well as simply amongst residents. For example, interviewee 39 contributed to forming a group that "*gives advice to the people in the area about land and property*", whilst interviewee 45 mentioned that, in order to tackle the water issues experienced in the *aldeia*, "*some people have put money together to dig a well and put a pipe so that the whole community can benefit, while those that have not contributed to its creation can still benefit from it by paying for the water they take"*.

Consequently, the analysis above on the type of associational and civic relations developed amongst the population in Liriu shows that, despite varied levels and types of social interaction, there is a high degree of social capital in the *aldeia*. The peaceful relations that have characterised Liriu, generally, since independence,

combined with the ability of local leaders to successfully engage residents in common projects, activities and discussions, has contributed to the development of good levels of trust amongst people as well as the development of strong networks that are subsequently replicated even outside of formal local governance arrangements. Through discussions with participants and local leaders, it did not emerge that there were any significant efforts to bridge with other *aldeias* on a regular basis; however, the fact that Motael hosted one of the largest IDPs camps Dili and Liriu became an *aldeia* of refuge during 2006, compounded with the fact that people in Liriu are much better connected – through education, employment and mobility – to the rest of Dili's urban space, resulted clearly in people's ability to relate more easily to issues taking place at a wider scale than their *aldeia*'s. As such, social capital in Liriu is bridged at a much wider scale, reaching in certain instances the national scales, and therefore resulting in a sense of belonging both to a local polity and the Timorese political community.

7.3. Urban social cohesion in Metin IV

7.3.1. Objective reading of Metin IV's urban fabric

a) Geographical location

Metin IV is situated in an isolated area of Dili' urban spread, bordered on one side by the Comoro river – which regularly floods during rainy season – and by the sea on the other side. It is part of the *suku* of Comoro, within the sub-district of Dom Aleixo – as shown in Map 13 below.

Map 13 – Geographical location of Metin IV (in blue) within Dili's urban area

(Map removed for copyright purposes)

Source: Google map

The *aldeia* of Metin IV is the most recent one of the three analysed for the purpose of this research; it only emerged during Indonesian times and was built on what at the time was mostly vacant land. It has, however, been the focus of too little development attention – if at all – and is therefore the most isolated area of the three: not only is it situated at a corner with a regularly flooding river and the sea, but the main road that connects it to Comoro road – hereafter referred to as 'main road' – is considered unsafe – for cars and pedestrians – and long. The *aldeia* itself is quite spread out, particularly concentrated along the road connecting the river bank to the main road – hereafter referred to as 'river road' – and more spread out and rural as one moves towards the sea – as Map 14 and Picture 9 below illustrate.

Map 14 – Aerial view of Metin IV

(Map removed for copyright purposes)

Source: Google map

Picture 9 – Towards the river and the sea roads and houses look more rural

Source: photograph taken by the author

b) Accessibility

Metin IV's geographical isolation is worsened by its absence of connections to urban transportation. In relation to *mikrolet* routes, the *aldeia* is located away from any immediate connection – as Map 15 below illustrates – with a minimum of a fifteen minutes walk to reach Comoro road where the closest stop is. The main road that Metin IV's residents need to walk on to reach Comoro road is very badly lit, in an area that is considered unsafe – particularly for women – which works as a deterrent in the evening. Moreover, even for cars and motorbikes it is a particularly bad road, riddled with deep potholes, at times unpaved and severely flooded during rainy season, thus contributing to many taxis refusing to take passengers to the *aldeia* – participants pointed out that generally, even during the dry season, taxis are reluctant to come to Metin IV because the area is known to be prone to violence. Consequently, Metin IV is not only geographically isolated from the rest of the urban area, but its lack of adequate infrastructure contributes to cut its population off further.

Map 15 – Location of Metin IV within the mikrolet route system



Source: Fritz, S. (2014)

As indicated earlier, Metin IV is interesting in that there is a particularly dense population living along the two (generally) paved roads of the area – the main road and the river road, seen in Picture 10 – reflecting a slightly more urban landscape, but as one moves closer to the river or the sea, the population becomes sparser and the landscape slowly becomes that of a rural area, connected to the rest of the *aldeia* by unpaved roads or tracks – as illustrated in Picture 11 below[83]. It is also interesting to note that on one side of the river road the houses have been built behind a long brick wall: discussions with participants revealed that that side of the road is prone to regular episodes of violence and the wall was erected there as a protection – part of this wall can be seen Picture 10 below, behind the girl walking down the street.

[83] In the middle is the road connecting the river to the main road, to its left is an unpaved road leading away from the first road and to the right is a track connecting houses in the more rural part of the area.

Picture 10 – On the urban side, two roads are paved, including river road

Source: photographs taken by the author

Picture 11 – Moving away from paved roads, Metin IV is connected by dirt roads

Source: photographs taken by the author

c) Socio-economic characteristics

When one looks at the statistics on education, the *suku* of Comoro appears to be fairing similarly to that of Motael, where Liriu is located: the share of school-age population that is at school is 43.6%, those who have left school represent 43%; similarities are also found in relation to the share of people who have graduated from secondary school, that is 32%, and from university, that is 16.5%. The only differences can be found in relation to the share of people who have never attended school – 12.6% in Comoro, incidentally also the second highest percentage in the sub-district of Dom Aleixo – and the share that have a diploma – that is 1.4%. The same resemblances between Motael and Comoro can also be found in relation to employment: the share of inactive population is 56.3% and those that are employed represent 35.7% – both quite close to Motael statistics.

Walking through both the urban and the rural parts of Metin IV, however, one can notice that the urban fabric of the *aldeia* is much more revealing of the low-income status of its citizens, than it did in Liriu. The houses are built as square blocks in grey bricks, some of them with a porch for people to sit and talk, but a vast majority without it – as seen in Picture 12 below. There are hardly any walls surrounding people's front gardens, although one notices, when walking around the *aldeia*, that front gardens are absent along the roads, but become increasingly more common as one moves into the more rural side.

Picture 12 – Low income houses in Metin IV are quite rudimentary

Source: photograph taken by the author

Similarly, as one moves away from the roads and into the more rural area of the *aldeia*, one notices the increasing presence of crops being grown in the gardens, a feature that is largely – though not completely – absent along the river road – as illustrated in Picture 13 below. Discussions with participants revealed that the crops being grown in these gardens serve both for household consumption and to sell either in the streets or in Dili vegetable markets as a form of livelihood.

Picture 13 – Vegetable garden in Metin IV

Source: photographs taken by the author

Metin IV's urban fabric therefore is particularly interesting because of the urban/rural duality it reflects. The presence of two paved roads, along which one can find high density living and the numerous *kios* selling essential groceries are reminiscent of the urban life described in Liriu; however, the presence of agriculture as a source of livelihood, the unpaved tracks and the high number of street vegetable and fruit vendors on the roads and tracks suggests a more rural fabric.

d) Development of the area

Much like in Liriu the population of the *aldeia* is characterised by diversity in the districts of origin, which may be partly explained by the two different waves of urbanisation of the area. Indeed, Metin IV, compared to the two previous areas, is a relatively new area that remained a vastly vacant stretch of land during Portuguese times, as the absence of Metin IV – in fact, Dom Aleixo sub-district in general – on the Portuguese urbanisation maps, used to locate Liriu in section 7.2.1, indicates.

Rather, the story of interviewee 56 indicates that the *aldeia* began emerging in the late 1970s, purposefully built by the Indonesians as a village where "*they forced population from the nearby mountains to relocate in order to maintain control*". The Indonesian government, he says, "*gave us a small patch of land where we could build a house and grow our own vegetables, so that we could be making a livelihood – and therefore not create problems – while also remaining under the surveillance of the Indonesian military personnel assigned to the area*".

Interviewee 53 pointed out that "*when the political tensions between Indonesians and Timorese resistance lowered in the mid-1980s, a number of people chose to move back to the mountains, selling their land to Indonesian military personnel".* As such, in the 1990s the population of the *aldeia* was a mix of Indonesians and Timorese, approximately 50-50 according to interviewee 56, but interviewee 60 added that "*the Indonesians had good control over the population and the relationships between Timorese and Indonesians in the area were generally peaceful*".

These movements of people from the mountains to the area therefore account for a first wave of urbanisation involving people from different districts. The second wave happened after **1999**, when the Indonesians withdrew from Timor Leste leaving behind the houses and land that had been sold to them; from then on, as indicated by interviewee 53, "*the population has been increasing significantly, which has created significant problems in relation to land and property because many of the newcomers have moved into houses that had been sold to Indonesian personnel and that are now sometimes being claimed by the previous Timorese owners."*

e) History of violence since independence

Whilst the withdrawal of Indonesians from the area was not accompanied, in Metin IV, by the violence that characterised the scorched earth policy across most of Dili, the *aldeia* has been a hotspot for much violence since 1999. Indeed, the arrival in the area of large numbers of people from different districts, who have moved to houses that were previously owned by other Timorese and had been left vacant by the Indonesians who had purchased them, has led to a number of issues related to land and property claims. Furthermore, during Indonesian military occupation a number of social control tools were used by the military in order to maintain control

over, and in the long run indoctrinate, the population; one of these tools included the practice of martial arts, a strategy aimed particularly a Timorese youth because it not only facilitated control – through their organisation into martial art groups (MAGs) with Indonesian masters – but it also promoted indirectly the Indonesian government through the establishment of patronage networks, as "membership in a MAG was a pragmatic step to gain access to scholarships, jobs, and, most importantly, protection from the military and militias" (Scambary, 2012; p.212).

Upon withdrawal of the Indonesians, these MAGs have continued to exist and, in fact, multiply, albeit without the same control over the type of philosophy that is being passed on, resulting in "*a large number of MAGs in Metin IV that are trained by martial art trainers that do not have the right education or license to do so*", interviewee 53 pointed out, adding that "*this is particularly problematic when the trainers have a negative mentality, prone to violence, and they teach martial arts as a weapon rather than as a philosophy, and often leading the way for very violent groups (and group clashes) to emerge*".

The combination of land and property right issues and the significant presence of MAGs in the area contributed to making Metin IV one of the hotspots for violence in the **2006 crisis**. Indeed, as the *lorosae/loromonu* rhetoric emerged and consolidated in the first months of the crisis, "occupation of the former Indonesian civil service housing [became] especially contentious, and east-west violence [became] particularly heated around the four main clusters of this housing in Dili" (Scambary, 2009; p.276). Metin IV, previously home to many Indonesian personnel, therefore became one of those *aldeias* where MAGs members began justifying violence against Easterners by claiming that they had no right to live in the houses and on the land they had moved into, becoming key players in the eviction process (ibid; p.277) and leading to much displacement in the area. As of 2008, there were still a significant number of displaced that had not returned to the *aldeia* – see Figure 17 below – and the *xefi aldeia* signalled a number of issues that were contributing to such delays, including land, private disputes, MAGs and general violence.

Figure 17 – Number of displaced and returnees for each *aldeia* in *suku* Comoro in 2008



Source: IOM (2008), p.15

By 2009, although there were still a number of displaced that had not returned to the area – see Figure 18 below – Metin IV was no longer considered an with major issues; according to interviewee 53 this was the positive result of a dialogue team organised by the MSS in 2008, which included the *xefi aldeia* himself who "*applied the skills learnt in my previous post, in Dom Aleixo, and combined them with my knowledge of the area*[84] *in order to promote dialogue in Metin IV and facilitate return*."

Figure 18 - Number of displaced and returnees for each *aldeia* in *suku* Comoro in 2009



Source: IOM (2009), p.3

[84] Metin IV's *xefi aldeia* has been living in the area since 1992 and was elected for the first time in 2004. He was reelected in 2009, proof of his positive influence in the area.

As such, Metin IV, became part of the National Recovery Strategy (NRS), carried out by the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS)[85], and benefitted from projects aimed at building youth resilience and improving their coping mechanisms in order to be able to deal with the violence in their area and move forward to build peaceful relations. Discussions with the participants have revealed that these projects, however, were only partially successful because they did not address the root causes of the violence, that is, land issues and MAGs, consequently, the role of the local leaders, as the forthcoming sections will indicate, has remained particularly important in containing violence and promoting social order in the *aldeia*.

7.3.2. Common values and civic culture

The issues highlighted above concerning gang related violence have emerged regularly in discussions with the participants as a starting point for keeping checks and balances on the state system and judging its functioning. The majority of the participants have indicated that there is a significant problem in the area with youth unemployment, which often leads, as indicated by interviewee 70, "*to young people who are unemployed and have lost hope to join the MAGs in order to feel like they belong and find ways to express their anger*". Similarly, the majority of interviewees, and in particular women, thought like interviewee 71, that "*the government doesn't pay enough attention to what is going on with our youth at the local level, instead it should try to understand what skills are needed for the country by gathering more accurate data on employment statistics*". Finally, many participants indicated, like interviewee 70, that "*there should be a youth centre and/or a training centre, but there is currently no programme to do that*".

For Metin IV's inhabitants this is not just a matter of poor national level decision making processes, but it relates more specifically to the failure of the state in connecting with the local level, understanding their issues and addressing them or providing them with the means to address them themselves. For participants in Metin IV there is a real problem, as indicated by interviewee 53, with the fact that "*the government never comes to see the communities and see what the problems*

[85] The NRS was implemented in the aftermath of the crisis of 2006 and focused on five pillars: housing, protection, security, socio-economic and trust-building (RDTL, 2012; p.9)

are"; interviewee's 69's lamenting that "*the last government made many promises but nothing happened*" was also echoed by the vast majority of participants. This is made even worse by the contrast between President Jose Ramos Horta succeeding in having river road fixed "*within two weeks of his visit in 2008 after he noticed himself that it was in really bad conditions*", interviewee 53 said, whilst "*people who try to go to government offices to ask for help get repeatedly ignored because government people think that we are 'small people'*[86] *in communities and we don't know any better*" – as pointed out by interviewee 69. Similarly, interviewee 53 noted that although the community tries to "*work together and write proposals to get funds to improve living conditions*", they are never successful. These issues were not only evident in relation to youth and gang related violence, but participants repeatedly brought them up also in relation to the *aldeia*'s lack of adequate infrastructure.

These comments reveal, therefore, that people are not limiting their judgement to the levels of social, economic and infrastructure development that takes place in their area; they are also aware that the state system is set up in a way that does not provide them with the room to voice their concern – or does not listen to their voice. This contributes to the development of a feeling of abandonment combined with resentment. Discussions with participants revealed that, in addition to judging their state on the basis of what is going on in their own *aldeia*, people also have a sense of what is going on at national level and realise that, compared to the levels of development in other part of Dili's urban space, they are being particularly left out. For instance, interviewee 70 indicated that whilst "*the last government [AMP] worked really hard and we started seeing changes in relation to health, education and peace through dialogues, there are still no infrastructure changes, all we see is new Ministry buildings and we know they are the priority because they are visible*". A large number of participants emphasised, like interviewee 64, that priorities at this stage should be "*improving access to higher education, investing in skills training so that young people have also better access to employment opportunities, and improving the implementation of the law, because many of the problems we are having are the result of good but badly implemented laws*."

As a result, discussions with participants have indicated that in Metin IV the role of local leaders is key in filling the gap between the needs of the *aldeia* and the

[86] In opposition to the concept of *ema boot*, small people are not part of the political elite, do not have a particular important status.

shortcomings in state delivery. However, unlike in Liriu, the gap that is being filled does not contribute to shaping a positive image of the administrative control of the state; rather, while the state appears to remain detached from the issues concerning Metin IV's residents, the local leaders have stepped up significantly to implement, with the community, initiatives and programmes to improve the living conditions in the area. The important role of the leaders in ensuring that the community works together was particularly evident in attendance to community meetings and the pattern that emerged along the lines of the urban/rural duality of the *aldeia*: whereas people closer to the *sede* indicated that they participate in all the meetings, a number of people in the more rural areas pointed out that they are not always aware of the meetings being organised and they do not always have the time to find out – unless they walk by and see that something is happening. These patterns reveal that people on their own do not necessarily actively seek to take part in *aldeia* life; rather, interviewee 80 noted that "the role of the local leaders remains crucial in ensuring everyone's participation, thus putting significant pressure on a role that however cannot be performed full-time do to financial restrictions"[87].

Similarly, the role of local leaders in attempting to provide solutions for youth violence and unemployment has been widely recognised by the majority of the participants. Many of them have pointed out, as mentioned previously, that there should be much more involvement by the state to provide young people in the area with activities, skills training and employment opportunities, but since the state is not forthcoming on this front, the local leaders are being proactive in writing proposals to access funds in order to implement them at local level. For instance, interviewee 55 indicated that local leaders "*have made many proposals to the government to bring skills training (to SEFOPE[88], to the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Education), they have even gone to the Prime Minister's office to try and get the fund, but so far they have often been unsuccessful*".

Consequently, whilst the local leaders are stepping up to fill the gap left by a national state system that does not provide room for community voices to be heard, the attitude of higher levels of state structures toward the disbursement of funds is contributing to reinforcing an image of the state that remains strongly

[87] *Xefi aldeia* are not remunerated for their work therefore many of them have a full-time job

[88] Secretariat of State of Professional Training and Employment

disconnected from the needs of the population, and fails to promote the idea of a Timorese political community with common aims and objectives that include everyone at all scales. In contrast to this attitude, local leaders are succeeding in creating an image of a cohesive local polity with common goals and objectives at *aldeia* level; their attitude toward the evictions that Metin IV's residents are facing as a result of state plans to expand the airport – which is located on the other side of the river – illustrates very well this finding. According to interviewee 63, in order to find a solution to the issue the government sent "*a team of consultants to talk to people in order to understand their position on the matter and what kind of solutions could be found (e.g. compensation, relocation, etc) but when they came it sent our area into chaos: everyone wanted something different, people were starting to argue*". By contrast, local leaders "*called a general meeting and tried to mediate, showing everyone that we would be stronger if we stood together as a community rather than everyone on their own. It worked, the situation calmed down."*

7.3.3. Social order and social control

As mentioned in sub-section 7.3.1, the nature of social order in Metin IV has been characterised by recurrent episodes of violence since independence in 1999 and, despite a reduction noted by the participants since the end of 2012, the *aldeia* continues to be considered by its residents, and Dili's population at large, as an area particularly prone to violence, a reputation that is "*hard to turn around"* as noted by interviewee 57. Discussions with participants revealed that, whilst the efforts made in the context of project implementation during the NRS were successful in restoring more peaceful relations in the area and allowing for the return of a number of IDPs, these projects failed to address the root causes of the violence in the area and therefore failed to eradicate it.

Indeed, for them the issues are not merely related to violence emerging out of the politicisation of the *lorosae* and *loromonu* rhetoric, consequently potentially resolved through community dialogue; rather, the fact that so much violence took place in 2006 was for Metin IV's population the symptom of the combination of both endemic and structural problems dating back to 1999: endemic, because the long standing presence of MAGs in the area has been a key factor in contributing to evictions and the propagation of violence, and structural because the lack of education and employment opportunities for young people in the area made it

easier to influence disenfranchised youth – and still does. This is particularly problematic in view of the lack of education not only for youth, but of the parents as well; number of interviewees noted, as interviewee 61 did, that "*many families either don't have the money to send their children to school (even if school is free, there is still a need to buy uniforms, books and supplies) or simply they are not educated enough to teach their children respect and understand the importance of sending their children to school*". As such, faced with significant lack of education and employment opportunities, combined with difficult family socio-economic situations, "*many young people that don't have jobs and don't have access to education (because sometimes their parents cannot afford it) feel like they have no future, so they get drunk together and throw stones or create problems with people who are better off than them. There is a lot of social jealousy at the root of this violence now*" – interviewee 56.

Discussions with participants, therefore, revealed that not only are there significant issues with social order in their *aldeia*, but that state response to these issues has so far been inadequate. Failure of state institutions to consult the population and attempting to understand the root causes of violence, as opposed to limiting its interventions to repression, is yet another proof for Metin IV's residents that state institutions are completely detached from the reality of people in communities.

Instead, as noted in the previous sub-section, local leaders have stepped in to take up the responsibility to maintain social control in the area through both conflict resolution mechanisms and mediation; as a result, "*problems in the area have slowly decreased*", as indicated by interviewee 67. Indeed, participants pointed out that, whilst it is not possible for local leaders alone to bring about the changes necessary for the improvement in employment and education the *aldeia* needs, they try instead to contribute to conflict resolution and mediation by taking the time, as often as necessary, "*to sit together with the perpetrators and talk to them to understand why they did what they did, and to explain to them that they should be more responsible because this is also their community and they should not harm it"* – interviewee 58. Furthermore, the strong connection of the local leaders with their *aldeia* significantly contributes to giving the leaders legitimacy in these processes. For example, interviewee 54 indicated that whilst he no longer is a youth leader, "*everyone in the area still trusts me very much, they know me well, so that when there is a problem they come to talk to me, they ask me to mediate*".

The importance of local leaders in filling the gap left by the state was equally noted in relation to the other significant issue concerning Metin IV, that is, land rights. Although only two participants mentioned having had trouble with land rights, one of them – interviewee 57 – noted that he has taken the case to court "*but the process to come to a decision is long and tensions between me and the other claimant were mounting, so we eventually sought the help of the xefi aldeia to bring us together and discuss the issue peacefully*". The other case, mentioned by interviewee 60, took so long to sort out that eventually he "*gave up and found another piece of land where to built the house."*

The importance of the local leaders in the process of conflict resolution and mediation, therefore, came across very clearly through most of the discussions with the participants. But discussions also pointed out that this was not only a result of the gap left by state institutions; rather, it was also a way to avoid dealing with security and judiciary systems that people in Metin IV appeared to distrust significantly. Interviewee 53 explained: "*, if there is a big problem with violence, we call the police but their interventions are not satisfactory: either they arrive too late and we have already solved the problem or the damage has already been done; either they arrive on time, they arrest the people they believe responsible for the trouble, they detain them for 72h, make a report and then send it to the court that might (or might not) call to go to trial. This system is not effective because people don't understand it. What they see is that the response rate is low and when it does happen a cumbersome, protracted process is set in motion, which no one explains to them; there is no reconciliation, no apologies from the perpetrator to the victim(s), no conflict resolution*".

Contrary to the situation in Liriu, where relations with the policy force appeared positive most likely as a result of the lack of history of violence in the area since 1999, in Metin IV discussions with participants made it clear that the high levels of disruption in the *aldeia*'s social order has resulted in a relationship with the police force that has practically constantly been characterised by repression and, what was felt like, unfairness. This was clearly reflected in interviewee 74's comment that "*while there is a little less violence in the area now it is because the police comes and represses the violence, scares young people into not engaging in violent activities*". Furthermore, this is particularly evident in the fact that, in order to convey an image of order and provide a presence in the area, a police post –

shown in Picture 14 – was erected in the heart of the *aldeia* where most of the confrontations between gangs take place; participants indicated, however, that actions taken by the police – during some time both national and international – were inadequate and, at times, repressive, contributing more to the representation of a state that represses rather than provides support. The fact that the post was left vacant when international forces withdrew in 2012 and PNTL became a force of its own again with a clearer mission, only contributes to shaping, in the minds of the *aldeia*'s population, the image of a state that does not provide the necessary and adequate support.

Picture 14 – Metin IV's police post conveys an image of repression, not authority

Source: photograph taken by the author

7.3.4. Social solidarity and reduction in wealth disparities

As described in sub-section 7.3.1, and as confirmed by the issue of social jealousy raised in the previous sub-section, wealth disparities in Metin IV are important.

Firstly, discussions with residents of the *aldeia* revealed that the isolated situation of Metin IV – both as a consequence of its geographic position and the lack of infrastructure development – contributes to significantly unequal common standards. Indeed, the lack of adequate connections with public transportation has been repeatedly pointed out as a major obstacle to their daily lives, for it not only prevents them from having ready access to the main shopping areas – food markets but also shops selling furniture, clothes, etc – and to economic opportunities – the difficulties presented by the inability to easily get out of the area imply that opportunities for finding employment are also hard to come by – but it is also a problem for accessing other services. For example, a number of participants indicated that access to electricity is a key challenge in the area because, as indicated by interviewee 71 "*while we do have electricity in this area, there are people that cannot afford it or simply do not have the means to go and get the pulsa*[89] *they need from the EDTL (Electricidade De Timor Leste) situated at the centre of town far from Metin IV, so they take it illegally from other people*". As a result, discussions revealed that unless they were employed outside of Metin IV or went to university, participants seldom left the *aldeia*; some female participants even indicated that they only left to do their monthly staples shopping at the markets or on Comoro road, whilst others said they only left the area once a week or once every two weeks.

Similarly, the *aldeia*'s isolation and violent history also considerably hamper social and economic development in the area because they prevent a large share of the population from having equal access to opportunities. Whilst there is a school in Metin IV it is however located at the junction between the river road and the main road, a location that is also unfortunately known to be a trouble spot where a lot of the violence takes place. As a result, the school in Metin IV is often closed, contributing to increasing the gap in the children's education. Furthermore, since teachers are left the choice by the Ministry as to where they wish to teach, not many teachers choose to go to Metin IV, whilst the few teachers that continue to

[89] The system is set up so that people have keys on which they regularly have to put credit – known as *pulsa* – but this can only be done at building at the EDTL building

teach in Metin IV are "*regularly sent to get further training on the constantly changing curriculum, leaving the children out of school very often*", as indicated by interviewee 67. As a result, interviewee 67 continued, "*people who have money here can send their children to better schools outside the area, often private schools, but those of us that cannot afford it have to keep sending our children to this school, where they are not getting all the hours they should and we are very worried about their level of education because if it is not good enough, they cannot go to university."*

The statistics of the MoF, however, do not reflect these significant disparities in access to opportunities, as demonstrated in section 7.3.1, indicating, therefore, that the information on which the state has so far been basing part of its national policies – statistics that have also only been produced twice so far, in 2004 and 2010 and are not comparable – is not only insufficiently disaggregated, as statistics at *aldeia* level might better reflect the differences in *sukus*, but they also leave out significant challenges faced by the population residing in *aldeias* like Metin IV. One of the main challenges, as indicated by interviewee 63, is the fact that "*the teaching of Portuguese is not yet well implemented but it remains a pre-requisite for many jobs, and since the level of education our youth is receiving doesn't allow them to develop good Portuguese skills, many of them face significant challenges in finding employment*". This is worsened by a significant lack of access to skills training programmes and the lack of motivation by the youth to attend them. As noted by interviewee 62, "*there are occasionally training opportunities organised in the area by NGOs and some private organisations (nothing by the government) but there are many young people who could benefit from them and don't bother to go*".

State institutions' approach to funding contrasts significantly, in the mind of Metin IV's population, with state's delivery of social solidarity. For a large number of participants, the big money approach displayed by the AMP government only managed to achieve one purpose, that is, showing people there is money to be spent; the fact, however, that such money is not spent on providing local leaders – arguably much better positioned to understand the needs of their *aldeias* – with the funds to support their youth and enable them to enable themselves, but rather is being disbursed through projects with debatable impacts or through social solidarity funds with opaque eligibility criteria, only contributes to the creation of an entitled population. As noted by interviewee 58, "*the government has been trying*

to help people out but it also really depends on how much people want to change. For example some of my friends don't care about their future or the situation in the country, all they want to do is sit and chat". Interviewee 60 similarly felt that people "*should try harder to find a job, because it makes them more responsible, and not wait around for the government to hand out jobs*".

Consequently, in view of the stark wealth disparities in the *aldeia*, accentuated by strong unequal access to opportunities, and the inability of state institutions to disburse the evidently available funds in a fashion that could give the chance to local leaders to enable social and economic development in Metin IV so as to improve common standards, results in an image of the state, in people's minds, that continues to remain detached from their reality whilst ostentatiously displaying elsewhere the availability of funds that could otherwise improve their situation.

7.3.5. Social networks and social capital

During fieldwork visits in Metin IV, it became apparent that there were different degrees of social interaction in the *aldeia*, not only between weekdays and weekends, but also between different sections of the area. During weekends, high social interaction between neighbours, children playing in the streets and men washing their cars mostly characterise the urban part of Metin IV as well as some of the more rural areas; the more rural parts of the area appear to have less interaction between neighbours, which could possibly be a result of the increased distances between groups of houses. During weekdays, on the other hand, much like in Liriu, one notices essentially women in the streets, either going about their daily routines or also at times playing bingo by the *sede aldeia* – that is the local government building where meetings are held and where the *xefi* carries out many conflict resolution or mediation activities; streets are generally quieter everywhere in the *aldeia*.

Much like high attendance to community meetings highlighted in section 7.3.2 did, investigation of the nature of conversations amongst people in Metin IV revealed that there is a high degree of civic engagement in the *aldeia*; it is interesting, however, to note that the scale of this civic engagement varies according to gender. The vast majority of male participants indicated that they liked to discuss politics with their friends and neighbours. Interviewee 58 indicated that he likes to sit with his friends and "*talk about issues related both to the development of our area and our suku and to decisions made at government level"*. Similarly,

interviewee 62 said that for him talking with his family and neighbours, about the decisions made by the government, is crucial because "*citizens need to be involved and obey to government decisions; it is the highest component of our society and that's where development happens"*.

Women, on the other hand, at the exception of one participant, tended to talk about more local issues like interviewee 67, "*such as the education of their children or problems with accessing services such as electricity"*. Some of them indicated that they do participate actively in community meetings and in problem solving in the area because they feel the local leaders listen, whereas others simply stated, like interviewee 70, that talking to leaders "*doesn't make a difference*". These differences between as well as amongst men and women, reveal that civic engagement in the area is quite developed, but the scale at which one engages very much depends on one's connection with other areas of the urban space and of the country; as such, men working or women interacting with other people generally engage much more about national scale issues than women living essentially within Metin IV and therefore engaging at a more local scale.

Willingness to engage in debate about either national or local issues also appeared to be contingent upon one's location within Metin IV. Interviewee 71, for example, noted: "*I do not share my opinion on politics or the situation in the aldeia, because they could disagree with me and think it I am being offensive toward their own point of view"*. Similarly, interviewee 66 stated that she doesn't talk to her neighbour or family about areas issues or government decisions "*because what we might end up discussing might become an issue with them or other neighbours*". Interestingly, these participants were all located close to one another and living in proximity to one of the areas where confrontations between gangs often take place. A similar, though less openly articulated, reluctance to open up to neighbours and *malae* – like the author and her interpreter – was also noticed on one stretch of the river road where stone throwing and violent confrontations are known to take place. Interviews at national level with national and international NGO staff provided an useful insight as to why such reluctance to voice dissent and concerns may take place in certain Timorese contexts: according to them, this type of behaviour is very often a consequence of centuries of colonial and military rule where dissent was not tolerated; furthermore, this could also be a result of the failure of the multiparty system so far in presenting a united front, for it is widely

known that many of the MAGs are affiliated to security forces and political parties (Scambary, 2012; p.213), which can be a significant deterrent for people to voice their opinions.

In light of the many issues faced by the *aldeia*'s residents, combined with state institutions' inability to provide support in resolving those issues, the role of the local leaders in fostering cohesion at the local scale was even more pronounced in Metin IV than it was in Liriu; because they have lived there for a long time and they know the issues and the people very well, Metin IV's *xefi aldeia* as well as the other local leaders – including the traditional elder, *lia nain,* and the youth leader – are well respected in the area and people trust them to fulfil not only an informative role but also an active role. Indeed, interviewee 63 noted that "*the government needs to implement the decision on decentralisation so that our leaders can work at improving our daily lives*".

This role was evident in local leaders' efforts to involve the whole *aldeia*'s population in organising, and participating to, associational activities that aim not only at bringing people together and creating networks of trust, but also at fostering responsibility for one another amongst the residents. As such, these activities ranged from engaging youth in sport events to involving the population in volunteering activities that can benefit the whole *aldeia*, such as women's involvement in raising awareness about health issues through the SISCa programme (Integrated Community Health Service) implemented by the Ministry of Health.

Finally, in contrast with a largely disconnected state, participants regularly highlighted the role on local leaders in encouraging the participation of the Metin IV's residents in the resolution of collective problems, as the construction of the *sede* demonstrates: whilst the *lia nain* offered the land on which it is built to the community, the *xefi aldeia* and other leaders gathered money from the community in order to be able to get the equipment necessary to build it; furthermore, young people from the area were involved in the collection of sand from the river to make the cement used to build it, whilst the rest of the material was bought with the rest of the collective money. Consequently, the *sede* – shown in Picture 15 below – represents not only the local government but, perhaps more importantly, it is a symbol of the ability of the *aldeia*'s population to work together and be responsible for a common good as a local polity.

Picture 15 – *Sede aldeia* in Metin IV

Source: photograph taken by the author

The investigation into Metin IV's social interaction, civic engagement and associational activities detailed above reveals an important outcome of the disjunction between national and local scale combined with geographical isolation. Indeed, it appears that for a large share of the *aldeia*'s population, the inability to access other parts of Dili's urban space significantly reduces their spaces of interaction; rather, a lot of their daily activities and, consequently, debates and interests are focused around issues that touch upon the local scale, rather than the urban or national one. The population is widely aware of the invisibility of state institutions in their space, and the authority gained by the local leaders who have stepped up in order to fill such gap shone through many of the discussions with participants. Indeed, the local leaders are not only succeeding in engaging a vast majority of Metin IV's population, thus building a local polity, but they have also shown considerable leadership and rallying skills in the construction of a government building; interestingly, however, far from contributing to restoring a frail link between local and national state institutions, the construction of the *sede* has contributed to further reinforcing, in the mind of the *aldeia*'s residents, the idea that

if they need something they need to get it done themselves. In this sense, the representation of the political community that is being constructed within Metin IV is one that is far removed and in stark contrast with the networks of trust and information that are developing within the *aldeia*; as such, the social capital emerging in Metin IV appears to be strictly bonded.

7.4. Conclusion – Spaces and scales of social identity construction in Dili

7.4.1. Substantive and formal citizenship in Liriu and Metin IV

Research question number three aimed at understanding how the urban fabric emerging from successive state building processes contributed to shaping the spaces and scales of interaction within which people regularly construct, deconstruct and redefine their social identity. To answer this question, social cohesion was introduced in the analytical framework as a tool that could articulate the connection between the impact of state building processes on the core functions of the state, the urban spaces they contributed to shaping and the spaces and scales of interaction that emerged as a result. The outcome of these interactions is analysed hereafter using the notions of substantive and formal citizenship: substantive citizenship facilitates the establishment of a connection between the impact of the core functions of the state on access to opportunities and the resulting spaces of social justice/injustice; formal citizenship links these spaces of social justice/injustice with people's ability to cope with them in order to exercise their rights – social cohesion and social capital – as such defining their scales of interaction. See APPENDIX X for detailed links between state building, core functions of the state and social cohesion, leading to the following analysis.

a) Urban fabric

The research carried out within the *aldeias* of Liriu and Metin IV revealed that post-1999 state building had a significant impact on the urban fabric of these *aldeias*, an urban fabric that had already been significantly shaped by the two previous external state building attempts carried out by Portugal and Indonesia. Arguably, the decisions made in relation to management of public finance have had the most tangible impacts on the *aldeias*' urban fabric; the historical developments of each one – not only in terms of geographical position and infrastructure, but in terms of history of violence – have significantly contributed to determine whether they would

attract investment in infrastructure and services, especially following the establishment of AMP's (neo)liberal *laissez-faire* market approach to investment.

Indeed, Liriu's central position within Dili's urban space, its national and international visibility and its historical link with authority – which has resulted in many embassies being located in the *aldeia* and the *suku* in general – have made the *aldeia* particularly attractive for investment; as such, it has benefitted more than many other *aldeias* in Dili, of improvements in infrastructure and services. Conversely, Metin IV's isolated geographical situation, its precarious position in relation to plans for airport extension and its violent reputation have thus far severely limited the amount of investments in the *aldeia*; much of the infrastructure needs significant upgrading and services are either non-existent or prove so difficult to secure that they lead to alternative, at times community-led, solutions.

The decision-making processes followed by UNTAET in relation to the drafting of Timor Leste's constitution, combined with the (neo)liberal, highly externally oriented nature of investments carried out by the AMP government, have only contributed to further entrenching these differences. Firstly, the decision to adopt Portuguese as one of the national languages – whilst Tetun is being developed – without however having successfully developed a coherent approach to its introduction in the education system, has resulted in a shortage of skilled teachers capable of compensating for a still weak education curriculum. Combined with the fact that teachers within the education system are free to choose which schools they wish to teach in, this has meant that the most skilled teachers generally choose schools with the best infrastructure. Consequently, whilst Liriu boasts one of the schools with the best reputation in Dili, therefore attracting better quality teaching and teaching conditions, the population of Metin IV continues to send their children to a school with bad infrastructure, lower quality teaching and which closes regularly due to episodes of violence in the area.

Additionally, investment in skills training has remained significantly wanting in Timor Leste. Whilst the first government considerably lacked the resources to adequately assess the skills needed in order to transition from a primarily oriented agricultural society into a more industrial and/or service oriented labour market, the second government's focus on infrastructure investment in order to attract FDIs, rather than skills training, has only contributed to further increasing the share of the labour force lacking the adequate skills to participate in the country's economy and

growth. As a result, whilst Liriu's urban fabric – central, connected and close to economic opportunities – continues nonetheless to provide its population with other accessible economic opportunities, in Metin IV population's lack of mobility, combined with their lack of skills and/or adequate education, contributes to crystallising these contrasts between their urban fabric and other areas of Dili.

Finally, the issues associated with the state's monopoly over the means of violence, considered in the widely diverging historical contexts of Liriu and Metin IV, has led to noticeably different approaches to violence by state security forces. Metin IV's violent reputation since 1999, which was only further established during the 2006 crisis, has resulted in the presence of police or military forces being generally associated to repression, unfairness and additional violence. Conversely, Liriu's generally peaceful reputation – even during the crisis of 2006 – has resulted into much less interaction with security forces and authority; the good relationship established between the local leaders and the PNTL also contributes to fostering a more positive image of state authority.

b) Substantive citizenship

The consequences of these impacts on Liriu's and Metin IV's populations' ability to access opportunities has considerably contributed to redefining their spaces of interaction. In Metin IV, fieldwork findings have revealed that a vast majority of the population seldom ventures outside of the confines of their *aldeia*; in discussions with participants it transpired that the reasons for such reduction in the spaces of interaction were primarily a result of a combination of all the above-mentioned factors. Indeed, the lack of adequate and readily accessible transportation means that, unless people need to leave, they will generally remain in their *aldeia*, for to move people need to be able to afford the cost of travel or have their own means of transportation; however, either of these options involves having a job that provides enough money, and to achieve that, it requires skills that are difficult to achieve considering the low level and quality of education identified in Metin IV. Even more constricting for the *aldeia*'s population is that this lack of opportunities creates a vicious circle: lack of education and skills prevents them from accessing well-paid employment, which prevents them from affording transportation, which prevents them from moving and therefore prevents them from seeking other opportunities or better education. Substantive citizenship in Metin IV is therefore characterised by a restricted space of social injustice.

By contrast, in Liriu, the urban fabric itself allows access to most opportunities. Indeed, the presence of a good school in the *aldeia* provides better quality education for the children, thus allowing them better access to higher education or skills training later on. Furthermore, although there is still a large share of the population that may not have the necessary skills and/or education to access a job that pays well, the *aldeia*'s central position allows them to access travel easily nonetheless, as well as a facility to access other economic opportunities in nearby *aldeias* or open their own businesses in an urban space that sees much movement and therefore provides better opportunities. Consequently, whether through education, skills training, employment or economic opportunities, Liriu's population creates wider spaces of interaction that reach beyond the limits of their *aldeia*. Substantive citizenship in Liriu is characterised by more social justice than Metin IV.

c) Formal citizenship

The analysis of social cohesion carried out within these settings revealed important consequences for people's scales of interaction, especially when correlated to the impact of the state building process on the fourth core function of the state explored in the context of this research, that is, administrative control. Indeed, the top-down system of governance that has emerged from the state building process tends, in theory, to create very little room for people's voices to be heard – other than through elections; if *aldeias* have significant issues they need to voice, the onus is therefore on local leaders to demonstrate that they are capable of stepping in. The ability of the local leaders to become channels for voicing the concerns of their community, however, varies significantly from one *aldeia* to the next, not only as an obvious result of their leadership skills, but also because the urban fabric of the *aldeia* itself can considerably affect the local leaders' influence at higher administrative levels.

Thus in Liriu, as previously established, the urban fabric has always been conducive, including after independence, to receiving investments for infrastructure upgrading or other initiatives that could improve its image. Within this setting, the analysis of social cohesion in the *aldeia* has revealed that the local leaders put considerable efforts into the development of proposals for initiatives targeting priorities they have identified with their community; as such, local leaders are succeeding in creating a social capital in Liriu that is both bonded – as the

community works together to establish priorities – and bridged – as they work with authorities to secure funding. Whilst not all proposals are necessarily successful in accessing the funds required, the fact that local leaders work with national authorities, in an attempt to secure access to more opportunities, establishes a connection between the local polity and the Timorese political community. Moreover, the analysis of substantive citizenship presented above highlighted the fact that the vast majority of the population in Liriu could exercise – albeit admittedly to varying degrees – their rights: access to quality education and common housing standards guarantees their social rights and cultural rights – learning Portuguese; access to quality education, as well as geographical location, allows most people to access good employment, in safe conditions, thus guaranteeing their economic rights; and, the presence of local leaders that are generally successful in voicing their community's concerns, together with a good education that provides language and critical thinking skills and a good relationship with authority, allows Liriu's population to exercise their political rights. Formal citizenship in Liriu therefore enables the establishment of a scale of interaction that also reaches to the national level.

In Metin IV, a very different scenario emerges from the urban fabric of the *aldeia* and its impact on substantive citizenship. Lack of access to quality education and employment opportunities, combined with the isolation of the area, are preventing most of the population from exercising their social and economic rights – many continue to work in informal, low-paying and unsafe jobs. Similarly, lack of access to quality education also prevents them from exercising their cultural rights since they are unable to properly "learn about forms of expression and dissemination through any technical medium of information or communication, to follow a way of life associated with the use of […] language" (UN, 2009; p.4). In relation to their political rights, participants in Metin IV highlighted the fact that the violent history of the *aldeia* has contributed to shaping the image of a repressive system where people do not feel they have a right to procedural fairness, whilst the continued violence in some areas of Metin IV prevents people from freely discussing, with their neighbours and community, about local or national issues. In light of these issues, analysis of social cohesion in Metin IV revealed that the role of the local leaders is key in defining their scales of interaction. Indeed, although they have repeatedly attempted to write proposals in order to improve the economic, social and infrastructure characteristics of their *aldeia*, the local leaders have thus far

been essentially unsuccessful in securing the necessary funds from the state; this is most likely a result of the *aldeia*'s reputation and its precarious position in view of the potential airport extension. As such, local leaders have resorted to filling the gap left by institutions – including in relation to conflict mediation and resolution – bringing the population together in a coherent polity, thus creating a significantly bonded social capital but failing to bridge it at urban or national level. Combined with the inability of the population to exercise their rights, the scales of interaction shaped by Metin IV's formal citizenship are therefore essentially local, excluded from the Timorese political community.

7.4.2. Place attachment and identity: "A large share of the population remains unaware of the elite's dream for the country"[90]

On the basis of the analysis of substantive and formal citizenship presented above, this section aims to look at how these different spaces and scales of citizenship affected the construction of social identity at the scale of Dili. The introduction to section 3.3 indicates that social cohesion is used in this research's analytical framework as a tool to understand how state building policies have impacted the social construction of local polity and, consequently, the construction of a political community understood as being constituted of nested socially constructed polities that start at the local and, if the right conditions are in place, gradually come to be encompassed in the wider political community. As such, the elements that characterise a local polity in the context of this research are used here to understand whether the spaces and scales of interaction, emerging from the analysis of the urban fabric and citizenship in the two *aldeias*, provide a basis for the development of a Timorese political community or not. These elements are: psychological, cultural, historical, territorial and political.

a) Liriu

The analysis of citizenship and the urban fabric in Liriu revealed that local leaders' role in the *aldeia* has considerably contributed to creating significant awareness of the functioning of the state system; an awareness that, the fieldwork indicated, is subsequently carried into more individual interests – such as applying for funds for economic activities, dealing with state authorities in relation to land claims – contributing to increasing the level of understanding of, and interaction with, the

[90] Interview with Roque Rodrigues (26/10/12), Special advisor to the President of the Republic of Timor Leste

state system. Furthermore, the peaceful relations that have characterised the *aldeia* since independence have also contributed, if not to creating a closer relationship with authorities, at least to building an image of state authority that is not tainted by negative feelings. As such, whilst it was clear from discussions with participants that there was still significant room for improving their participation to the country's **political** life, their opinions of the state indicated that the local leaders have succeeded in making the population feel part of the political community.

Historically, Liriu is closely linked to the Portuguese history of the country. Home to the administrative colonial staff, its architecture is reminiscent of that period and a number of its inhabitants have worked, or have parents that have worked, as civil servants for the Portuguese colonial administration. Its history during Indonesian times is uncertain, but the fact that post-1999 it has become an *aldeia* that attracts number of international staff – and therefore development – continues to closely intertwine its history with national administration and power. As such, throughout the history it appears that Liriu has maintained a strong link with the various forms of authority in the coutrny, a link that continues today with a connection between local polity and the Timorese political community, as the previous section has highlighted.

The analysis of substantive and formal citizenship in Liriu also revealed that access to education is not only a reality for the vast majority of the *aldeia*'s population, but also that the urban fabric of the *aldeia* lends it sufficient importance to warrant good educational infrastructure and, consequently, attract more quality teaching. Thus, whilst the curriculum remains the same in Liriu as anywhere else in the country, the better quality of education in Liriu's school – as indicated in section 7.2.1 – gives its population better access to the **cultural** life of the country; the fact that Liriu is located in one of the sub-districts with the highest school and university attendance, as well as the highest literacy rates in Portuguese and Bahasa, means that its population has easier access to elements of culture such as language, literature and methods of production. Additionally, the strong involvement of local leaders in developing sports facilities also facilitates the population's access to sport and games.

Finally, as a result of the facilitated access to transportation, economic activity and opportunities, one important feature of Liriu's residents is their mobility across Dili's

urban space. Through work, education or simply for necessity – such as grocery shopping – participants have the opportunity to interact outside their own *aldeia*, therefore meeting more people as well as gathering a better sense of social and economic development elsewhere; consequently, the construction of their social reality goes beyond the spaces defined by their *aldeia*'s boundaries, extending to Dili's urban **territory**.

Therefore, whilst the majority of the population in Liriu has arrived after 1999 – a fact that could have contributed to the fragmentation of social identity in the *aldeia* – the positive impact of the local leaders on the development of social capital, combined with multiple opportunities to confront other social realities than their own, has resulted in both the development of a local polity and the inclusion of this polity in the wider Timorese political community. That is, although people are aware of the different shortcomings of the state – reflected in the discussions with participants – they understand its functioning and feel **psychologically** part of a wider, state project to which they can contribute.

b) Metin IV

The analysis of citizenship and urban fabric in Metin IV has highlighted the important role of the local leaders in filling the gap left by the state in terms of security, infrastructure and opportunities. Interestingly, however, the strong presence of the local leaders on all fronts of social cohesion, combined with their ability to mediate and transcend differences to bring people together for collective problem resolution, does not contribute to restoring the link between the local polity and the Timorese political community; rather, the former has developed in stark contrast with the latter as a result of the invisibility of the state, creating an interaction of the *aldeia* population with a form of authority that is not part of the representation of the state but exists in its stead. Moreover, the history of violence and police repression that characterises Metin IV, contributes to creating the image of a state that fails to understand the situation and is unfair in its proceedings instead. As such, the scale of interaction with the polity is bonded to the local, detached from a national scale that bears no internal point of reference common to the *aldeia*'s population, who feel cut out of the **political** sphere of their country.

Historically, Metin IV is in significant contrast with Liriu on all points. Firstly, the *aldeia* was created, during Indonesian military rule, by the Indonesians for the

purpose of controlling the population; therefore, whilst no participant made specific reference to any climate of fear or violence characterising the *aldeia* back then, it is clear that Metin IV is related to a historical chapter of the country that the political elite wished to archive and move on from with the selection of Portuguese as a national language and by strengthening ties with lusophone countries. Secondly, the persistent presence of MAGs, created during Indonesian rule, and their crucial role in the violence that pervaded the *aldeia* during the 2006 crisis – and which have contributed to the disruption of social order before and after – is also a reminder that the population of Metin IV is still suffering from the consequences of its past; the inability of state institutions, however, to efficiently deal with the situation – through dialogue and by addressing socio-economic problems – only serves to remind the *aldeia*'s inhabitants that the collective memory they hold of authority is somewhat different from the national framework being promoted.

The analysis of substantive and formal citizenship in Metin IV demonstrated that, in contrast with Liriu, the vast majority of the population does not have access to quality education. Indeed, the lack of adequate infrastructure for the school, compounded with the fact that it often closes as a result of episodes of violence in the area, result in poor teaching conditions that are unlikely to attract quality teachers. Consequently, the majority of the population in the *aldeia* does not speak Portuguese, and remains therefore unable to access the country's **cultural** life through "technical medi[a] of information or communication […] language or specific institutions" (UN, 2009; p.4).

Finally, the combination of geographical isolation, poor road infrastructure and lack of access to public transportation contribute to making Metin IV one of the most isolated *aldeias* East of the Comoro river. Discussions with participants have highlighted that this is not only an objective characteristic of the *aldeia*, but it is also the way in which they themselves represent their spaces of interaction. Indeed, as indicated in section 7.3.3, for a large share of the population that does not engage in economic activities and/or does not have access to education outside the area, interaction with other *aldeias* and across Dili's urban space, is an occasional occurrence, largely limiting therefore their spaces of interaction to the **territory** of Metin IV.

As a result, for a large share of Metin IV's population, the significant challenges they face in terms of access to opportunities, both in their *aldeia* and in the country

in general, reflects an image of the state that remains strongly disconnected from the reality of people at the local scale. Furthermore, widespread awareness in the *aldeia* that there are state funds available for development, but that those funds are not being disbursed to provide them with the support they need to improve social justice in the *aldeia*, combined with people's inability to contribute politically, socially and economically to the country, triggers the feeling of being cut out from the Timorese political community. Thus, **psychologically**, Metin IV's inhabitants are constructing a representation of a state that does not reflect their needs and expectations in a binding social contract, resulting instead in a local polity that is constructed around a strongly bonded social capital at *aldeia* level.

CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSIONS: THE IMPACT OF STATE BUILDING ON POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN URBAN SPACES

"Belongings are not important, but belonging is"

(Anonymous refugee, London 2014)

8. Conclusions – the impact of state building on political community in urban spaces

This research set out to understand the impact of exogenous state building processes on political community construction in post-conflict countries. It argued that, within the ideal-type state of the liberal peace at the heart of state building, the state and its political community are inherently intertwined through the notions of territory, sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship, and sought to demonstrate that international state building's ahistorical and decontextualised approach can significantly damage this relationship, thus compromising both state building and the construction of a political community.

To explore these dynamics, the research set out to understand the relationship between state building and political community in the context of post-conflict urban spaces. It argued that, in an increasingly globalised world, where demands to meet international market standards and growth expectations weight heavily on countries recovering from conflicts, the role of cities as engines of economic growth and competitiveness has propelled them at the centre-stage of post-conflict international attention and state-wide development. The inequalities resulting from the largely (neo)liberal approach to development applied to these cities, however, converge with widely different spaces of urban history and development to further entrench society's cleavages, thus shaping new spaces of interaction and scales of belonging that may run counter to the image being promoted by political elites. Situating the research within post-conflict urban spaces, therefore, provided the opportunity to draw the link between state building decision-making at state level and local level processes of polity construction; it favours the analysis of the impact of the construction of virtual spaces and scales of local polity on the actualisation of state's legitimacy, sovereignty and territory.

This concluding chapter consequently seeks to provide a closing discussion based on the literature review, analytical framework and findings presented in this research. The first part uses the fieldwork findings to answer the three main research questions identified in order to analyse the dynamics outlined above, that is: how do international state building practices affect the nature of post-conflict state institutions? How do the policies emanating from these institutions affect the core functions of the state? How does the relationship between the urban environment emerging from state policies and social cohesion affect the spaces

and scales of socially constructed polities? The second part highlights the importance of these findings for the disciplines of international relations, political science and urban development. It does so by outlining the advantages and limitations of the analytical framework and, on this basis, provides a selection of recommendations for further research that could contribute to strengthening the relevance and importance of this research in the context of international state building processes.

8.1. From state building to political community – answering the research questions in Dili, Timor Leste

8.1.1. Research question one

The first research question aimed at understanding, through an exploration of state building decision-making processes, how international state building affects the nature of post-conflict state institutions. The literature review carried out for the purpose of this research draws attention to the fact that in the past 70 years international post-conflict assistance has veered from merely providing conditional financial assistance for the reconstruction of conflict-affected countries to a much more interventionist approach concerned with the nature of post-conflict state institutions. Throughout this shift, international assistance has attempted to maintain a neutral, apolitical and ahistorical attitude toward its task, premised on the assumption that the implementation of liberal peace, and the democratic process within, would bring about the societal changes necessary for the development of peaceful relations. However, this research argues, such attitude remains blind to the fact that any intervention aimed at developing state institutions is inherently tied to political and historical dynamics and, as such, is bound to have profound effects on the scale of the polities the state is meant to control and organise, that is the construction of a political community across the whole territory.

In this context, the fieldwork carried out in Timor Leste aimed at understanding how UNTAET apprehended the state building process between 1999 and 2002. Using the notions of territory, sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship which underpin the relationship between state building and political community, it explored who was involved in the process, how, and to what extent the historical and political dynamics, that had come to characterise the country upon independence in 1999, were taken into account. The findings revealed that, caught

between the imperative to govern Timor Leste in the short-term and the long-term objective to lay the foundations for democratic self-government, UNTAET took a series of steps that have severely affected the nature of state institutions. Firstly, the very short timetable dictating the Timorese state building process during the transitional administration not only prevented decision-makers from adequately understanding the consequences of the Portuguese colonial administration and Indonesian military rule on Timorese society; it also precluded adequate and thorough consultation of the Timorese population.

Secondly, still cognisant of the very short time available for the task ahead and focused on protecting the neutrality of the process, UNTAET decision-makers declined to engage in the politics characterising Timor Leste's history, thus failing to fully comprehend the deep-seated rivalries that strongly opposed a number of political leaders. As a result, the institutions and Constitution that emerged from the process bore very little resemblance with the way in which Timorese society had organised thus far, and reflected little of the expectations and dreams of the population. On the contrary, they reflected a vision pertaining essentially to the Timorese political elite – itself badly communicated to the public, such as decisions regarding national languages – inadvertently institutionalising deep-seated rivalries in the process.

8.1.2. Research question two

The second research question sought to draw a link between the way in which state building processes shaped state institutions, on the basis of the previous findings, and the impact of those dynamics on the core functions of the state. In the section of the literature review that outlines the main impacts of state building on the construction of political community it was argued that state legitimacy in the framework of international state building interventions is expected to derive from two processes. Firstly, since existing forms of authority are assumed to be inherently dysfunctional for having failed to prevent the country to descend into conflict, new states are approached as a *terra nulli* where new institutions are to be built in order to carry out the core functions of the state that will ensure administrative capability and, as such, democracy[91] (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005; p.6). Secondly, once these institutions are set-up to carry out

[91] Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence; administrative control; management of public finance; investment in human capital; delineation of citizenship rights and duties; provision of infrastructure services; formation of the market; management of state's assets; international relations; and, rule of law.

their functions, national elections are held so that the population can choose their leaders. This approach to state building, this research maintains, has negative consequences on legitimacy as it is understood in the framework of the ideal-type liberal democratic state these interventions are modelled on; that is, failure to integrate existing forms of authority can easily result into the population's lack of recognition of state's authority, whilst the institutionalisation of political differences can result in the development of a political elite which legitimacy hardly reaches beyond electoral processes.

In the context of Timor Leste, the fieldwork revealed that the state building process had particular impacts on four of the ten core functions of the state. The governance arrangements designed for the administrative control of the territory are a direct result of the state building decision-making processes. On the one hand, the distribution of power at state level is a direct reflection of FRETILIN's political interests at the time the Constitution was drafted: executive and legislative powers rest with the Prime Minister and its national parliament – at the time expected to be FRETILIN – whilst the function of President of the Republic retains essentially a public figure role with a right to veto – a reflection of FRETILIN leaders' desire to sideline Xanana Gusmão without incurring the wrath of the population for whom he represented a hero. The result has been a state decision-making system that is constantly stalled by political skirmishes amongst its elite. On the other hand, the organisation of local level governance reflects the distribution of authoritative power prior to 1999, without however retaining its original legitimacy and with no link to the state decision-making structures.

The same issues were noted in relation to the organisation of the legitimate monopoly on the means of violence. The political divisions that characterise Timorese political elite were reproduced in the division of the security sector into a military and a police force, and further aggravated by the exclusion of the primarily concerned group – the veterans – in the decision making process, thus laying the foundations for the political crisis of 2006. Furthermore, failure to integrate pre-existing customary systems of organisation and social control has resulted in the development of a security sector that remains alien to the population's understanding of conflict mediation, resolution and justice. As such, the majority of the population continues to rely on these customary sources of authority rather than relying on a security system they do not trust or understand.

Finally, the external influence that continued to affect the management of public finances from 2002 to 2012 resulted in a primarily (neo)liberal approach to investment, which has continuously prioritised policies aimed at attracting international capital investment over crucially needed investment in human capital. This has been an issue particularly in relation to education and training, as a large majority of the population remains unable, to this day, to speak Portuguese, the pre-requisite language to access one of the main sources of formal employment – the state – and to participate in the political life of the country.

8.1.3. Research question three

The third research question set out to explore how the policies, resulting from the processes identified in the two previous spheres, interact within contrasting historical and development urban contexts to produce different spaces of interaction and, consequently, shape different processes of local polity construction. The analytical framework developed for the purpose of this research served as a tool to carry out the fieldwork in the two selected *aldeias* of Dili – Liriu and Metin IV. The use of the four domains of social cohesion provided the analytical structure necessary to identify how state policies contributed to shaping widely different urban fabrics that either enabled or hindered people's access to political, social and economic opportunities. The development of different types of substantive and formal citizenship within these urban fabrics, therefore, produces distinct spaces and scales of polity construction. Indeed, the literature review for this research argues that for local polities to scale up from the local to the urban and state level, the spaces and scales at which people interact need to transcend the local. This does not necessarily entail physical travel across the territory of the state; rather it emphasises the role of state institutions in building representations, in people's minds, of a territory where local rhythms are often coordinated and synchronised with other rhythms across the territory, local customs are incorporated into the wider cultural mosaic, and state institutions penetrate local worlds (Edensor, 2006; p.537), so that the population can feel that they are participating in the political, historical, economic and cultural life of the state project.

The analysis of social cohesion in Liriu shows that the influence of the exogenous state building process on state institutions and policies is not having a negative effect on the spaces and scales of polity construction. Instead, a combination of

active local leaders and favourable urban fabric has facilitated the population's identification with the historical, cultural and political images of the state project. The ability to participate economically and socially allows Liriu's population to feel as citizens taking part in activities alongside other people they have never met, whilst their ability to participate, albeit somewhat still restrictively, to decision-making makes them feel part of the Timorese political community, contributing to giving legitimacy to the state and recognising the authority of its institutions, both at local and at national level.

In contrast to Liriu, Metin IV displays spaces and scales of social cohesion that are essentially limited to the *aldeia*. The historical, cultural and political points of reference of the *aldeia*'s population find very little counterpoints in the Timorese political community as it is being represented by political elites; the inability to speak Portuguese, compounded with a violent history since independence that has been criminalised rather than addressed by the state, contribute to building representations of a state that bears little connection with people's daily realities. Consequently, the analysis of substantive and formal citizenship has demonstrated that the policies and actions emanating from the state institutions, and resulting from the state building process, are essentially inadequate for Metin IV's population, resulting in spaces of social injustice; conversely, the important role of the local leaders as providers for their population is affording them the legitimacy and authority that the *aldeia*'s population is not granting to the state, leading to a strong local polity.

Dili, therefore, is not cohering into an urban space where state institutions are successfully including the majority of the population by affording them access to the opportunities that would facilitate them exercising their rights. Diverging representations of history, culture and belonging, as well as differing urban fabrics contributing to reproducing isolation or inclusion, are combining to produce fragmented senses of citizenship and belonging to polities that result in uneven representations of state legitimacy and sovereignty at varying scales within different spaces. Given the importance of Dili in the context of Timor Leste as a centre of growth, administration and development, the fact that the state is currently unable to establish its legitimacy and sovereignty through a unified sense of citizenship across one urban space can potentially be significantly damaging for the sustainability of the state in the long term.

The crisis that brought the country to its knees in 2006 is but one clear example of the power of divisive discourse in a highly unequal society. The way in which events that started within Dili's urban space have quickly escalated into a nation-wide attack against state institutions, and what they represented to people, shows that exogenous state building's inability to account for historical differences and customary practices in its project can have significant consequences on society's cleavages. Perhaps even more striking is how the analysis of social cohesion in two distinctively different urban spaces has revealed the extent of the impact of state building decision-making on the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state ten years after the celebration of an independence that had brought the entire country together against one enemy. Kearns and Forrest (2000; p.1001) noted that "one place's cohesion may be society's deconstruction"; this analysis has revealed that currently the differences in the spaces and scales of social cohesion that characterise Liriu and Metin IV may become just that, Timorese political community's deconstruction.

8.2. Implications for international state building and urban post-conflict reconstruction

The rationale for the development of this research lay in the gap, identified by the author, in the literature pertaining to two distinct fields that share, however, an interest for the reconstruction of peaceful and cohesive societies in the aftermath of conflict, namely: international relations and urbanism. In chapter four, it was argued that despite this common interest, the two fields did not appear to reconcile on a common ground: the field of international relations remains locked within a polarised state/local worldview that defines the state in realist terms, characterised by security of international state boundaries, and detached from societal processes; conversely, the realm of urbanism has produced a wealth of research in relation to the role of cities in shaping divided/cohesive societies, but it has thus far lacked the connection with the national and international processes contributing to building the institutions that will then produce the institutional framework within which urban spaces are shaped.

This research comes in as an attempt to bridge the two fields, maintaining that the way in which international state building processes are currently being designed and carried out bears important consequences for the processes of polity construction that shape the development of a political community. These

consequences can in turn severely undermine the capacity of the new states to sustainably govern the population within their territory. As such, in order to analyse the relationship between the local, urban and state-wide dynamics underpinning these processes, an analytical framework has been developed as a tool to investigate the effects of international state building processes on the development of citizenship within post-conflict urban spaces. Its aim is twofold.

Firstly, it places the ideal-type state, used to frame international state building processes, back in its historical context where the mutually constitutive relationship between states and their political community is restored to its central position. It does so by establishing the notions of territory, sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship as the parameters around which this relationship is articulated. Secondly, it introduces social cohesion as an analytical tool to understand the impact of state building decisions on the social construction of polities in different urban spaces. This facilitates an understanding of how indigenous structures and societal processes (Lemay-Hebert, 2011; Richmond, 2014) are used by the population to cope with the internationally shaped state institutions, creating hybrid forms of governance (Richmond, 2014) that create “complex relationships between the state and the nonstate” (Fregonese, 2012; p.2). Figure 19 below shows the analytical framework of the research, which was then used to analyse the fieldwork findings – see APPENDIX X for the detailed introduction of the findings in the framework.

Figure 19 – Analytical framework of the research



The analysis of the findings showed that, in the context of Timor Leste, the analytical framework highlighted three important elements. Firstly, it confirmed that the *terra nulli* approach, taken by the international community in carrying out state building processes, has significant implications for the urban environment. When interacting in contexts charged with diverging histories of violence, development and cohesion, the policies emanating from the new state institutions actually contribute to further entrenching differences in social justice. Secondly, the analysis of social cohesion in the two *aldeia* has revealed that these differences shape the way in which citizens interact with each other and their state. In the absence of a system of government they can relate to, citizens adapt by re-appropriating new institutional arrangements through customary means. The role of local leaders, in the context of Timor Leste, was clearly evidenced in their ability to bond and/or bridge social capital and, consequently, to develop a local polity in opposition with, or connected to, the Timorese political community. Thirdly, comparing the findings on social cohesion with the five elements characterising the political community, the framework has highlighted how the spatial scales emerging from the state/urban/local interaction affect place attachment and identity.

Consequently, as highlighted in Figure 20 below, the analytical framework developed in this research has successfully brought to the fore the interconnectedness of the state/urban/local dynamics emerging from the state building process, and their effect on the construction of political community.

Figure 20 – Highlighting the national/urban/local interconnectedness



Source: elaborated by the author

Within the field of international relations, therefore, the framework has brought the political community back into the state. Likewise, for the field of urbanism, the framework has highlighted the dynamics and processes that affect all the decisions made at urban planning level. There are however four areas of further research that could contribute to strengthen the analytical framework in bridging the gap between the fields:

- The role of urban space has been put forward in this research as an interesting site for analysing the dynamics at stake. The findings have also highlighted the importance of local leaders in these dynamics. Further discussions, at a recent conference, with interviewees 34 and 35 have brought to the fore, however, that local leaders have very different sources of legitimacy in urban and rural contexts: whilst the former is more akin to Western state's legitimacy – based on state impacts and outputs – the latter continue to retain a customary form of leadership. Further research should therefore look at comparing these tensions

between urban/rural, Western/customary, in order to reinforce the role of urban space as a site for exploring potential issues that may spread across the wider territory if no action is taken.

- The research has demonstrated that the way in which state building was carried out in Timor Leste resulted, in certain areas such as Metin IV, in more local forms of polity that do not fit within the Timorese political community. This tension between the Timorese political community and the local polities, and the impact it has on the development of the country, has been increasingly recognised by international institutions in the past years (OECD, 2010; UNDP, 2012; World Bank, 2011). Further research could use social cohesion and social capital, as they have been inserted in the analytical framework of this research, to prove that local polities can bring about development in their own space, but if this potential is extended through a more formal inclusion of the communities in the political community then development within an urban area is likely to bring about more economic and social development, and consequently more growth.

- There has been no room in the context of this research to tackle more in depth issues such as corruption. Nevertheless, a number of interviewees, both at community and national level, have mentioned that this is likely to play an important role in the ability of local leaders to bridge social capital. Since corruption is an oft-cited issue in post-conflict states, the analytical framework would be a useful tool to further explore the impact of state building decisions on the construction of a polity at urban level.

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APPENDIX I – POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

Political – right to procedural fairness (Claiming Human Rights, 2011)

Economic – right to work[92] (Amnesty International, 2014)

Social – right to adequate housing, food and water (ibid)

Cultural rights - right to learn about forms of expression and dissemination through any technical medium of information or communication, to follow a way of life associated with the use of […] language or specific institutions, and to benefit from the cultural heritage and the creation of other individuals and communities (UN, 2009; p.4).

[92] Particularly just and fair conditions of employment, protection against forced or compulsory labour and the right to form and join trade unions (Amnesty International, 2014)

APPENDIX II – DEFINITIONS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE LITERATURE

Source: Adler & Kwon (2002), p.20

External versus internal	Authors	Definitions of social capital
External	Baker	"A resource that actors derive from specific social structures and then use to pursue their interests; it is created by changes in the relationship among actors" (1990; p.619)
	Belliveau, O'Reilly & Wade	"An individual's personal network and elite institutional affiliations" (1996; p.1572)
	Bourdieu	"The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalise relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition" (1985; p.248) "Made up of social obligations ("connections"), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the form of a title of nobility" (1985; p.243)
	Bourdieu & Wacquant	"The sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition" (1992; p.119)
	Boxman, De Graaf & Flap	"The number of people who can be expected to provide support and the resources those people have at their disposal" (1991; p.52)
	Burt	"Friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use your financial and human capital" (1992; p.9)
	Knoke	"The process by which social actors create and mobilise their network connections within and between organisations to gain access to other social actors' resources" (1999; p.18)
	Portes	"The ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures" (1998; p.6)
Internal	Brehm & Rahn	"The web of cooperative relationships between citizens that facilitate resolution of collective action problems" (1997; p.999)

External versus internal	Authors	Definitions of social capital
	Coleman	"Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure" (1990; p.302)
	Fukuyama	"The ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organisations" (1995; p.10) "Social capital can be defined simply as the existence of a certain set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permit cooperation among them" (1997)
	Inglehart	"A culture of trust and tolerance, in which extensive networks of voluntary associations emerge" (1997; p.188)
	Portes & Sensenbrenner	"Those expectations for action within a collectivity that affect the economic goals and goal-seeking behaviour of its members, even if these expectations are not oriented toward the economic sphere" (1993; p.1323)
	Putnam	"Features of social organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (1995; p.67)
	Thomas	"Those voluntary means and processes developed within civil society which promote development for the collective whole" (1996; p.11)
Both	Loury	"Naturally occurring social relationships among persons which promote or assist the acquisition of skills and traits valued in the marketplace… an asset which may be as significant as financial bequests in accounting for the maintenance of inequality in our society" (1992; p.100)
	Nahapiet & Ghoshal	"The sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit. Social capital thus comprises both the network and the assets that may be mobilised through that network" (1998; p.243)
	Pennar	"The web of social relationships that influences individual

External versus internal	Authors	Definitions of social capital
		behaviour and thereby affects economic growth" (1997; p.154)
	Schiff	"The set of elements of the social structure that affects relations among people and are inputs or arguments of the production and/or utility function" (1992; p.160)
	Woolcock	"The information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in one's social networks" (1998; p.153)

APPENDIX III – PRBANISATION RATES IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES

Source: Kilroy (2007), p.2

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APPENDIX IV – LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AT NATIONAL AND RESEARCH AREA LEVEL

National level		
Interviewee reference number	**Organisation**	**Interview Date**
1	UNDP	15/05/2012
2	UNDP	15/05/2012
3	Asia Foundation	18/05/2012 & 14/03/2013
4	Asia Foundation	25/05/2012
5	Asia Foundation	18/05/2012
6	Timorese Freelance consultant/grassroot activist	20/05/12 & 05/02/2013
7	National Parliament/UNPAZ	24/05/12 & 12/11/2012
8	Lao Hamutuk	28/05/2012 & 15/03/2013
9	UNMIT	18/10/2012
10	UNMIT	25/10/2012
11	UNMIT	08/10/2012
12	Timorese Freelance consultant	18/10/2012
13	Presidential advisor	26/10/2012
14	Researcher at IRASEC	19/10/2012
15	BELUN	06/10/2012
16	Ministry of Culture	20/11/2012
17	Ministry of Culture	05/11/2012
18	Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva	18/12/2012
19	Catholic Relief Services	29/11/2012
20	(ex) Catholic Relief Services	21/01/2013
21	Community Housing Ltd	24/01/2013
22	CEPAD	30/01/2013
23	Presidential adviser (researcher)	19/02/2013
24	Director of CEPAD	12/02/2013 & 15/07/2013
25	Lecturer at UNTL (department of political science)	01/03/2013
26	World Bank, Country Representative	11/03/2013
27	Parliamentarian	11/03/2013
28	AusAid (governance)	12/03/2013
29	Ministry of public works, housing and urban planning department	20/03/2013
30	World Bank, Social Protection	20/03/2013
31	ILO, Youth employment and community empowerment	03/04/2013
32	Lecturer at Monash University, Australia	15/04/2013

33	Chief of staff, Presidential Adviser Office	15/04/2013
34	Associate professor in politics and public policy & Chair of department	16/04/2013
35	Director Globalism Research Centre	17/12/2013
36	Ministry of Education, Timor Leste	25/05/2014
Research area level		
Liriu (Motael)		
37	Xefi Aldeia	February 2013
38	Youth leader	February 2013
39	Employed, government (28, male)	March 2013
40	Employed, government (28, male)	March 2013
41	Employed, government (29, female)	March 2013
42	Employed, selling food (45, female)	March 2013
43	Employed, private sector (53, male)	April 2013
44	Employed, private sector (46, male)	March 2013
45	Unemployed (38, female)	March 2013
46	Unemployed (36, female)	March 2013
47	Unemployed (55, female), owns land	April 2013
48	Elderly, unemployed (82, female)	March 2013
49	Elderly, unemployed (65, male)	March 2013
50	Youth (21, male), unemployed	March 2013
51	Youth (32, male), employed security	March 2013
52	Youth (25, male), university	March 2013
Bebonuk (Comoro)		
53	Xefi Aldeia	March 2013
54	De facto community leader	March 2013
55	Employed, INGO (45, male)	March 2013
56	Elderly, farmer (68, male)	April 2013
57	Employed, government (35, male)	April 2013
58	Employed, NGO (29, male)	April 2013
59	Employed, private (29, male)	April 2013
60	Employed, government (45, male)	April 2013
61	Employed, government (39, male)	April 2013
62	Employed, government & NGO (35, male)	April 2013
63	Employed, INGO (32, male)	April 2013
64	Employed, private (34, male)	April 2013
65	Employed, government (61, male)	April 2013
66	Employed, private (48, woman)	April 2013
67	Unemployed, volunteer (34, female)	April 2013
68	Unemployed (23, female)	April 2013
69	Unemployed (29, female)	April 2013
70	Unemployed (32, woman)	April 2013

71	Unemployed (41, woman)	April 2013
72	Youth (18, male)	April 2013
73	Youth (21, male), university (+ 3 other female same age)	April 2013
74	Youth (19, female), high school	April 2013

APPENDIX V – SURVEY GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH AREA INTERVIEWS

(1)Participant's basic information:

a. Age?

b. District of origin?

c. How long have they lived in the area?

d. Why did they move to the area?

e. Where does their family come from?

(2)Educational background:

a. Did they go to school?

b. What level of education did they achieve?

(3)Employment information:

a. Are they employed?

b. If so where?

c. If not, why not?

d. If not, have they tried to look for opportunities, programmes, etc which facilitate access to employment? Are they aware of any such programme?

(4)Participation in community activities:

a. Are there many activities organised in the community (e.g. sport events, etc)?

b. Do they take part in those activities? Why (not)?

(5)Participation in community meetings:

a. Are they informed of all the community meetings taking place in their area?

b. If so, do they participate? Do they feel like they are being heard?

c. If not, why not? Do they do anything to find out if there is anything going on?

(6)Perception of the violence in their area:

a. Is there a lot of violence?

b. If so, why? Who is responsible?

c. If not, why not?

d. Do they feel like the government is trying to solve the problems related to the violence? Or do they feel this is being dealt with at the local level?

(7)Main issues in the area:

a. What are the main issues in their area?

b. Have they complained about those issues and if so, to whom?

c. Do they feel like their complaint was heard by their local leaders?

d. Do they feel like the government is trying to solve the issue if it is beyond the scope of a local leader's mandate?

e. Do they discuss those issues with their neighbours?

(8) Evolution of their area:

a. Have they witnessed many changes in the area since they have moved in/for as long as they have lived there?

b. Do they know the history of the area?

(9)Movement across Dili:

a. Do they often travel outside of their area?

b. If so, what is their mean of transportation? Where do they go?

c. If not, why not?

d. Do they participate in activities in other areas of the city?

(10) Involvement in urban-wide, national issues?

a. Do they follow what is going on in Dili and in the country?

b. If so, do they discuss these issues with their neighbours, friends and/or family?

(11) Perception of the government:

a. How do they perceive the governments since independence? i.e. have they tried to improve the situation of everyone in the country, have they worked toward peace, have they worked to create a sense of togetherness, of nation.

b. What do they think is the most important issue to solve at the moment in Timor Leste to ensure peace and for the future generations?

APPENDIX VI – MAIN MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN TIMOR LESTE

Type of organisation	Name of organisation/mission
Multilateral	UN missions: UNMISET (UN Mission in Support of East Timor) – May 2002 to May 2005 UNOTIL (UN Office in Timor Leste) – May 2005 to August 2006 UNMIT (UN Integrated Mission in Timor Leste) – August 2006 to December 2012 UN agencies: Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) UN Childrens Fund (UNICEF) UN Development Programme (UNDP) UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
	World Bank (WB)
	International Monetary Fund (IMF)
	Asian Development Bank (ADB)
	International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)
	International Labour Organisation (ILO)
	International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
	World Health Organisation (WHO)
Bilateral	Australian Aid (AusAid)
	Japan International Organisation Agency (JICA)
	German Cooperation (GTZ)
	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

N.B. This table only represents the main international organisations that have been significantly involved in Timor Leste and are still present in the country to this day[93].

[93] For a comprehensive account of all the international and national organizations active in Timor Leste, please refer to: http://www.easttimorgovernment.com/usefullinks.htm

APPENDIX VII – CHRONOLOGY OF THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN F-FDTL AND PNTL IN 2006

Source: UN 2006 in Scambary (2009), p.272

Date	Event
16 March	Dismissal of 594 soldiers from F-FDTL for desertion
24 April	Group of sacked soldiers who became known as the Petitioners and their supporters stage demonstrations outside Parliament
28 April	Demonstration turns into riot and two people are killed
3 May	Major Alfredo Reinado (popularly known as Alfredo) abandons the F-FDTL Military Police, taking with him other military police officers, PNTL officers and weapons
23 May	Five killed in armed confrontation between F-FDTL and Major Alfredo
24 May	Attack on residence of F-FDTL Commander Brigadier General Ruak by 10 PNTL officers led by PNTL Deputy Commander Abilio Mesquita, (also a PSHT warga or master) and MP Leandro Isaac. One person was killed and two injured
24–25 May	Nine people killed when the Petitioners and group led by ex-F-FDTL member Vicente de Conceicao aka Railos attacks F-FDTL base in Tasi Tolu
25 May	Nine PNTL members killed in confrontation between F-FDTL and PNTL at the PNTL Dili headquarters; PNTL largely disintegrates as a force in Dili

APPENDIX VIII – MAJOR FEATURES OF THE CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES

Source: Elaborated by the author on the basis of World Bank, 2013; p.27

Name	Target population	Benefit amount	Coverage	Conditionality	Implementing agency
Elderly	Elderly (60+)	US$30/month, paid in a lump sum once per year	84,569 (2012)	None	National Directorate of Social Security (MSS)
Disabled	18+ with severe disabilities (Class III or IV per WHO)	US$30/month, paid in a lump sum once per year	5,558 (2012)	None	National Directorate of Social Security (MSS)
Bolsa da Mãe	School-going children who are orphans, living in single-parent households or in large families	Primary students: US$40/year; Pre-Secondary and Secondary: US$80/year; University (domestic/ international): US$160/240 per year, paid once per year	15,150 (2012)	School attendance, proven through submission of report card and letter from school headmaster	National Directorate for Social Reinsertion (MSS)

APPENDIX IX – EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION POLICIES BETWEEN 1999 AND 2012

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2" rowspan="3">Compulsory school grades</th><th colspan="2">1999 - 2004</th><th colspan="2">2004 – 2006/7</th><th colspan="2">2006/7</th><th colspan="2">2008 - 2012</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Phasing out Bahasa: Focusing on PT</td><td colspan="2">Transitional model: allowing Tetun & introducing PT</td><td colspan="2">Build national unity: PT & Tetun as language of instruction</td><td colspan="2">Tetun in primary school and PT in secondary school</td></tr>
<tr><th>PT</th><th>T</th><th>PT</th><th>T</th><th>PT</th><th>T</th><th>PT</th><th>T</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="6">Primary school</td><td>Grade 1</td><td rowspan="6">LOI + TS four hours per week</td><td rowspan="6">Not to be used in the classroom</td><td>TS three hours per week</td><td>TS five hours per week</td><td>30% TS + LOI</td><td>70% TS + OE</td><td rowspan="2">N.T</td><td rowspan="2">Priority TS (3-4 periods/week)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Grade 2</td><td rowspan="2">Incrementally reverse hours, but no mention of LOI</td><td></td><td>50% TS + LOI</td><td>50% TS + OE</td></tr>
<tr><td>Grade 3</td><td></td><td>70% TS + LOI</td><td>30% TS + OE</td><td rowspan="2">N.T</td><td rowspan="2">Priority TS (3-4 periods/week)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Grade 4</td><td rowspan="3">TS six hours per week</td><td rowspan="3">TS two hours per week</td><td rowspan="3">LOI + only written language</td><td rowspan="3">OE only</td></tr>
<tr><td>Grade 5</td><td rowspan="2">Incrementally reverse priority TS</td></tr>
<tr><td>Grade 6</td><td>Priority TS (5 periods/week)</td><td>N.T</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Secondary school (compulsory since 2008)</td><td>Grade 7</td><td rowspan="3">N.I.</td><td rowspan="3">N.I.</td><td rowspan="3">N.I.</td><td rowspan="3">N.I.</td><td rowspan="3">N.I.</td><td rowspan="3">N.I.</td><td rowspan="3">Priority TS (5 periods/week)</td><td rowspan="3">N.T</td></tr>
<tr><td>Grade 8</td></tr>
<tr><td>Grade 9</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="10">Notes: PT = Portuguese; T = Tetun; LOI = Language of Instruction; TS = Taught Subject; N.I. = No Information; OE = Oral Explanation; N.T = Not Taught</td></tr>
</table>

Source: elaborated by author on the basis of Taylor-Leech, 2013; pp.115-118

APPENDIX X – UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF STATE BUILDING ON SUBSTANTIVE AND FORMAL CITIZENSHIP IN LIRIU AND METIN IV

Figure 21 – Impact of administrative control issues on formal and substantive citizenship in two *aldeias*



Source: Elaborated by the author

Figure 22 - Impact of monopoly over the means of violence issues on formal and substantive citizenship in two *aldeias*



Source: Elaborated by the author

Figure 23 - Impact of management of public finance issues on formal and substantive citizenship in two *aldeias*



Source: Elaborated by the author

Figure 24 – Impact of investment in human capital issues on formal and substantive citizenship in two *aldeias*



Source: Elaborated by the author